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This thesis conducts a constructivist analysis of Thatcherite policy in order to 
determine the role played by material economic interests in the formation of British 
foreign policy towards the member States of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). In 
accordance with constructivist principles Thatcherism is viewed ideationally as a 
belief system based upon notions of economics and interests and the hypothesis states 
that this created a framework for approaching foreign policy, and that the nature of 
British foreign policy towards the GCC States during the Thatcher era was 
constructed by the positivist discourse of economic interests. In order to test the 
hypothesis, and drawing on extensive primary sources, the analysis of Thatcherite 
discourse is based upon two overarching perspectives, the British Government's 
perceptions of the economic importance of the GCC States, concentrating on oil and 
Britain's exports to the region, and the Government's response to the perceived threats 
to its economic interests, examining the consequences of the Iranian Revolution, die 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait The 
thesis therefore takes as its basis the constructivist principle that both ideational and 
material structures have a role to play in influencing foreign policy.
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Chapter 1: Methodology, Literature survey and Establishing Parameters
Introduction
This thesis aims to use the constructivist approach to determine the extent to which 
material economic interests in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) States were 
perceived by decision makers as shaping British foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region 
during the period 1979-1991.1 The key events which mark the beginning of the analytical 
period are the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the election of 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of Great Britain, all of which occurred in 1979. 
Similarly the end of the period is denoted by the British involvement in the Gulf Crisis 
following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The general period of the thesis is 
that of the “Thatcher era”, however, for the sake of completeness the analysis continues 
up to the point when Iraq is forcibly removed from Kuwait.
At present there is no definitive analysis of the Thatcher Administration’s (1979- 
1990) record in the Persian Gulf. Most studies of relevance are US orientated, and fail to 
recognise the role played by Britain in the region’s dynamics during this period.2 Studies 
conducted in Britain further demonstrate that there is a serious lack of literature in tins 
field. Even Sir Richard Scott’s report on the ‘arms to Iraq’ affair is quantitatively 
different from the central aims of this thesis, as his detailed investigation, which centred 
on Whitehall oversight and cover-up, falls short of analysing the British Government’s 
foreign policy objectives in the Persian Gulf.3 Likewise, Davina Miller’s Export or Die is 
concerned mainly with the internal dynamics of the Thatcher Government’s attempts to 
export defence equipment to both Iran and Iraq.4 Although the question of defence 
exports is a central issue in this thesis, it is placed within the wider context of British 
foreign policy objectives in the GCC States. This study is different from any prior 
analysis, as there are no other relevant studies whose central aims are an analysis of the 
Thatcher Government’s foreign policy objectives in the GCC States, particularly not in 
terms of assessing the discourse.
The thesis adopts Social Constructivism as its theoretical approach because it 
highlights the importance of ideas and discourse in shaping policy. An analysis of the
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discourse of the Thatcher era reveals an emphasis on the importance of economic 
interests as influencing the formation of UK policy towards the GCC States. Thatcherite 
discourse was constituted by economic emphasis and imagery and, as a consequence, 
structured ideas about the formation of British policy in the Gulf. This thesis, therefore, 
focuses specifically on Thatcherite discourse and draws on it to reach its conclusions. The 
discourse is identified in the research material, which includes statements by leading 
politicians, information gained through interviews with specific officials and a reading of 
other key primary documents such as the House of Commons Official Record (Hansard ), 
numerous relevant Select Committee Reports and other secondary and primary sources. 
In order to explain the importance of discourse and ideas in creating impressions it is 
necessary to provide theoretical justification that not only endorses the economic 




In this initial chapter, a general survey of IR theory will be conducted in order to 
establish a firm theoretical basis for the use of discourse, language and ideas in creating 
perceptions of policy. This section highlights the limitations of the leading rationalist 
theories in successfully explaining the connections between language, discourse and any 
understanding of policy, and adopts constructivism as the theoretical basis of the thesis. 
In highlighting the central arguments at the heart of the constructivist project it 
demonstrates that there are elements of this approach that allow analyses to go beyond 
meta-theoretic discussion in the post-positivist era to conducting case study enquiry. It 
further shows that discourse and ideas are socially constructed elements that in turn 
encourage the formation of identities which subsequently influence foreign policy. For 
constructivists, the discourse and ideas prevalent in a particular era must be responsible 
for the formation of perceptions of policy. This section ends with a statement of the 
hypothesis put forward as a basis for the thesis.
1 he relevance of Thatcherism is analysed in the next section in the context of the 
ideational construct of decline in British economic and global power. However,
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Thatcherism propounded a vision of a profoundly challenging external environment, 
arising from the new problems which were emerging in the 1980s, leading inexorably to 
Britain having to reconsider its foreign policy options and ultimately begin playing a 
more prominent world-wide role, not least in the Persian Gulf.
Chapter 1 ’s third section begins by setting parameters around the Persian Gulf, 
narrowing the region to Britain’s relations with the GCC States. Britain’s preoccupation 
with these States is analysed in light of its perceived economic interests in the region, and 
the factors which dominate the discourse, namely oil, markets and finance. The section 
then examines the nature of the constructed threats to the region, and Britain’s response 
to them. These are sub-divided into internal and external threats. Threats perceived from 
the revolutionary regime in Iran and conflict within the region is seen as internal, while 
external focus on the perceived Soviet encroachment into the Persian Gulf and its 
encirclement of the area.
The fourth section will provide a brief introduction to the British response to the 
above threats, and the fifth section will give an account of the sources approached and 
used to complete the case study, emphasising discourse. Finally, the conclusion to this 
chapter will combine the various elements and examine the connection between them.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 analyses British foreign policy towards the GCC States during the years 1979- 
1988, a timeframe which encompasses crucial events, from the election of Mrs. Thatcher 
in 1979, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the subsequent onset of the Iran/Iraq war in 
1980, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) to the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 1988 and the formal ceasefire in the Iran/Iraq war.
Government discourse increasingly emphasised rising export levels to alleviate 
some of the economic problems of the day, particularly in the manufacturing sectors. The 
defence industry was seen as one area which had largely remained insulated from the 
problems affecting manufacturing industry as a whole. The strong stance on defence, 
therefore, included an active policy on encouraging the export of defence equipment to 
the GCC States which were once again seen as natural British markets given historical, 
political, diplomatic and military ties. The analysis of the Gulf markets revolves around a
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representative sample, considering Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. All GCC States 
were spending heavily on procuring defence equipment and Britain stood to gain 
considerably. Indeed, as the chapter highlights, securing the Al Yamamah contract, for 
instance, ensured that Britain retained a considerable degree of influence in Saudi 
defence considerations.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the possibility of disruption to oil and trade 
routes through the Straits of Hormuz in light of the onset of conflict between Iran and 
Iraq and the consequences of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were presented as a 
rationale for a British military presence. British discourse focussed on the possibility of 
the expansion of “fundamentalist” fervour from Iran to other GCC States, perceived to be 
threatening to British markets and other interests in the region. The discourse was also 
filled by fears that the Iran-Iraq war might spread conflict to the moderate pro-Western 
Gulf States. Finally, the discourse also stressed that Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
threatened the Persian Gulf, illustrating a perceived expansion of the Soviet threat.
These factors form the basis upon which the chapter then considers the British 
response. In view of the perceived strategic importance of the region for Britain coupled 
with the perceptions of threats, the Government could not, if it was to be consistent with 
its own assumptions, have considered any option but to take steps to safeguard its 
interests in the GCC States. The final section provides an analysis of Britain’s military 
presence in the Persian Gulf, its support for the US Rapid Deployment Force, its naval 
deployments (the Armilla Patrol), the deployment of Naval Task Groups, conducting 
military exercises in the region, the provision of military assistance to the GCC States, 
and secondments of British military personnel.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 extends the analysis up to July 1990 and in the same fashion as chapter 2 draws 
upon Thatcherite discourse to highlight firstly Britain’s economic interests, and secondly 
the changes which took place during this period. The ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the improvement in relations between Britain 
and the Soviet Union were taken as evidence upon which changes in British threat 
perceptions vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf had taken place. Although the effects of the then
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Soviet President’s (Mikhail Gorbachev) “new thinking” in foreign policy may have been 
predominantly European in focus, changes in Soviet attitudes towards the West were seen 
to have global implications, with the Gulf being amongst the first regions to be affected. 
Improvement in East West relations continued following the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and in view of the Soviet Union’s willingness to co-operate with regard to 
bringing the Iran-Iraq war to an end. Consequently, British threat perceptions were 
altered, and die Government became no longer insistent on maintaining the full range of 
naval vessels assigned to the Armilia Patrol.
British threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf now became centred on the 
threat of weapons of mass destruction. There is evidence that the British Government was 
fully aware of the use by Iraq, for instance, of chemical weapons against both Iranian 
forces as well as its own Kurdish population. The analysis in this chapter, therefore, 
establishes the basis for a consideration (in chapter 4) of tire Government’s active 
participation in establishing the conditions imposed on Iraq by Section C of Security 
Council Resolution 687 (see Appendix 8).
Chapter 4
British discourse shaping involvement in the 1990/91 Gulf War is analysed in chapter 4. 
As the chapter shows, the discourse highlighted the Government's belief that it needed to 
develop an unambiguous commitment towards Iraq's unconditional withdrawal with a 
view to stabilising an often-faltering international coalition thereby giving the impression 
that Britain was able to offer the United invaluable diplomatic support The importance 
that Britain attached to the stability of the Persian Gulf region is shown in this chapter’s 
detailed analysis of the British military contribution to the coalition effort, which was 
second only to the United States. A detailed analysis of Operation Granby, therefore, 
demonstrates the extent to which the British Government enhanced its military presence 
in the region.
The British government's threat perceptions are also analysed here and the 
discourse shows that the Government believed that even following the cessation of 
hostilities steps would need to be taken to ensure that a remilitarised Iraq would not pose 
a threat to the GCC States. The role played by Britain in the establishment of the United
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Nations Special Commission set up to dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and 
to verify that these programmes were not re-constituted showed that the government 
continued to remain concerned about the stability of the region long after the war ended.
The chapter then provides further evidence to support the premise that the 
discourse of the era was dominated by an economic image and shows that, despite US 
pronouncements that arms to the region needed to be restricted, the War enabled Britain 
to demonstrate its military equipment to an already crucial defence market This directly 
benefited the British defence industry since the Gulf States, fearing for their security, 
clamoured to develop and reconstruct their own defence systems.
Section 1: International Relations Theory: the limits of Rationalism
The intention here is not to conduct a detailed examination of the rich array of theories in 
International Relations (IR), but rather to explain why Social Constructivism has been 
adopted as a lens for the study. International Relations as a discipline has been the subject 
of a large number of debates between proponents of its various paradigms, each of which 
highlight both the discipline’s heritage and its failure to find common ground.5 Though 
characterising the great debates in IR is complicated, a parsimonious account reveals 
disciplinary movement. The first debate, focusing, amongst other factors, on the nature of 
man, raged between the Realists who were concerned with seeing the world as it was and 
the Utopianists who wished for war to be abolished.6 Classical Realism has traditionally 
been seen by many to provide analysts with a most lucid interpretation of international 
events. Its focus on the power politics feature of humans boasts, as Buzan claims, ‘a long 
intellectual pedigree going back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau’.7 
Doyle and Ikenberry provide a useful summary of core realist principles: ‘realists hold in 
varying degrees that the best description of world politics is a state of war - not a 
continuous war or constant war but the constant possibility of war among all states’. They 
further specify that ‘Politics is gripped by a state of war because the nature of humanity 
or the character of states or the structure of international order (or all three together) 
allows wars to occur. This possibility of war requires that states follow realpolitik. be self 
interested, prepare for war, and calculate relative balances of power’.8
6
Realists further argue that all individuals must ‘accept the national interest as an 
ideal, as the one true guide to the formulation of the public policy of states ... [and] 
failing to follow the national interest ... is a prescription for national disaster’.9 In 
transposing notions of human selfishness and self-interest to states in the international 
system, Morgenthau succeeded in highlighting the centrality of the state. This also had 
the effect of imposing on the state a ‘unitary’ image which relegated sub-state actors, 
namely individuals and other domestic processes such as economics.10
It is this preoccupation with state-centrality, its relegation of domestic processes, 
its central emphasis on human nature, and its inability to analyse the role of ideas in the 
construction of identities and interests that places severe limitations on classical realism 
as a basis upon which to organise this thesis. Morgenthau saw international politics as a 
‘struggle for power’, a notion further developed by other Realists such as Stausz-Hupe 
who also saw the conduct of international relations as a search for power and further 
conceptualised history as being dominated by ‘several states locked in deadly conflict, all 
desiring the augmentation or preservation of their power’.11 Furthermore Grieco argues 
that 'for realist theory the key result of the recognition by states of the possibility that 
force [may] be used against them is that they have security as their principal interest’.12 
Realism therefore fails adequately to explain foreign policy processes because its 
conception of the ‘national interest’ based almost entirely on notions of sovereignty, 
security and the struggle for power in an anarchic international system, is far too 
narrow. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed further.
Terriff et al have stressed that the second ‘Great Debate’ arising in the 1960s 
‘threatened to pull the discipline apart’. In this debate Bull and Northedge stressed an 
‘understanding of history’ whereas their opponents, Kaplan and Rosenau ‘stressed the 
need to develop a scientific (behaviouralist) approach focused on quantification’.*4 
During and following this debate state-centric ideas came under sustained pressure, firstly 
because the behaviouralists, particularly in the US, attempted to provide a direct alternative 
to international relations theories based upon a scientific and quantifiable study. This 
‘scientific’ approach, however, failed to replace what Halliday referred to as ‘traditional IR’ 
and the state remained at the centre of focus. One important contribution of the 
behaviouralist era was that its demise resulted in the emergence of a number of new sub-
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fields within international relations in die 1970s; both Foreign Policy Analysis and 
International Political Economy were to achieve a permanent place and subsequently 
challenge the dominance of realism.15
The study of British foreign policy also experienced the effects of debate. In 
describing the various approaches used to analyse British foreign policy, Steve Smith and 
Michael Smith referred to the challenge to state-centric ideas as traditionalist versus 
transformationalist. The traditional view argued for continuity in international relations in 
that it remained centred on a competition for power between sovereign states.16 The 
transformationalists on the other hand argued for the existence of a ‘much broader and more 
diverse reality which encompasse[d] a host of participants, issues and interactions, affecting 
and constraining states’17 and that foreign policy should be seen ‘in terms of government 
attempts to control and manage a wide range of economic and other issues in a setting where 
states were joined and challenged by other actors and where boundaries between domestic 
and international politics were distinctly fuzzy.’18
Challenges to realist dominance continued unabated during the 1970s as 
academics like Robert Keohane sought to establish alternatives to classical realism. His 
work on transnationalism, multiple access channels and complex interdependence 
expanded theoretical pluralism considerably and it appeared for a while that the realist 
pedestal was finally being rocked.19 Keohane’s work highlighted that interdependence 
was characterised by interactions which involved states but importantly also non-state 
actors. States were no longer insulated from either each other or the international system 
and this openness combined with interdependence to impose severe limitations on their 
ability to act autonomously. Referred to as ‘complex interdependence’ these widening 
interactions were bringing about a qualitative change in international relations that was 
clearly non-state centric in nature.21
Despite the challenges to the state-centric ideas of realism, Waltz’s influential study, 
Theory of Inter national Politics, written at the time of the new outbreak of cold war between 
the USA and USSR propelled the state back into the centre. Where economic and social 
issues had been gaining ground as explanations for foreign policy behaviour, military and 
political tensions once again re-emerged. Despite these tensions, however, the foundations
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of debate had been securely fixed and new more pluralistic sub-fields of international 
relations emerged to challenge the state as central actor.
The period since the 1970s has been dominated by a number of additional 
debates, of which Terriff et al provide a useful summary, beginning with Keohane’s 
response to Kenneth Waltz’s Herculean attempt to reconstitute classical realism and 
establish neo-realism as IR orthodoxy. The second debate ‘includes the structuralists in 
what Michael Banks has called the inter-paradigm debate; and the third includes the post­
positivists’ and is, according to Yosef Lapid ‘a discourse about the nature of analytical 
frameworks (positivism against post-positivism)’.22
The debate between the neo-realists and the neo-liberal institutionalists continues 
to be of major concern for the discipline. The convergence between these two theories - 
the so-called neo-neo synthesis - is ultimately based upon both paradigms seeking to 
‘apply the logic of rationalist economic theory to international relations’ even though 
they reach ‘radically different conclusions about the potential for international co­
operation’ under conditions of anarchy.23 The terms of this debate are dealt with 
elsewhere but a brief account of some central elements may be useful since later sections 
highlight the very different nature of social constructivist enquiry.
In Theory of International Politics Waltz presents his own uncompromising 
image of the international system in the form of neorealist theory. As Hollis and Smith 
state, neo-realism ‘insists on explaining the behaviour of states solely on the level of the 
international system’ and that there is ‘to be no appeal to the intentions or capabilities of 
states, or to the ...nature of their leaders’.24 It is in this context that Waltz’s 
preoccupation with systemic anarchy needs to be understood in that, since the 
international system lacks a central authority, states are primarily interested in their own 
survival.
Waltz was also adamant in specifying that his theory was not ‘reductionist’ as it 
was not concerned with explaining ‘the whole by analysing the attributes and interactions 
of the parts’ , and was therefore different from much of the literature at the time, which 
was failing to identify ‘a set of causes that operate[d] at the systemic level and which 
[could] not be unearthed by looking at the attributes and interactions of the parts’.26 In 
Theory of International Politics Waltz used the term “structure” to specify the way in
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which the units in a system were arranged by arguing that structures could be either 
hierarchical (as in domestic political systems) or anarchical (as in the international 
political system).27 Furthermore Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff stated that since neo-realism 
has as its focus the international system, it is the structure of the international system that
shapes the political relationships that take place among its members. For 
structural realism [as it is sometimes referred to] international politics is 
more than the summation of the foreign policies of states and the external 
balance of other actors in the system. Thus Waltz argues for a neorealist 
approach based on patterned relationships among actors in a system that is 
anarchical ...28
This represents a very brief summary of core neorealist principles which must be placed 
in the context of the debate between neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Central 
to this debate was Robert Keohane who, by repositioning himself to neo-liberal 
institutionalism, moved away from his previous concern with interdependence and 
transnational relations. The acceptance by neo-liberal institutionalists that die 
international system is indeed anarchic because there is no authority over and above 
states vindicates to some extent Waltz’s position in highlighting anarchy as an ordering 
principle. However, despite this acceptance, neo-liberal institutionalists have concerned 
themselves with analysing the extent of co-operation possible under conditions of 
anarchy and the conclusions that the two sides reach are radically different. Neo-realists 
claim that under anarchy conflict and the struggle for power are enduring characteristics 
of international politics, and that because of this ‘co-operation between states is at best 
precarious and at worst non-existent.
Even though neo-liberal institutionalists emphasise the importance of anarchy and 
agree that achieving co-operation is difficult in international relations, they argue that 
’world politics is not a homogenous state of war: co-operation varies among issues and 
over time’. Axelrod and Keohane, for instance, state that
To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks 
organisation. Relationships among actors may be carefully structured in 
some issue areas, even though they remain loose in others. Likewise, some 
issues may be closely linked through the operation of institutions while the 
boundaries of other issues, as well as the norms and principles to be 
followed, are subject to dispute. Anarchy, defined as lack of common 
government, remains a constant; but the degree to which interactions are 
structured, and the means by which they are structured, vary.30
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Another important work that highlights the nature of this debate is David Baldwin’s 
edited collection Neo~realism and neo-liberalism: the contemporary debate published in 
1993, where, apart from setting out the focal points of the debate, a number of neo-liberal 
institutionalists expressed their viewpoints over the question of co-operation under 
conditions of anarchy. Axelrod and Keohane emphasise the importance of anarchy 
defined as the absence of government but argue that this ‘constant feature of world 
politics permits a variety of patterns of interaction among states’.31 Arthur Stein, on the 
other hand, ‘develops a conceptualisation of regimes as serving to circumscribe national 
behaviour and thus shape international interactions’.32 Charles Lipson admits that co­
operation is a fragile enterprise but claims that ‘rule-guided and norm-governed 
arrangements are far more common’ than neo-realist notions of anarchy would suggest.33 
Finally, Helen Milner investigates the concept of anarchy in the realist tradition and 
concludes that the international system is largely a ‘chaotic arena of war of all against 
all’. She then questions whether ‘chaos, lack of order, and constant threat’ are really what 
scholars mean by the anarchic system and argues that there are ‘persistent elements of 
order in international politics’.34
This brief analysis then represents the first part of Yosef Lapid’s “third debate”, 
and the analysis of Social Constructivism below will draw on some of the elements 
highlighted here in order to establish why neither of these neo-paradigms has been 
adopted as a basis for this thesis.
Michael Banks’ inter-paradigm debate constitutes the second element of the “third 
debate” in IR and it is beyond the remit of this thesis to analyse this in any great detail. 
However, to summarise: Banks argues that there are three overarching paradigms - 
realism (including its classical and neo versions), pluralism (which embodies variants of 
liberalism), and structuralism (which includes analysts who focus on socio-economic 
structures as explanations for IR). The first two aspects of this inter-paradigm debate 
have been dealt with above but it remains necessary to explain why structuralist theories 
were rejected as a possible theoretical basis for the thesis.
Traditionally Marxism had not been central to the debates in International 
Relations and it was not until at least the 1970s that Marxist analysis was put forward as
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an alternative IR theory. Ole Waever uses the level of analysis problem to explain the 
distinction between each of the paradigms:
the state-as-actor for realism, the many non-state (e.g. firms), sub-state 
(e.g. bureaucracies), supra-state (e.g. regimes) and trans-state (e.g. 
transnational bureaucracies) actors for liberalism, and finally the system 
for neo-marxists. He goes on to state that it was this logic that led many in 
Britain to use the term “pluralism” for the liberal strand and 
‘structuralism’ for the Marxist. Pluralism because of the many actors ... 
and structuralism because the whole system is much more organised and 
ordered according to the Marxist, than according to the other two.35
The structuralist approaches share certain key principles which are essentially based on 
economic relations within and among states. This emphasis on economic relations 
inevitably leads structuralists to question what forms of exploitation exist in the 
international system. Clearly this form of analysis has its roots in classical Marxism 
which highlighted the unequal economic relationship between the proletariat and the 
bourgeois classes, and the development of class-consciousness which would ultimately 
lead to class struggle and revolution leading to the overthrow of capitalism. This strand of 
thought has recently been dominated by neo-marxists such as Immanuel Wallerstem who 
have argued that the world capitalist system consists of core, semi-peripheral and 
peripheral states and that a relationship between these three positions is necessary if 
global capitalism is to continue to flourish. He has placed considerable importance on the 
semi-peripheral states because of his belief that these states act as a buffer between the 
core and the periphery. In their unique position as exploiter and the exploited, their 
existence prevents the development of a unified opposition to the dominance of the core 
states - essential for the continuation of world capitalism.36
Structuralism must be seen as a “bottom up” perspective on the world ‘which 
prioritises the plight of the poor, the marginalised and the oppressed’ (as opposed to 
Waltz’s ‘top down’ emphasis). As Steans and Pettiford have outlined, ‘Structuralists 
argue that global economic relations are structured so as to benefit certain social classes, 
and that the resulting ‘world-system’ is fundamentally unjust’. Structuralism, therefore, 
highlights a connection between politics and economics, so, given that the thesis places 
such importance on analysing British economic interests in the GCC States, why has a 
structuralist basis been rejected? It is worth re-emphasising here that the thesis in no way
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claims that it was purely economic interests which shaped British policy in the region - 
but rather that the discourse of the period was constituted by an emphasis on economics 
and this in turn helped shape certain perceptions about policy. It is, therefore, the 
structuralist emphasis on economic issues at the expense of other factors which has led to 
that particular approach being rejected.
The discussion between the positivists and the post-positivists is the central 
feature of the third debate. While focusing directly on questions of epistemology, certain 
aspects of this debate are particularly relevant to an understanding of the position of 
social constructivism in the discipline of IR. Based on a ‘commitment to a unified view 
of science, and the adoption of methodologies of the natural sciences to explain the social 
world’, positivist assumptions have dominated much of international relations since 
World War One.38 Spegelc defines positivist beliefs as those which ‘include the 
identification of knowledge at its best with natural science and mathematics ... the idea 
that science ideally provides [the] best method for describing all facets of the one world 
in which we live ... and an emphasis on the social value of science and its practical 
effects’.39
Epistemological questions themselves were relegated in the face of an implicit 
acceptance of a ‘rather simple and, crucially an uncontested set of positivist assumptions 
which have fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world is like and how we 
might explain it’.40 In this sense the debates outlined above, realism/idealism and the 
inter-paradigm debate have all worked under positivist assumptions which therefore gives 
the impression that they are merely three versions of one international system ‘rather than 
genuine alternative views of international relations’.41
According to Smith, positivism has been important not so much because it has 
given international theory a method but because ‘its empiricist epistemology has 
determined what could be studied because it has determined what kinds of things existed 
in international relations’.42 The belief in the unity of science (including the social 
sciences), an emphasis on the distinction between facts and values, a ‘belief in the 
existence of regularities in the social as well as natural world’, and a reliance on the need 
for empirical validation or falsification are central features of positivism.43
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By adopting the positivist methodology of the natural sciences, Morgenthau 
attempted to construct a ‘science of international relations’. He claimed that the 
‘intellectual rigour of this approach would reveal the underlying ‘reality’ of world 
politics, from which certainties and predictions could be deduced.’44 Positivists like 
Morgenthau therefore believe that there is a ‘knowable reality’ in international relations 
which can be revealed by theoretical application. Another useful account is provided by 
Burchill, who refers to certain theories as having “explanatory” powers, the purpose of 
which is to ‘test[ ] hypothesis[e], propos[e] causal explanations, describ[e] events and 
explain[ ] general trends and phenomena, [ultimately] with the aim of constructing a 
plausible image of the world’.45
It is thus possible to begin to understand the very distinct nature of post-positivist 
epistemologies. Hollis and Smith provide a useful distinction categorised as ‘explainers’ 
and ‘understanders’. Whereas positivist theories seek to explain reality by emphasising 
empiricist observation, where the analyst is able to detach himself from the analytical 
process, post-positivism appears more concerned with ‘understanding’ and the analyst is 
assumed to be part of the process. In distinguishing between the two positions, Dessler 
argues that post-modernists and critical theorists ‘deny the existence of a reality logically 
and causally independent of mind ... [thereby generating] deep epistemological criticisms 
of mainstream social research’. These two positions are therefore radically different from 
one another.46 Burchill also contributes by distinguishing between ‘explanatory theories’ 
on the one hand and ‘constitutive theories’ on the other where the latter highlight the 
effects that the preconceptions, experiences and beliefs of analysts have on the way in 
which international relations is understood.47
Adopting Social Constructivism
It is this final version of the ‘third debate’ in IR, namely that between positivism and 
post-positivism, which has had a tremendous impact on the recent progress of the 
discipline. In addition, the contribution made by the social constructivist project needs to 
be considered in the context of this ongoing debate. The following analysis, therefore, 
begins by highlighting the core principles of social constructivism and then attempts to 
distance these principles from key assumptions espoused by rationalist theories like neo-
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realism and neo-liberalism. This comparison will confirm why constructivism has been 
adopted at the expense of other theories as a basis for this thesis.
Defining and identifying its core principles is not an easy task, given that social 
constructivism is a broad school which spans positivist and post-positivist frameworks. 
Dessler, for instance, refers to constructivism as a ‘broad movement in the study of world 
politics (and) its slogan that ‘ideas and discourse matter’ underpins research in a variety 
of traditions including those of post-modernism, feminism [and] critical theory...’48 
Others, such as Burchill, approach the problem by considering the key debates in IR since 
the 1980s. As analysed above, during the 1980s neo-realism and neo-liberalism ‘sought 
to apply the logic of rationalist economic theory to international relations, but reached 
radically different conclusions’. The 1980s were also dominated by a debate between 
interpretive and rationalist theories where the former challenged the ‘epistemological, 
methodological, ontological and normative assumptions of neo-realism and neo- 
liberalism’ and the latter, based upon choice-theoretic assumptions of micro-economic 
theory, ‘accused interpretive theorists of having little of any substance to say about ‘real 
world’ international relations’.49
There has been a shift in the nature of the debates since the end of the Cold War. 
The earlier debate between critical theorists and rationalists evolved to incorporate a 
number of distinct positions: namely the debates between critical theorists and 
constructivists on the one hand and between constructivists and rationalists on the other. 
The common denominator here, social constructivism, sought to ‘challenge! ) 
rationalism and positivism of neo-realism and nco-liberalism while simultaneously 
pushing critical theorists away from meta-theoretical critique to the empirical analysis of 
world politics’.50 Therefore, despite roots in critical international theory, constructivism 
differs due to its increasing emphasis on empirical analysis, and it is this feature which 
has increasingly led to claims that it occupies, as Adler claims, “the middle ground” 
between rationalist and interpretive approaches.51
This notion of the “middle ground” needs further elaboration. The confusion is 
compounded by post-positivist claims that constructivists have hidden their rationalist 
and positivist underpinning. Both critical theory of the third debate and post-modernism 
have questioned positivist approaches to knowledge and have challenged the scientific
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method. As Price and Reus-Smit argue, critical theory was concerned ‘primarily with 
undermining the foundations of dominant discourses in International Relations'.52 Post­
modernism, another post-positivist enterprise, nevertheless shares certain 
epistemological, ontological and methodological assumptions with critical theory. Then- 
criticism of ‘objective, empirically verifiable truth statements ... rejection of a single 
scientific method ...[and] rationalist conceptions of human nature’ throws a serious 
challenge to positivist IR theory.53 Indeed, post-modernists have gone further by rejecting 
all meta-narratives such as realism or Marxism, criticising their all-encompassing 
explanations and world views. By rejecting these attempts at hegemony they argue that 
their ‘scepticism and uncertainty combined with a plurality of world views ... is an 
appropriate response to a highly complex world’.54
Adler argues that the lack of early constructivist empirical research has 
contributed to the uncertainty over social constructivism. Indeed the ‘debates within 
constructivism itself as to “what constructivism is really about” ... have tended to 
obscure constructivism’s scientific basis ... and its potential contribution to a better 
understanding of International Relations’.55 Positivist IR theories seek to discover, 
through observation, causal factors for questions of international relations, but this 
process has limited place in interpretivist approaches such as post-modernism and early 
critical theory. The question arises therefore where to place social constructivism in this 
ontological, epistemological and methodological debate. According to Dessler, the 
positions adopted by key social constructivists such as those in Peter Katzenstein’s edited 
volume, the Culture of Nationcd Securityy ‘are compatible with a positivist epistemology’ 
and he then goes on to argue that social constructivist empirical analysis should be 
‘assessed according to positivist standards’.56 Price and Reus-Smith, however, raise a 
powerful counter-claim, arguing that constructivism’s core assumptions remain firmly 
embedded within critical theory. They make this claim despite accepting that 
constructivism is less occupied with meta-theoretical issues and even though 
constructivist analysis has engaged with the ‘mainstream on issues of interpretation and 
evidence’.57
Wendt provides a usefill connection between critical theory and constructivism by 
referring to the former as a family of theories (as opposed to a single theory) which
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includes post-modernism, constructivism, neo-Marxism and some feminist theories. 
Their common denominator is their concern over ‘how world politics is socially 
constructed’. Wendt goes on to argue that this premise involves two basic assumptions: 
first that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly 
material and second that structures shape actors' identities and interests rather than simply 
their behaviour. These claims clearly oppose the materialism and rationalism of both neo­
realism and neo-liberalism,58 and will be examined further in due course.
The strength of social constructivism lies in its ability to straddle positivist and 
post-positivist approaches. Its roots in critical theory provide the constructivist project 
with reflective and interpretive credentials while its reshaping of many of the core 
debates in international relations has led Dessler to claim that in die last decade social 
constructivism has ‘emerged as a significant force in empirical research’.59
The fundamental essence of constructivism is that it sees international relations as 
being socially constructed by identity, meanings, the assumptions of actors themselves 
and indeed by the analysts’ linguistic interpretation of social phenomena. Ontologically, 
social constructivism embodies a number of core principles, beginning with the 
importance that it places on ideational as well as material structures. The assumption here 
is that structures in international relations are able to constrain or shape behaviour. Neo­
realists, for instance, emphasise systemic anarchy as shaping state behaviour which is 
ultimately based on material structures such as the balance of power and military 
capabilities. Constructivists on the other hand argue that ‘systems of shared ideas, beliefs 
and values also have structural characteristics, and that they exert a powerful influence on 
social and political action’.60 However, this is not to say that constructivists dismiss 
material structures. Indeed, material and ideational structures both play a role in shaping 
behaviour, but for constructivists it is the system of meanings which defines how actors 
interpret their material environment As Wendt argues, ‘material resources only acquire 
meaning for human action through the shared knowledge in which they are embedded’ 
and this is in contrast to the de-socialised view held by neo-realists.61 For constructivists, 
therefore, individuals are social beings whose interactions involve subjectivity and 
interpretations where meaning is created through the process of human understanding of 
the material world.
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Hopf provides an excellent analysis of the notion of ideational and material 
structures by adopting the notion of “power” as a lens. He argues that, though power is 
central to mainstream and constructivist theorising, their conceptualisation of it differs. 
Despite their differences neo-realism and neo-liberalism see material power, whether 
military or economic, as ‘the single most important source of influence and authority in 
global politics’. Constructivists, on the other hand, emphasise both material and 
discursive power as necessary for any understanding of world affairs. Discursive power is 
defined as the ‘power of knowledge, ideas, culture, and language, that is discourse’.62 The 
implications of this for the thesis are discussed later. Ideas as important structures, 
therefore, are central to constructivist thought as Wendt, for example, claims that material 
capabilities in themselves explain very little and argues that asking ‘when do ideas as 
opposed to power and interest matter is to ask the wrong question. Ideas always matter, 
since power and interest do not have effects apart from the shared knowledge that 
constitutes them as such’.63 Finally, Albert Yee argues that the ‘Inability of ... neo- 
realism ... ultimately to skirt the cognitive complexity of decision making by utilising 
some form of rationality assumption has led many analysts ... to rediscover the 
importance of ideas ... in policymaking’.64
Secondly, social interactions, subjective interpretations and human understanding 
of the international environment mean that for constructivists the creation of identities is 
a necessary feature of international politics. Identities bring order and predictability to the 
anarchic structure. As Hopf writes, ‘A world without identities is a world of chaos, a 
world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than 
anarchy’. He goes on to qualify the importance of identities by highlighting the functions 
that they perform, namely: ‘they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who 
others are. In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of 
interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with 
respect to particular actors’.65 In other words identities inform interests which in turn 
outline particular forms of action. Hopf goes on to argue that
A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, 
while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social 
practice. The crucial observation here is that the producer of the identity is
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not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective 
structure is the final arbiter of meaning.66
Similarly Arfi in analysing the social construction of ethnic fear and insecurity through 
specific forms of discourse defines social identities as a ‘set of meanings that an actor 
attributes to itself while taking the perceptive of others ... [it] defines the actor and 
provides information on its interest and behaviour’.67 The commonality here is the view 
that identities and interests are closely connected. When comparing this notion to the 
perceptions held by conventional theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, the 
differences become even more apparent Mainstream theories define interests and 
identities as exogenous and given where actors, as Burchill et al argue, ‘encounter one 
another with a pre-existing set of preferences’. Such theorists are not interested in ‘where 
such preferences come from, only in how actors pursue them strategically.’ In contrast to 
this de-socialised view, they argue that constructivists claim that it is necessary to 
understand how actors develop these interests and identities, since this provides the 
ability to explain a wider range of international political phenomena that rationalists 
ignore.68
Waltz’s neorealist analysis, for instance, conceptualises the structure of 
international relations in terms of self-help which explains the competitive nature of 
anarchy and thus, as Wendt argues, ‘occupies a privileged explanatory role ... setting the 
terms for and unaffected by interaction [and] states failing to conform to [this logic are 
likely to be] driven from the system’.69 This shows that such features are exogenous to 
the states and their interactions. The notion of self-help clearly exists independently of 
time, place and state interaction. Constructivists, however, argue that this logic fails to 
explain why, for instance, some states are allies and others are enemies. Neo-realism sees 
states as lacking the autonomy in their abilities to mitigate against the effects of anarchy, 
since this assumption remains rigid regardless of time and space.
Similarly, realist thought denotes much of its attention to the notion of national 
interest, arguing that the policies and actions of states emerge from their need for security 
in an international system based on anarchy and the distribution of power. Despite this 
conceptual emphasis on “interest”, however, Weldes argues that realist content ‘defined 
as the security and survival of the state ... is so general as to be indeterminate’.70 He
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criticises it further by claiming that it ‘rests on a questionable empiricist epistemology 
which ignores the centrality of processes of interpretation’. Its assumption that there is an 
independent reality which outlines objectively and accurately the threats to a state, its 
national interests and policy options is necessarily flawed given that ‘objects and events 
do not present themselves unproblematically to the [analyst]’.71 As Weldes states,
Determining what the particular situation faced by the state is, what if any 
threat a state faces, and what the correct national interest with respect to 
that situation or threat is, always requires interpretation ... [Realism] with 
its assumptions that threats are self-evident, cannot explain why particular 
situations are understood to constitute threats to the state. It therefore also 
cannot explain why certain actions, ostensibly taken in response to these 
threats, are in the national interest in the first place72
Wendt, instrumental in outlining the key principles of constructivism, successfully re­
conceptualised the notions of identity and consequently interests in ‘Anarchy is what 
states make of it’, and thus advanced the cause of constructivist thought in international 
relations. Linked to the perception outlined above that ideas are central to constructivist 
thought is the notion that identity and interests can be created and changed through 
intersubjective processes. The way in which actors behave towards objects is dependent 
upon the meanings that those objects have for them, meanings that are intersubjectively 
constituted. As Wendt argues ‘states act differently towards enemies than they do 
towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not’. In contrast die de­
socialised ethos of neo-realism is unable to distinguish between such social 
characteristics. Granted, the distribution of power and the anarchic structure of the 
international system affect state behaviour but how they do so ‘depends on the 
intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the distribution of knowledge, that 
constitute [its] conceptions of self and other’.73
A third main characteristic of constructivism is that of mutual constitution, 
namely the perception that observer and observed cannot be separate entities. Reality for 
constructivists is socially constructed, as the material and social worlds construct or 
constitute each other. Despite key constructivists like Katzenstein adopting positions 
which are compatible with positivist epistemology, there is a rejection of certain 
positivist tenets of the methodological unity of science. As Dunne outlines, this rejection 
of the scientism of naturalism ensures that the interests of the observer cannot be
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separated from the subject being observed. This mutually constitutive nature means that 
the subject matter and observer are part of a single process.74 The implications of this for 
constructivist analysis are profound, since the analysts’ own perceptions of reality take on 
added significance. It is also an acceptance that there may be multiple realities each as 
valid as the other. Undoubtedly this assumption has its roots in the rejection by post­
positivist theories such as post-modernism of hegemonic claims by meta-narratives.
The notion of mutual constitution also extends to the structure-agency debate with 
the constructivists claiming that actor behaviour is neither exclusively determined by 
social structures nor the result of individual agents. Instead, the relationship has a mutual 
orientation whereby agents and structure constitute one another. As Burchill et al state, 
‘Normative and ideational structures may well condition the identities and interests of 
actors, but those structures would not exist if it were not for the knowledgeable practices 
of those actors’.75 This is clearly in contrast to the two dominant perspectives, the first 
being that agents are the dominant element whose practices are responsible for the 
formation of structures. The second specifies that structures have greater force than 
agents and are therefore able to set conditions and constraints upon their practices.76
The constructivist alternative specifies that agents and structures remain 
inseparable, so that structures are able to impose constraints on agents but can themselves 
only be explained by the practices of agents.77 This “middle ground” adopted by 
constructivism can once again be contrasted with the neo-realist position where states are 
seen to have no autonomy in their interactions in the face of the structural constraints 
imposed by anarchy. Under neo-realism the anarchic structure is a given, sets the terms 
for, and exists independently of state interaction. The constructivist emphasis on social as 
well as material structures, its treatment of identities and interests as a consequence of 
social practices, and the importance it attaches to mutual constitution of structure and 
agency shows that anarchy is, ultimately, ‘what states make of it’ through their social 
interaction, meaning creation, and cultural and linguistic practices.78
Finally, it may be useful to end this section with a brief account of Ruggie’s 
analysis of social constructivism in Constructing the world polity: essays on international 
institutionalisation. He claims that it was the post World War 2 aversion to idealism and 
the resulting primacy of realist theory which led to the relegation of ideational factors in
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international relations. The neo-realist and nco-Iiberal treatment of ideas in strictly neo­
utilitarian terms reinforced this position and it wasn’t until the full-scale debates between 
positivist and post-positivist theories that the discipline began to emerge from its narrow 
confines. As Ruggie states, neo-realism and neo-liberalism ‘share a view of the world ... 
in utilitarian terms: an atomistic universe of self-regarding units whose identity is 
assured, given and fixed, and who are responsive largely ... to material interests ...,79 
Social constructivism on the other hand, ‘seeks to account for what neo-utilitarianism 
assumes: the identity and/or interests of actors ... In addition, it attributes to ideational 
factors ... social efficacy over and above any functional utility they may have, including 
a role in shaping the way in which actors define their identity and interests in the first 
place’.80
The Hypothesis - Social Constructivist Principles and British Foreign Policy
Social Constructivism, therefore, can be differentiated from rationalist theories such as 
neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism in terms of its core assumptions. Whereas 
rationalism treats material structures as exogenous and given in a desocialised world the 
essence of constructivism is that it sees international relations as being socially 
constructed through the interplay of ideational as well as material structures. These 
systems of shared ideas, meanings, assumptions of actors themselves and linguistic 
interpretation also have structural characteristics whereby they can exert influence on 
political action. Material structures are not dismissed, but for constructivists the 
interpretation of material objects depends upon the meanings that those objects have for 
individuals. Clearly this becomes a two-way relationship in which human perception and 
the material world are involved in a mutually constitutive process whereby they construct 
each other.
Closely linked to this is the importance that constructivism attaches to the notion 
of identity - identities define the self and others but carry with them significant 
implications with regard to relationships and actions - hence crucially identities inform 
interests. This contrasts with mainstream theories like neo-realism which treat identities 
and interests in the same way as they treat material structures - as exogenous and given.
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In other words, actors approach international relations with preconceived notions 
irrespective of time and space. As shown above, constructivists such as Wendt have 
shown that identities and interests are endogenous to international relations and can be 
created and changed through intersubjective processes. As McSweeney states, ‘identity is 
not a fact of society, it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups. 
Identity is a consequence of apolitical process which constitutes reality
For Constructivists, therefore, reality is socially constructed by individuals whose 
interactions involve subjectivity and interpretation. The epistemological foundations of 
positivism are not entirely rejected, but at the same time constructivism can lay claim to 
the “middle ground” with its emphasis on interpretation, reflection and the laying down 
of constitutive questions. It succeeds in claiming origins in critical theory but also steers 
away from meta-theoretic discussion towards asking questions about “real world 
international relations”. Nevertheless, its rejection of the hegemony of rationalist meta­
narratives crucially opens the door into the realm of interpretation and the multiple 
explanations that go along with this. Linked to this notion of interpretation is the view 
that the analyst and the subject matter are no longer separate but rather part of and 
included in a single process. The perceptions, opinions, subjectivity and consciousness of 
the observer provide meaning to the subject matter thus ensuring that there are no neutral 
and entirely objective facts. By conceiving international relations as the product of social 
practices, international relations are dynamic and can consequently be changed or 
reconstituted by actors - in essence international relations are dependent upon how actors 
interpret their environment and the meanings they attach to the material world.
Finally, to quote from Ruggie:
Constructivism is not a theory of international relations as balance of 
power theory is for instance, rather it is a theoretically informed approach 
to the study of international relations ... [It] concerns the issue of human 
consciousness: the role it plays in international relations, and the 
implications for the logic and methods of social enquiry of taking it 
seriously. Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of 
international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational 
factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they 
express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the 
meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time 
and space ... even identities are generated in part by international 
interaction ...[and] at the level of individual actors, constructivism ...
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seeks to map the full array of additional ideational factors that shape 
actors’ outlooks and behaviour ranging from culture and ideology, to 
aspirations and principled beliefs ...
The preceding analysis has identified both the strengths of the constructivist project and 
the weaknesses of some of the mainstream theories in explaining international relations. 
This thesis will therefore adopt constructivist theory as a basis to analyse the extent to 
which material economic interests shaped British foreign policy towards the GCC States.
Since the period of the study is the Thatcher era, the central tenets of Thatcherism 
(discussed below in section 2) form an integral part of this analysis. As the following 
evaluation will demonstrate, Thatcherism was a belief system dominated by ideas of 
economics, incentives and interests, which in turn were based on materialism. The 
discourse of the era allows us to see that the nature of foreign policy at the time was 
understood to be overwhelmingly shaped by materialism. The hypothesis is, therefore, 
that the central elements of Thatcherism created a framework for approaching foreign 
policy, and that the nature of British foreign policy towards the GCC States during the 
Thatcher era was constructed by the positivist discourse of economic interests.
This hypothesis warrants further explanation. Constructivism focuses on the 
creation of meanings reproduced by human interpretation of social interactions. It argues 
that ideas are central to the discourse and in this context ideational structures can be seen 
to correlate to state behaviour. As has been demonstrated above, ideas refer to the beliefs 
that exist within the public domain and play the role of underpinning the values, norms 
and other individual and collective understanding held by actors participating in social 
interaction. Constructivist analysis places much greater emphasis on the role of ideas than 
rationalist theories such as neo-realism. In addition to being sceptical about the role of 
ideas, neo-realism highlights that it is the rational behaviour of actors which generates 
policy outcomes. This relegation of ideas and perceptions contributes to the inability of 
neo-realism to proceed beyond its rigid explanation of the international system.
One notable exception amongst rationalist theories which does place some 
importance on the role of ideas is neo-liberal institutionalism. The neo-neo synthesis
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highlighted a convergence between the positions adopted by neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism when the latter accepted that under conditions of low or no co-operation 
in the international system neo-realist explanations of structural anarchy were correct. 
However, neo-liberal institutionalists sought to distance themselves from neo-realists by 
arguing that co-operation remained possible even under conditions of anarchy. To 
strengthen their argument neo-liberal institutionalists Goldstein and Keohane crucially 
investigated the impact of ideas and beliefs on foreign policy. In an important text, Ideas 
and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions and political change, they categorised beließ 
(ideas) into three areas, namely, world views, principal beließ and causal beließ. World 
views are defined as the most general and universal ideas providing normative, 
ideological, ethical and religious reasons behind actor behaviour. Principled beließ 
provide actors with a reference point from which to define their actions. As Goldstein and 
Keohane argue, actors often draw on their world views in order to define their normative 
principles. Finally, causal beliefs provide individuals with guidance on how to pursue 
their objectives and interests.83
By highlighting the roles that such ideas/beließ play in influencing policy 
outcomes, Goldstein and Keohane successfully showed that the effects of anarchy can be 
mitigated against and that co-operation is possible. Nevertheless, neo-liberal 
institutionalism remains epistemologically and ontologically firmly embedded within the 
confines of positivism and rationalism. It is possible, therefore, to distinguish between 
neo-liberal notions on “ideas” as being individualisitic whereas constructivism sees them 
as mutually constituted in a social context. Ideational structures are fundamental to 
constructivism, since behaviour within a historical setting is explained in terms of the 
norms and values that the actors hold and are socialised with.
Though these characteristics were dealt with earlier, they are worth reiterating, 
given the importance that constructivism attaches to meaning creation through 
intersubjective and social interaction. When the hypothesis refers to the “central elements 
of Thatcherism”, therefore, it is referring to the “ideas” embodied within this particular 
belief system, in this case economics, interests and incentives. The case study will 
demonstrate how it is possible to construct meaning or draw conclusions out of the raw 
material and linguistic resources drawn upon during the research process. Weldes refers
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to this as the ‘The process of articulation ... [which] is one in which ... extant linguistic 
resources are combined to produce contingent and contextually specific representations 
of the world’.84
Finally, there are a number of additional questions relating to constructivism as an 
approach that will need to be addressed in the conclusions to each of the chapters and to 
the thesis itself. Firstly, given that the discourse of the Thatcher era was overwhelmingly 
shaped by economic factors and given the Government’s aims in the Persian Gulf region 
- inevitably shaped by Thatcherite beliefs - was the Government successfill in meeting 
their aims as they defined them? Secondly, does constructivism allow for the 
identification of alternative explanations for British foreign policy which were not 
present in the discourse? The answer to this may be that since the discourse was 
dominated by economics, identifying alternative explanations such as human rights or 
ethics may be difficult. However, since constructivism embodies reflective and 
interpretive principles, the observer is able to ask constitutive questions and therefore 
his/her opinions become part of the discourse, thereby leading to the possible 
identification of alternatives.
Section 2: Ideational Constructs: Thatcherism and British Foreign Policy
The preceding section engaged with some of the general theoretical literature in 
International Relations and considered the basic tenets of some mainstream theories such 
as realism, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. It also explained that the central 
principles of constructivism, namely, its emphasis on discourse, language, meaning 
creation, and the importance it attaches to the mutual constitution of ideational and 
material structures, signify its relevance as a basis for this thesis. It has also been claimed 
that Thatcherite discourse was constituted by material economic interests and the case 
study will analyse this discourse in search of evidence to support this. In order to 
facilitate this, however, a further factor needs to be analysed in light of the earlier claim 
that Mrs. Thatcher herself played an important role in constituting the discourse of the 
era. The hypothesis above stated that certain elements of Thatcherism influenced the 
formation of a specific foreign policy based upon material economic interests. The
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purpose of the following section, therefore, is to ask a number of key questions relating to 
Thatcherism as a belief system which in turn gave rise to a framework for approaching 
foreign policy.
One factor which has become obvious in conducting the survey is that no analyst 
has been able to provide a clear, concise or widely accepted definition of the concept of 
Thatcherism. The so-called ‘Thatcher phenomenon’ has, however, attracted much 
attention and as a consequence numerous views have emerged. Major areas of 
disagreement have been the issue of whether or not to label ‘Thatcherism’ as an ideology 
and, related to this, the question of whether the Thatcher era represented a radical 
departure from past policies or whether, despite the rhetoric, there remained a large 
degree of continuity. The disagreements, therefore, have largely been between those who 
argued that there was nothing special, let alone ideological, about Thatcherism and those 
who were convinced that Mrs. Thatcher introduced something new and significant into 
British political life.
The phenomenon now known as Thatcherism came about in reaction to 
perceptions of Britain’s decline during the decades of the post-war period and therefore 
any analysis of that phenomenon must take into account the historical background of the 
period. In 1945, following the end of World War Two, the Labour Government was eager 
to reinforce and re-establish Britain’s international position, in both military and financial 
terms, but it faced the task of somehow converting the wartime economy into an effective 
system for economic development. The Conservatives, on the other hand, when they 
returned to power in 1951, rejected the idea of a formal plan, and let market forces take 
their course. This led initially to ‘rising living standards, full employment and a relative 
social stability ... An unusual consensus characterised British society presided over by 
the Tories - in which conflict appeared relatively marginal or at least thoroughly 
contained’.85
However, by the time Labour returned to power in 1964 there was growing 
concern about the economy, as it became apparent that the ‘boom’ of the fifties had been 
deceptive. Britain’s competitors such as the United States and Japan were gaining 
ground, and it became increasingly apparent that the traditional imperial markets on 
which Britain had relied would no longer be sufficiently powerful to raise the country
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from its decline. As Bob Rowthom has explained, the increasing pressure on Sterling 
meant that London’s position as a world financial centre was becoming increasingly 
uncertain.86 This brought about, as Hall and Jacques stated, a ‘growing conviction of the 
need to modernise the economy and society’, which in turn was largely responsible for 
the Labour Government’s return to power, and it therefore adopted a “modernist” 
approach on several fronts. Its aim was to make industrial capital more competitive, and 
it saw the state itself as a key agent in this, particularly in collaboration with major 
companies and unions. It therefore set up the Department of Economic Affairs with the 
intention of creating successful plans for economic development, but in light of the 
industrial capitalists’ unwillingness to relinquish any real power, these measures proved 
inadequate, given the extent of Britain’s weakness. Indeed, in the face of the Sterling 
Crisis, the plan was abandoned, and this led to an extended period of crisis: ‘As economic 
difficulties ... multiplied, government policy [went] from one desperate experiment to 
another and, until the advent of the Thatcher Government in 1979, there [was] nothing 
which [could] be described as a long term strategy for the economy’.87 As the economic 
difficulties continued, the Government concentrated increasingly on the working class, 
but this aggravated the situation, leading to Trade Union opposition and increasing 
dissension among the working classes, which eventually led to the Tories regaining 
power in 1970.
This period, therefore, was one of major structural change when ‘the previous 
ruling strategy was increasingly seen to have failed’. Britain’s ‘standing’ in the world 
seemed to have changed irrevocably, and this brought into question all aspects of the 
political system, leading to ‘a crisis of the established forms of hegemony, a situation 
where the old forms of rule, previous ideological assumptions and the established 
patterns of alliances became increasingly difficult to sustain’.88
In light of this, when the Heath Government returned in 1970 it made a 
determined bid for power in Europe by entering the EEC. However, it did not continue 
Labour’s modernist approach, but rather emphasised market forces as opposed to the 
State’s role in industry, and reasserted its authority over the working classes by adopting 
a much more aggressively modernist approach. Rather than improving the economic 
situation, however, this stance caused such fierce resistance on the part of the Trade
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Unions and the working classes that it forced the Tories to abandon their position and 
move ‘from a pre-Thatcherite position to a comprehensive corporatist approach, which 
more closely resembled Labour’s modernism’.89
When the minority Labour Government came to power in 1974, therefore, it was 
against a background of increased working class militancy which influenced the initial 
policies, and it promised to ‘implement a vigorous programme of industrial regeneration’. 
However, despite changes to industrial relations policies in an attempt to pacify the 
working classes, there was no major change of direction. It was more a case of adopting a 
persuasive, rather than an aggressive approach. As Hall and Jacques stated: ‘Formally 
speaking, the modernist project remained, but, as Britain’s own economic crisis grew 
increasingly acute with the onset of the international ... recession, the Government’s 
approach consisted of little more than pragmatic crisis-management in which the central 
element was securing working class acquiescence to cuts in real wages and public 
expenditure together with rising unemployment’.90
Having shown that British governments during the post-war era became 
preoccupied with Britain’s economic decline, the question arises whether this decline 
translated to a wider reduction in international status and power. There was an emerging 
perception that the level of resources had to match the world-wide commitments and by 
the mid-1950s it was clear that Britain was facing relative economic and political decline. 
The Suez Crisis of 1956, in particular, was indicative of Britain’s changing position in 
that it demonstrated that it no longer had the capacity to maintain an imperial role. 
Thereafter, the Conservatives under Macmillan accepted the need for withdrawal from 
commitments east of Suez.
Paul Sharp also provides a useful historical summary of Britain’s declining 
international position between 1945 and 1979. As well as receiving a reduced share of die 
world’s trade, merchant shipping, overseas investment, and the gross product ‘all shrank 
dramatically’. He goes on to state that, ‘Over the same period, the Empire, as any sort of 
cohesive force in international politics, disappeared, and Britain became dependent on the 
US for military technology, most notable the delivery systems for its nuclear warheads’.92 
Sharp blames Britain’s decline as a world power on the emergence of other States such as 
Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan who all had larger economies: ‘Their economic
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size and strength gave them a potential for world power which Britain could not hope to 
match, let alone master... Britain’s relative decline was inevitable, therefore’.93
According to Sharp, the British Government had a number of options in 1945, 
namely, to accept the new weakness and retire from the world stage, to seek a more 
modest role, or to act as if nothing had changed. He claims, however, that a reduced role 
was not considered since Britain had emerged on the winning side and it did not appear, 
at the time, that World War 2 had destroyed Britain’s great power status. Britain’s decline 
was also partly due to America’s preferences for a world based upon open economies. 
This did not ‘augur well for Britain whose wealth depended upon preferential relations 
with the Commonwealth and the Empire’.94 Given these fears over US intentions, post­
war leaders remained adamant that Britain had to retain as much international 
involvement as possible and it could be argued, therefore, that this decision was a 
conscious response rather than a failure to recognise Britain’s new reduced 
circumstances.
Britain’s need to retain great power status was based upon the belief that, once 
lost, such power and influence could not be regained. It was this perception which 
seriously damaged post-war British foreign policy, since situations such as the Suez crisis 
highlighted the significant changes in Britain’s capabilities. Although some colonial 
possessions were relinquished, such as India and Palestine, others such as the Persian 
Gulf States were seen as too valuable militarily and commercially. In the context of die 
Gulf, Britain wished to retain considerable influence by being seen as ‘a modem, 
industrial power which was independently procuring the latest military means and was at 
the centre of a system of states bound by reasons of history, sentiment and practical self 
interest who looked to Britain for leadership on questions of international importance’.95
This was believed possible by means of the economic recovery prevalent during 
the 1950s. However, as Suez so vividly demonstrated, it was open to serious 
misinterpretation. Following the Suez crisis, it was realised that Britain not only needed 
US acquiescence to use force but that it no longer had the economic means to act alone. 
This is confirmed by Sharp who states that this situation ‘remained axiomatic for the next 
quarter century until... Argentina invaded the Falklands Islands in 1982’.
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The debates on Thatcherism have raged between those who have seen it as an 
ideology with coherent views and a grand plan and those who stress that it introduced 
nothing new and that it was merely a moral instinct based upon Mrs. Thatcher’s own 
personal views. An actual definition is almost impossible, but as Kavanagh states, ‘Since 
1979 the so-called Thatcher experiment in Britain has attracted attention, partly because 
Mrs. Thatcher’s Conservative Government has broken with so many features of the post­
war consensus ...’.97 This consensus can be defined as general agreement on policy 
across the parties, and a willingness to compromise and bargain even in cases of 
disagreement. There had, therefore, been considerable continuity between governments 
during the post-war period, and the central tenets had been commitment to full 
employment and providing welfare, in other words the “Butskellism” which had emerged 
in the late 1940s and 50s. However, these attitudes, which were part of the Keynesian 
legacy, had become increasingly problematic as the pressure on the public purse 
continued to increase, and Britain was having to borrow more and more to 
counterbalance industrial failings. A further danger was over-reliance on North Sea oil, 
which was postponing the eventual inevitability of economic reform.
The so-called consensus, however, had begun to break down even before 
Thatcher, for example, as Riddell clarifies, with Edward Heath’s short-lived quiet 
revolution in the early 1970s, and most significantly with the oil shock of 1973. Riddell 
goes on to state that subsequently Callaghan and Wilson abandoned any attempts to attain 
full employment but that ‘The key shift towards a broadly monetarist approach and 
tougher control on public expenditure occurred under Labour from 1976 onwards’.98 
Despite attempts to curb Trade Union power and resuscitate Britain’s economy, the word 
“decline” entered the political vocabulary by the end of the 1970s and as a consequence, 
as Jenkins claims, the 1979 General Election was fought openly on this issue. As the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe, stated during his first budget address: 
‘In the last few years, the hard facts of our relative decline have become increasingly 
plain, and the threat of absolute decline has gradually become very real’.99 Jenkins goes 
on to state that for Mrs. Thatcher therefore “consensus” meant the appeasement of 
socialism and the advance of collectivism. Her approach was accorded the label
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“conviction politics” and can be defined as ‘...a way of declaring that she was not bound 
by the consensual wisdom ... but by her own passionately held beliefs’.100
It therefore remains difficult to define Thatcherism, but a number of common 
themes can be identified. Central to these, however, is the question of whether or not 
Thatcherism can be regarded as an ideology, and as a consequence the definitions range, 
as Taylor states, ‘...from celebrations of the individual herself to Marxist analyses of a 
new hegemonic bloc’.101 On the other hand, there are numerous examples of writers who 
argue that Thatcherism must not be seen as ideological, but rather concentrate on its 
range of characteristics. Holmes, for instance, defines Thatcherism as ‘an instinct, a series 
of moral values and ... an expression of Mrs. Thatcher’s upbringing in Grantham, her 
background of hard work and family responsibility, ambition and postponed satisfaction, 
duty and patriotism’.102 Marquand takes this further and lists a series of dimensions to 
Thatcherism which define it as a response to the collective despair of continuing national 
decline; as a vehicle for the promotion of economic liberalism; as a revolt against the 
social liberalism of the 1960s, and as Mrs. Thatcher personally emphasising her 
charismatic leadership with its populist overtone. However, as Taylor states, Marquand’s 
dimensions, though describing the phenomenon of Thatcherism, do not constitute a 
coherent ideology.103 This is backed up by Jenkins who defines ideology as a consistent 
system of ideas, but claims that Thatcher’s ‘...conviction politics were largely instinctive 
and very much the product of her own experience. Those instincts were narrow in range, 
dogmatically voiced [and] that she came to be credited with an ‘ism’ ... [was] a tribute to 
the force of her beliefs rather than to their coherence’.104
Biddiss also recognises the divisions over the precise meaning of Thatcherism, 
and places emphasis on Thatcher’s style of leadership and her values. Like Jenkins, he 
places importance on her conviction politics and describes as crucial the link between her 
upbringing as the daughter of a small trader in the uncertain economic circumstances of 
the 1930s and ‘her deep feeling for small businessmen and people who [were] staking 
their livelihoods on their activities’.105 Letwin also admits the existence of problems in 
defining Thatcherism but insists that it is possible to categorise. These categories include 
regarding it as a mere ‘ragbag of ideas’, asserting that Thatcherism was also occurring 
elsewhere as all governments were becoming more conservative, were cutting public
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borrowing, deregulating the private sector and so on, and finally claiming that what 
happened after 1979 perhaps had no distinctive pattern and that, as a consequence, 
Thatcherism is a meaningless label.106
Letwin goes on to argue, however, that since Thatcherism is a widely used term 
there has to be some meaning attached to it and offers a range of possible labels. These 
include Thatcherism as an economic enterprise, as a drive for power, and as a moral 
crusade. Those who label it as an economic enterprise claim that it was a clearly focused 
programme to increase economic efficiency and therefore was a conscious ‘effort to put 
into practice an economic dogma’. The roots of Thatcherism are, in this context, 
connected to Adam Smith and Milton Friedman, and are thereby equated with 
monetarism and strict control of the money supply. As a drive for power Letwin insists 
that Thatcherism is nothing like an ideology or any other system of ideas. She claims that 
it is ‘...rather driven and shaped by ambition ... [which] is allied to certain instincts 
which being narrow in range and dogmatically voiced, created die illusion of an 
ideology’. Similarly those who see Thatcherism as a moral crusade dismiss power and 
economics as Thatcherite objectives and instead claim that the ‘object of the crusade ... is 
to restore old-fashioned discipline in Britain’, centering on antipathy to inflation, respect 
for authority and law and order.107
Kavanagh confirms that there are problems associated with analysing 
Thatcherism but identifies three different contexts in which the term has been used. The 
first refers to Mrs. Thatcher’s no-nonsense style of leadership and her hostility towards 
gaining agreement by consensus. Secondly, there are claims that Thatcherism is 
synonymous with the creation of a state and government strong enough to resist the 
demands of pressure groups via ‘law and order, traditional moral values, a stable 
currency, and a free economy’; and thirdly Thatcherism has been labelled as a reaction 
against the post-war consensus such as Keynesian economics, high welfare spending, 
inflation, and trade union militancy. From this he concludes that
Thatcherism is a matter both of style and policies. As a political 
style - emanating from Mrs. Thatcher herself - it vigorously 
challenges many established beliefs and interests, boldly expresses 
personal and often right-wing views, and does not compromise on 
many deeply held political principles.108
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He then goes on to analyse Thatcherism in the context of its policies which, he states, 
rested on four separate foundations, namely, a determination to reduce inflation by 
controlling the money supply, a commitment to reduce the public sector along with the 
active encouragement of a free market economy, an attempt to free the labour market and 
curb excessive trade union power, and finally a resolve to strengthen the authority of the 
100 government.
As can be seen from the various definitions, Thatcherism cannot be discussed 
without reference to the economic situation prevailing at the time, and in this context it 
must be seen as a rejection of the social democratic consensus prevalent during the post­
war period. It was the defeat of the Heath Government between the years 1972 and 1974 
by trade union power which encouraged a major reassessment of British politics. The 
strength of the trade unions had highlighted the weaknesses in democracy as differing 
interests meant that parties were compelled to struggle against one another in a bid to 
gain votes. This led to the perception that Britain was becoming ungovernable and the 
Thatcherite solution was to roll back the state and base its economic policy not on 
servicing the many interests but on controlling the money supply. As Taylor states:
Stripped of their guilt, the Conservatives could allow the market 
and not the state to be the great distributor by rewarding enterprise 
and penalising dependence ... In this argument, therefore, 
Thatcherism ... has broken through the logjam of the social 
democratic consensus and produced a new era of British politics.110
Jessop et al regard the focus on monetarism as merely one factor in the search for a 
definition of Thatcherism, and identify a range of other equally relevant elements 
including Thatcher’s personal attitudes and beliefs. Even though the Thatcher era may 
have represented ‘something special or even unique ... which justifies associating [her] 
with a specific “ism”’, they stress that the “ism” is ‘better deciphered from Thatcher’s 
conference speeches, personal statements ... and interviews than it is from the policies 
and actions of her government’. They also focus on issues of her personality and political 
style rather than merely emphasising her direct personal qualities, and examine the 
impact of Thatcherism on the strategies and policies of the Conservative Party itself and 
the influence that this may have had on the restructuring of various segments of society.
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This realisation that a definition of Thatcherism cannot rest merely on one strand of 
analysis means that, as Jessop et al state
... Thatcherism must be related to the long-run relative decline of 
the British economy ... and the mode of growth with which this 
came to be associated; it must be related more directly to the 
emerging crisis of the specific form of Britain’s insertion into the 
global economy after 1945 and its associated social democratic 
mode of economic and political regulation; and it must be related 
to the organic crisis of British society which once again became 
acute in the mid-1970s.111
The above analysis leads to the belief that there has been a clear style to British politics 
since 1979. However, as Riddell states, the many differing interpretations have meant 
that there is a tendency, 'particularly on the left, to make Thatcherism seem more clear- 
cut than it is - to devise an ideology from what is in practice a series of values and 
instincts. Both opponents and supporters of the Thatcher Administration have created 
more of a pattern from disconnected events and policies than is warranted’.112 Indeed, far 
left or Marxist analyses were amongst the first theoretical studies of Thatcherism and 
provide a most lucid focal point for understanding possible ideological foundations. 
Marxist studies have argued that Thatcherism constitutes a coherent ideology and see it 
as establishing an 'illiberal, strong state, waging class warfare against the working class 
and progressive groups such as ethnic minorities and feminists. Thatcherism is [thus] 
regarded as a form of social control of which market disciplines are only one 
exposition’.113 In addition, it may be argued that in view of its contrast to the Keynesian 
era which preceded it, Thatcherism does mark a radical departure of an ideological type.
Riddell, however, disagrees with the view that Thatcherism was an ideology and 
argues that the “ism” was more of a reflection of the time. As he states, ‘There have 
obviously been ideological elements in the approach of Mrs. Thatcher and the 
Conservatives since 1979 - for instance, the dislike of state intervention in the economy - 
but this has not produced a pre-determined strategy’. He then goes on to refute Marxist 
claims by stating, ‘To talk, as the new Marxists do, of a coherent hegemonic project, or of 
the Thatcher project, is meaningless, as well as absurd. It is part of the dire linguistic
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legacy of Marx and Gramsci, which makes the work of many Marxists commentators so 
indigestible and so misleadingly determinist’.114
The difficulties entailed in defining Thatcherism have become apparent in the 
above analysis, and the debate over whether or not to regard the phenomenon as an 
ideology remains unresolved. But it is possible to moderate between the various extreme 
views regarding Thatcherism and adopt, as Gould and Digby state, a middle way which 
can be ‘gauged by a selection ... of its associated slogans and conviction politics’. Its 
popular capitalism, medium term financial strategy, reduction of public borrowing, 
pushing back the welfare state and attitudes to law and order ‘all suggest a hard-headed, 
unsentimental, realistic approach’.115
One of the most important elements to emerge from die debate on Thatcherism, 
however, has been the extent to which it represented a departure from past policies. As 
already highlighted, academic opinion varies greatly in this regard ranging from those 
who see Thatcherism as representing a radical change to those who see events post 1979 
as merely a continuation of previous policy. Marsh et al also discuss this question by 
stating that Thatcherite literature includes those who emphasise that significant change 
did occur in policy in many areas with others being more sceptical ‘...arguing that 
disaggregation is crucial, with significandy more change in some areas than others’.116
Much of the case study analysis on Thatcherism has centred on areas such as 
privatisation, health and housing policy, civil service reform, and industrial policy, with 
very few studies conducted on Thatcherite influence in foreign policy. Amongst these 
have been Freedman’s analysis on the Falklands war and some studies on the motivations 
for British defence exports.117 However, no definitive studies have been conducted on 
British foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf during this period, despite the fact that 
this remained a crucial area during the three Thatcher terms. In fact, in light of the 
importance of the Persian Gulf to British interests (defined later) this area might have 
been expected to be a particularly prevalent part of the Thatcherism debate.
The questions which were highlighted as part of the debate on Thatcherism are 
still relevant in die foreign policy context, as it is necessary to query Mrs. Thatcher’s role 
in British foreign policy and question whether her influence brought about a more 
aggressive stance, thereby reversing the perceived decline in Britain’s global position. As
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already indicated, there is a perception that a sizeable gap existed between Mrs. 
Thatcher’s rhetoric and the actual implementation of policy. This perception is 
applicable, as Dolowitz and Marsh highlight, in the case of various domestic policies, and 
it must be considered whether this was also the case in foreign policy implementation.118
In order to establish the importance of Mrs. Thatcher’s role in foreign policy in 
general and towards the Persian Gulf in particular, two differing perceptions need to be 
identified. The first, held by a large number of academics, is that Thatcher was 
predominantly interested in the domestic arena and played a very limited role in British 
foreign policy. In this context the appointment of Lord Carrington, a highly experienced 
politician and diplomat, as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AlTairs, is 
seen as reflecting Mrs. Thatcher’s priorities of placing domestic policies at die top of her 
agenda. Indeed, when the Thatcher Administration came to power, it was against a 
background of decline and pessimism brought about by the economic failures of the late 
1970s alongside a considerable reduction in Britain’s global role. There is no doubt, 
therefore, that in 1979 the task facing the new Conservative Government was to arrest the 
ongoing decline, before moving on to reassert Britain’s presence in Europe and beyond. 
For instance as Sharp states, it is
Important to understand that Thatcher had no strong foreign policy 
convictions at an early stage...Thatcher knew little and cared less 
about international relations...she did not yet believe that 
international affairs were important to what she sought to 
accomplish. Restoring Britain, for her, was primarily a matter of 
pursuing the correct domestic policies: reducing the money supply, 
lowering taxes, cutting public expenditure.119
Therefore, since Thatcherism appears to have centred primarily around domestic 
economic policy, it is perhaps difficult to identify a distinctive Thatcherite foreign policy. 
There is a second perception, however, which centres on Mrs. Thatcher’s aim of 
reversing Britain’s global decline by means of her vehemently anti-Soviet stance, her 
forceful patriotism, and her unshakeable belief in the Anglo-American special 
relationship. Mrs. Thatcher had a very different attitude towards policy from all other 
Conservative Prime Ministers, as she had no formal foreign affairs background, and her 
style in this field was based purely on her own personal patriotism and anti-communist
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attitude. Her forceful attitude may not have been popular with the Whitehall elite, but it 
ensured that for the general public Thatcherism in the field of foreign affairs came to 
mean strong defence policy, as demonstrated by the Falklands War and the Second Gulf 
War. This was all the more striking in view of the Labour Government’s unilateralism 
post-1982. As Holmes states ‘what has made her approach to foreign policy unique is that 
she has conducted international relations in an era when the post-war consensus on 
British defence policy had collapsed, leaving a clear-cut contrast between a Thatcherite 
pro-Nato, pro-nuclear stance and the unilateralism of the Labour Party’.120
Although Byrd acknowledges the fact that foreign policy was a relatively 
unknown area of the three Thatcher Governments, he refers to Thatcher’s resolute 
approach as highly ideological, closely identifies it with Mrs. Thatcher herself, and 
quotes it in support of the premise that Thatcherism represented a radical departure. His 
contribution to the literature has its basis in the argument that foreign policy under 
Thatcher was synonymous with ‘high politics’ and that although the content of foreign 
policy had not changed dramatically the ‘external environment ha[d] become more 
challenging while at the same time the domestic consensus of foreign and defence policy 
ha[d] weakened’. It is in this light, therefore, that foreign policy under Thatcher took on a 
‘domestic political significance and [became] an important tool in the game of party 
politics’.121
Foreign policy is one area, therefore, in which it is impossible to separate die 
policy from the personality and style of the Prime Minister herself as Mrs. Thatcher 
played a dominant role in its formulation, especially during her later years in office. Her 
influence was particularly apparent with regard to policy on arms control, the European 
Community (EC), the Falklands, South Africa and, significantly in this case, the Gulf, 
and this led to a belief that Britain had returned to a far more influential global 
position.122
The above analysis has shown that defining Thatcherism is not straightforward, 
though there are some common elements which emerge. The debate reveals distinct 
opinions including those who see it as a distinct ideology with coherent views and a 
grand plan and those who stress that it did not represent anything new and was merely a 
moral instinct based upon Mrs. Thatcher’s own personal views. However, her revolt
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against the social liberalism of the 1960s, her promotion of economic liberalism, and the 
adoption of a distinctly domestic economic enterprise based upon interests and incentives 
represented a conscious effort to put economic dogma into practice. These factors 
provide a basis upon which to claim that Thatcherite discourse was indeed constituted by 
an economic imagery itself based on positivist material economic interests. Therefore, 
even though it may be argued that Thatcherism was predominantly a domestic, economic 
phenomenon it may well have provided a specific framework for foreign policy. This 
chapter will now move on to identify the specific economic interests referred to in the 
case study.
Section 3: Establishing Parameters for the Case Study
Section 3.1: Defining Economic Interests and explaining the Military Presence
The following three chapters will analyse in detail the elements within Thatcherite 
discourse which were ultimately responsible for structuring specific ideas about the 
formation of British foreign policy towards the GCC States. Constructivist emphasis on 
ideas and discourse reveals the material economic interests that dominated the discourse 
of the era and the purpose of this section, therefore, is to conduct a preliminary analysis 
of those material interests. Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez, was to become 
synonymous with the question of decline, as the decision to withdraw was based upon a 
realisation that Britain could no longer afford to retain a sizeable military presence in the 
Persian Gulf region. Analysis of Thatcherite discourse, however, shows an emphasis on 
British interests in the Persian Gulf and military decisions taken to safeguard them.
Section 3.1.1: Material Economic Interests
a) Persian Gulf Oil
In addition to destroying the prevailing belief that oil supplies were abundant, the 1973 
Oil Crisis made the Persian Gulf region into one of the most important theatres in the 
global politico-strategic struggle for secure energy supplies. Cunningham, writing in 
1988, stated that the preoccupation with the Gulf came about due to the realisation that 
‘to date the world’s discovered reserves of oil have totalled 1,180 billion barrels of which
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700 billion remain to be produced. Over 56 percent of these reserves are in the Gulf.123 
He went on to claim that if established production patterns were to continue then there 
would come a time when the ‘only conventional reserves of oil’ were in the ‘hands of the 
governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Syria and Iraq’.124
Despite attempts to reduce dependency on oil through diversification and 
alternatives, Western European States remained dependent on the Gulf, and as Levy 
stated, ‘the world remained enormously dependent on the production policies of one key 
OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) country - Saudi Arabia’.125 Key 
economic sectors, in Western Europe in particular, remained heavily reliant on oil and 
therefore any disruption to supply would have had a detrimental effect on the various 
economies. While Western States such as the US and Britain may have had other 
interests in the Persian Gulf, one of the primary objectives was to secure access to the oil 
reserves and exports of the Gulf States. It therefore became increasingly clear that the 
relationship with the Gulf States was pivotal to Western security. As Table 1 illustrates 
any loss of Gulf oil would have resulted in ‘massive global economic and political 
instability’.126
Table 1: World Petroleum Supplies in 1980: The “Top Ten” before the Iran-Iraq 
War






1 USSR 11.7 SA* 9.4 SA* 168.0
2 SA* 9.9 USSR 3.0 Kuwait 67.9
3 US 8.6 Iraq 2.3 USSR 63.0
4 Iraq 2.6 Nigeria 1.9 Iran 57.5
5 Venez’la 2.2 Venez’la 1.8 Mexico 44.0
6 China 2.1 Libya 1.7 Iraq 30.0
7 Nigeria 2.1 Abu Dhabi 1.6 Abu Dhabi 29.0
8 Mexico 1.9 Kuwait127 1.5 US 26.4
9 Libya 1.8 Indonesia 1.2 Libya 23.0
10 Kuwait 1.7 Iran 1.1 China 20.5
(* Saudi Arabia, * MBD - Million Barrels per Day)
Source: Cordesman, Anthony H., The Gulf and the search for strategic stability, Boulder, 
Colorado, Westview Press Inc., 1984, p.4.
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The table shows that five Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and Abu 
Dhabi) were in the top ten league of oil producers, thus making this region strategically, 
politically and economically crucial to Western Europe, Japan and the United States. It is 
also important to realise that Saudi Arabia alone accounted not only for nearly 25 percent 
of the world’s proven oil reserves but also for 30 percent of the sustained oil production 
capacity of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).128
The other Gulf States, however, were also crucial in terms of their oil reserves and 
production capacity. Though not as wealthy or as influential as Saudi Arabia, collectively 
they did have roughly 50 percent of the former’s production capacity and approximately 
16 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Furthermore, estimation of proven oil 
reserves in Kuwait was to go up in 1981 from 67.9 billion barrels to over 167 billion 
barrels, thus significantly increasing the importance of the region and that particular Gulf 
State (see endnote 49).
b) Persian Gulf Markets
Of course oil was not the only factor which accounted for Western (especially US and 
British) interests in the Persian Gulf. Apart from oil the importance of the Gulf region lay 
in providing a lucrative market place for Western exports, the sale of which provided 
much needed profits and employment in British and US industrial sectors. As a nation 
importing goods Saudi Arabia, for instance, ranked behind only Western European 
nations and the US. Although approaches to the market varied amongst Western 
European States, reflecting in part historical ties, many had a stake in the Gulf markets 
exporting both defence and civilian products, and it was clear that the market was vast 
Oman was spending around 40 percent of its annual budget on defence and Saudi Arabia 
alone accounted for a total of 8 percent of global military spending. Amongst the Western 
European States with a significant stake in the Gulf markets Britain had a 
‘disproportionately large influence among the smaller Gulf States such as Oman, 
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’.129 As the case study chapters will 
show, this interest also included Saudi Arabia and other GCC States.
Furthermore, since 1973 the West had spent vast amounts of money on the 
purchase of oil from the Persian Gulf. As a result, one of the primary objectives of States
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such as Britain and the US was to recycle these sums back into Western financial 
markets. This is why Western States attached great importance to establishing bilateral 
economic links with the Gulf States. Providing programmes for infrastructural 
development in the Gulf countries, arms sales and other general imports into the region 
became one important method by which money spent on purchasing oil could be 
channelled back into the Western economies. As Table 2 shows, the oil revenues of all 
the Arab oil exporting countries were to increase substantially between 1973 and 1981, 
thereby indicating to the British and other Governments that the GCC States were 
lucrative markets.
Table 2: Oil Revenues of Key Arab Oil Exporters: USS billions
1964-73 73 75 77 79 81
Kuwait 11.8 2.8 5.9 8.9 16.7 14.9
SA 16.7 9.0 29.5 43.3 62.9 116.2
Qatar 1.8 0.6 1.8 2.0 3.6 5.4
UAE 2.2 1.9 6.8 9.1 12.9 18.8
Iraq 7.3 1.9 7.5 9.6 21.3 10.4
Oman - 0.18 1.1 1.4 2.2 4.2
Bahrain 0.05 0.29 0.4 0.53 3.0
Source: Taken from Ehteshami, A., ‘The rise and convergence of the ‘middle’ in the 
world economy’, Global interests in the Arab Gulf, (ed.), Davies, Charles E., University 
of Exeter Press, 1992, p. 161.
As Ehteshami writes, the fortunes of the Gulf States have varied. Whereas Iraq (and Iran) 
squandered much of their revenues during the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait was to consolidate 
its international holdings and significantly increase its foreign investments.130 Since the 
early 1970s Kuwait had been ‘an active investor in Western markets, acquiring equity 
holdings in some of the major corporations of the Western industrialised countries, 
including a substantial share in British Petroleum...[thus] equity investments account[ed] 
for approximately 50 percent of Kuwait’s net foreign assets ... Kuwait investments in the 
UK alone exceeded $6 billion by 1987’.131
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Section 3.1.2: Threat Perceptions: Reasons for the Military Presence
One key aspect of the period was the perception of threats to interests. Indeed, there is a 
mutual constitution here of threats and interests and these threats can be categorised as 
both internal and external to the region. As regards (a) internal threats the regional 
conflicts of the Persian Gulf were numerous and diverse. The competition between the 
Arabs and the Persians had been translated into a quest for dominance of the region 
between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, and the hostility between Iran and Iraq was to 
become open and protracted conflict in 1980 and was to last for eight years. Similarly, (b) 
external threats also dominated the way in which Britain defined its security interests as 
they centred on attempts to keep the GCC States free from Soviet influence, thereby 
containing the Soviet Union.
a) Internal Threats: Threats emanating from within the region
These can be defined as threats emanating from within the Persian Gulf region itself and 
can be broadly classified under three headings: (i) self assertion on the part of the Gulf 
States with regard to oil pricing and production levels, (ii) revolutionary changes within 
the Gulf States and (iii) conflict in the region, specifically the Iran-Iraq war. The 
consequences of these causes of instability will be introduced in the following section but 
will be analysed in detail from a British perspective in the case study chapters.
i) Self assertion
Before 1973 global energy issues did not seem to be a high priority in the West and this was 
probably due to the fact that at this time prices were largely determined by the efforts made 
by the oil companies in the exploration, investment and production of oil. Between 1945 and 
1973 the oil companies set prices well below the costs of alternative fuels, thus ensuring that 
the international community had access to cheap and what seemed at the time to be an 
almost unlimited supply of oil.132 This sense of false security brought about by adequate oil 
supplies not only contributed much to rapid economic expansion, but also caused an age of 
dependency for the industrial democracies.
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However, following the oil crisis of 1973, energy issues rose to the top of the 
Western security agenda. This concern was to become more serious, as the crisis also 
demonstrated that nation states (in this case OPEC governments) had successfully seized 
control of their oil back from the oil companies and had become capable of setting prices 
unilaterally, In addition, OPEC’s newly acquired power had coincided with the fact that, 
despite the West’s declared aims of reducing oil imports, imports had actually increased and 
were likely to go on increasing.133 Indeed, as figures for the US indicate, in 1947, for 
instance, it imported approximately 7.2 percent of its 2.1 billion barrel requirement. In 1970 
this had increased to 23 percent of a 5.5 billion barrel requirement, and by 1977 there had 
been a further increase to a staggering 47 percent of 6.8 billion barrels.134
The decision by the Arab oil-producing countries to market their oil themselves 
rather than through the oil majors resulted in the latter’s control being reduced from 60 
percent in 1973 to around 30-35 percent in 1979. This switch reduced the flexibility in the 
world oil system, making it more difficult for the West to adjust to minor disruptions in oil 
supply.
Fiona Venn highlights a number of other factors for concern. She supports the view 
that the price escalation had a severe impact upon Western economies, which were already 
experiencing the onset of recession. However, she stresses the fact that ‘though it was the 
Western nations whose problems were the more immediately apparent, the impact was 
global in its implications’.135 These global effects were of particular significance since the 
West feared that other underdeveloped raw material producers would follow the precedent 
set by the oil rich states.
Despite the fact that many advocated conservation and the search for alternative 
fuels, Western demand for oil continued to rise, and the self assertion sweeping through 
OPEC capitals placed increasing pressure upon price constraint and high production levels. 
It became apparent that it was simply not in the interests of die Gulf States to maintain high 
production levels, as this would result in reduced prices. Indeed, during the 1970s, they 
came increasingly to the conclusion that revenues could be raised by restricting oil 
production.
This raised questions with regard to Western security and continued access to secure 
oil supplies. Bissell claims that since oil began to be mentioned as a key factor in stronger
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allied security, this gave rise to the possibility that there was a strong relationship between 
oil and national security itself.136 In addition, Denis Healey (Chancellor of the Exchequer of 
the British government until May 1979) wrote an article in Foreign Affairs in 1979 stating 
that oil producing countries had begun to think about restricting production in order to 
increase prices. He went on to state that ‘oil is so important in so many ways that sudden 
changes in its price or supply can inflict great damage on the whole world economy. When 
change is sudden, the industrial consuming countries cannot hope to meet it by conservation 
alone’.137 From this it is possible to contend that the importance of oil was such that merely 
relying on OPEC was insufficient to guarantee oil supplies. Indeed, certain Western nations 
(including Britain - see chapter 2) took action to physically safeguard oil supply routes.
David Deese lends further credibility to the importance of oil in his analysis of 
various conflicts since World War 1, as he states that ‘Protecting the Western Alliance, 
preventing conflict and war, and preserving the ability to defend vital national interests with 
force all hinge on understanding the relationship between oil and grand strategy’.138 He 
argues that oil influenced four crucial elements in the formulation of peacetime national 
strategy. These included the protection of vital interests through the use of force, alliance 
formation, the form of national force structures, and ultimately the decision whether or not 
to conduct international conflict.139
Against this background the moderation demonstrated by some pro-Western Arab 
Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia was seen as particularly important. As Turner stated, it 
was ‘in the British interest to hope for Saudi authorities to continue [their] current policy 
of using some of their marginal production capabilities to bring some order to turbulent 
oil markets’.140 This view was also expressed earlier during the onset of the 1979 oil 
crisis (which came about as a result of the Iranian Revolution). It was highlighted at the 
time that increased production by Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela and the UK had 
made up about half the Iranian shortfall. In the Middle East, Abu Dhabi, and the other 
UAE countries, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, accounted for about one-third of all the 
OECD imports of crude oil and natural gas, with Saudi Arabia producing about one-fifth 
of their total. As was stated at the time: ‘if we reduce the Iran supply to its present 3 
million barrels a day, the importance of the remaining states becomes apparent’.141
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ii) Revolutionary Changes
Revolutionary changes in the Persian Gulf represent another set of factors which were of 
concern to the West in general. Any change in the political stability of the Gulf States 
would have meant an alteration in the status quo, and this could have seriously affected 
Western interests in the region as stability was crucial in order to safeguard Western 
economic and strategic interests. This was confirmed, in particular, after the 1973 crisis, as 
one of the clearest dangers inherent throughout the Persian Gulf was the incapacity of the 
ruling elites to establish adequate responses to the demand for political participation. 
These demands were compounded by the rapid modernisation which had been sweeping 
through the region - essentially as a result of the huge amounts of oil revenues.
Another important factor in the equation was external support for the local power 
elites without whom, it can be argued, their duration in power would have been seriously 
reduced. Ayoob provided evidence of this when he analysed the ‘linkage between the 
interests of order within the international system valued by the superpowers ... and the 
preservation of local privileges - economic, social and political - cherished by narrowly- 
based elites’.143 He went on to argue that in the Hom of Africa (in the Soviet Union’s 
case) and the Persian Gulf (in the US’s case), the two superpowers ‘firmly came down in 
favour of the established political order and against the demands of political and 
economic justice’.144 It is in this context that the commitment to the status quo on the part 
of the Western States must be understood.
As OPEC became more assertive, the West felt a need to search for an alternative to 
the structures which had existed prior to the crisis, and the new order came to be based 
primarily upon the improvement of US-Saudi and US-Iranian relations. Included within this 
mix was the need to improve relations with the regimes of the other oil rich Gulf States such 
as Kuwait and Bahrain. It can be argued that Ihe moderating influence of US-Saudi relations 
provided a mechanism by which the West could safeguard its interests, and this re­
emphasises the importance of Saudi Arabia, which Doran identified as the state which had 
ultimate power within the OPEC system, as he stated that ‘it alone [was] able to cause 
serious disruption of organisational unity by changing the rate of growth in its output’.145
Although Saudi Arabia could be perceived as an important member of OPEC, not all 
members adhered to its position on pricing and production levels, but by placing Saudi
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Arabia at the centre of a series of concentric circles, Doran was able to show that those 
states closer to Saudi Arabia in ethnic, political and religious terms would be more likely to 
accept Saudi Arabia’s price preferences.146 In this sense it is possible to argue that the Gulf 
Sheikhdoms also adhered, albeit in varying degrees, to Saudi Arabia’s own pro-Western 
position. It is clear that, despite differences between the Gulf States, they were like minded 
since they were all governed by autocratic monarchies, followed the Sunni version of Islam, 
and were beset by similar internal and external problems.147 It now becomes possible to link 
this line of thought with the contention that by targeting this inner circle of OPEC States the 
US was able to create a degree of stability in the region, thus safeguarding Western interests.
A second factor surrounding the new order created after 1973 concerns the US, and 
to what extent it played an important role in supporting the status quo in the region. The US 
response to the crisis was important in that this may have strongly influenced the British 
decision to support its ally. This argument now becomes crucial, largely because of the high 
level of US dominance in conducting Western relations with the Gulf States.
On 17 January 1968 Britain announced that it was preparing to withdraw all its 
forces from ‘east of Suez’, at the same time ending its military and political presence in 
the Persian Gulf. This withdrawal left a power vacuum in the region which was quickly 
filled by the US after 1973.148 From then on US policy centred around encouraging Saudi 
Arabia and Iran to act as surrogates and police the Gulf on behalf of the West’s economic 
interests. American assistance (known as the Nixon Doctrine) was offered in return for 
local military self-reliance149, and the Shah of Iran, for example, accepted the invitation 
to serve as guarantor of Gulf security, Western oil supplies and access through the straits 
of Hormuz, and demanded in return considerable amounts of advanced weapons systems 
which, according to Whettan, amounted to approximately $18 billion worth.150 This 
framework for security continued until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which 
significantly magnified the Western sense of insecurity in the Persian Gulf, resulting in 
the emergence of three serious challenges to Western policy in the region, namely the 
threat of a fundamentally different ideology, the attraction to Iran of fifth columnists 
based elsewhere in the region, and territorial claims made by revolutionary Iran.
. The 1979 demonstrations by countless Iranians in opposition to the Shah and his 
despotic rule were understood, in the West, to be attributable to the ‘fanaticism of the
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Iranian people’, and to the emergence of a virulently anti-Western regime in Teheran headed 
by Ayatollah Khomeini.151 Khomeini and his followers, on the other hand, as Rouleau 
argues, claimed that han’s problems largely lay in US interference in Iranian politics: ‘All 
the problems of the East stem from these foreigners, from the West, and from America at 
the moment All our problems come from America. All the problems of the Moslems stem 
from America’.152 It was perhaps tins change in Iran that led to the disintegration of the US 
policy of‘employing’ Iran and Saudi Arabia to ‘manage’ Western interests in the region.
Chaos in the oil market coincided with the instability in Iran as in 1978 strikes led to 
a total cut-off of Iranian oil exports, and when Iran did begin re-exporting it was at a much 
reduced level, leading to serious supply disruptions, particularly in Sweden and in the 
United Kingdom, despite the feet that North Sea oil facilities were expanding.153 The extent 
of the disruption to European oil supplies also became apparent when British Petroleum and 
Royal Dutch/Shell had to begin cutting deliveries to third party customers.154
The fact that Iran decided to refuse to export oil to certain States such as Israel and 
South Africa suggested that politics would feature strongly in its decisions regarding oil, and 
this further demonstrated Saudi Arabia's importance 155 since by increasing their own oil 
production levels the Saudis were able to cushion the effects of the significant decrease in 
oil supply. The increase in European and US oil consumption levels, however, meant that 
the Saudi action did not provide lasting assistance. In addition, as Yergin and Stobaugh 
claim, the Saudis themselves were increasingly unable to influence the price and as a result 
were soon reluctant ‘to go out on a limb against the other OPEC countries’ - especially in 
light of the US’s ‘inability to control demand and reduce imports’.156
It was against this background of revolution in Iran that radical Iranian students, 
influenced by Khomeini’s religious fervour, seized the American embassy in Teheran on 4 
November 1978 and thus prompted a crisis which was to last for over fourteen months. 
Despite claims that the ‘Carter administration considered the Shah to be finished and 
accepted the Islamic Revolution, and their common enmity to the Soviet Union made Iran 
and the US natural allies’, the Shah’s admission into the US nullified American gestures, 
and Khomeini urged Iranian students to ‘expand [their] attacks against America and Israel 
with full force, and to compel the US into extraditing this criminal, deposed Shah’.157 In this 
way the hostage crisis not only contributed to the deterioration in relations between Iran and
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the West but also hinted at the intractable nature of instability in the Persian Gulf and the 
problems yet to come.
The challenges posed by Iran’s revolution continued to be seen as a threat well 
into the 1980s, with the result that outside interests in the Persian Gulf were to be 
seriously affected.158 Essentially, two different world views came into conflict with each 
other after the Revolution - secular Arab Gulf States versus a fundamentalist Iranian 
Islamic view. There was a genuine fear in Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
that their traditional monarchies would come under serious threat from the 
revolutionaries in Iran. It is widely accepted that Khomeini wanted to overthrow secular 
authority not only in Iran but elsewhere in the Middle East, and to replace it with 
theocratic systems of government.159
Another perceived threat in this context was the fact that the Shi’ites had 
traditionally been ruled as a disadvantaged class by the other major Islamic sect - the 
Sunnis.160 Even in Iraq where the Shi’ites were the majority sect (52 percent of the 
population), they did not have political control since Sunnis occupied 80 percent of top 
government posts.161 Iran, being the only Middle Eastern country to have an absolute Shi’ite 
majority (90 percent of the total population), therefore had the potential of providing a 
powerful attraction to the Shi’ites elsewhere in the Gulf. Paranoia and fear of Iranian 
fundamentalism among the Gulf Arab States was such that Iraq took action against al- 
Dawaa, an Iraqi Shi’ite group accused of attempting to assassinate Tariq Aziz (Iraq’s 
Deputy Premier) in April 1980, by expelling up to 200,000 Iraqi Shi’ites, labelled as ‘illegal 
Persian immigrants’.162
Further evidence of the threats posed by the change in the political structure of han 
was provided by Iranian territorial claims in the Gulf region. Most notable were its claims to 
the Short al-Arab (the river separating Iraq and han) and Bahrain. The problems between 
Iran and Iraq were further exacerbated by Iranian support for the Kurdish separatist 
movement in Iraq. The rebellion by the Kurds during the early 1970s had seriously 
weakened Iraq, and Iranian support for the Kurds was almost to lead to war in 1974. The 
Algiers Agreement, signed between Iran and Iraq on 6 March 1975, brought about a 
reduction in Iranian aid to Iraqi Kurds in exchange for a relocation of the frontier along the 
Shatt. This settlement in effect meant that a major Iranian ambition had been achieved, and
49
this territorial issue has often been cited as one of the reasons behind the Iraqi invasion of 
Iran in September 1980.163 The other Gulf States were also well aware of the potential 
threats posed by revolutionary Iran. Claims to Bahrain for instance, though treated with 
scepticism by many analysts, have to be considered in light of the unsuccessful coup in 
Bahrain in December 1981. It was widely accepted that Iran was behind the attempt, and the 
fact that Ayatollah Rouhani (a leading member of the Iranian clergy) referred to Bahrain as 
Iranian in September 1979 must not be dismissed lightly.164
Ui) Conflict -within the region - The Iran/lraq War
Actual and potential conflict in the region was also perceived as posing a threat to Western 
interests in the Persian Gulf. The Iran*Iraq war had the potential of polarising Islamic 
populations in the Middle East between Sunni and Shi’ite and it could have further divided 
the Arab world between secular states and those advocating some form of fundamental 
religious hegemony. Ayatollah Khomeini’s success demonstrated that Islamic revolution 
was possible and this was ‘a powerful sectarian example to the shi’ites in Bahrain, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Yemens’.165 Alongside the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the 
possibility of the longstanding hostility between Iran and Iraq erupting into full-scale war 
not only endangered the stability of the region as a whole but also, in light of die possibility 
of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on neutral shipping in the Gulf, posed a 
very real threat to both trade routes and freedom of navigation.
b) External Threats - threats emanating from outside the region
Particularly crucial in this context is to what extent the Soviet Union was perceived as being 
a threat, and the question arises whether Soviet actions (combined with internal threats) had 
significant policy implications for outside powers such as Britain. This is one of the factors 
which will feature in the case study on the discourse of the era. This section highlights the 
prevalent academic viewpoints, which deal predominantly with US concerns and 
preoccupation with the region. The fact that most literature of the period concentrates on 
events from a US perspective provides further proof of the lack of material addressing these 
topics from a British viewpoint, and the case study chapters will, therefore, further analyse 
this material in the context of British foreign policy and military presence in the region.
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Following the Soviet invasion and the Iranian Revolution, Iraq seemed to have 
adopted a more moderate stance towards its Arab neighbours. Similarly, Saudi Arabia 
vehemently opposed Soviet encirclement of the Persian Gulf and feared that fundamentalist 
Iran might seek to export its revolution. As a result the British and the US were able to build 
upon such fears and realignments and pursue their own policies of containing the Soviet 
Union. The one crucial implication of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, therefore, was that 
it provided the context for a convergence of US, British, Iraqi and Saudi Arabian interests.
The failure of the US to maintain a direct presence in the Persian Gulf led to a 
‘steady erosion of the West’s ability to protect oil routes’.166 Indeed, as events in 1979 
demonstrated, the power vacuum left by the US was in serious danger of being filled by the 
Soviet Union and its clients in the region. Two conflicting views need to be considered here. 
On the one hand not only did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appear to be the latest 
move towards the oil in the Persian Gulf, but the US appeared for a time incapable of 
adequate response.167 On the other hand, however, it is possible to argue that the Soviet 
invasion was a watershed in East-West relations and that the US response reflected this.
Concern about the Soviet Union was once again growing in the United States during 
the final years of the 1970s, as the perception was that the Soviet Union had changed from 
being a continental to a global power, and from being merely concerned during the 1960s 
with ‘immediately adjacent areas and with what came to be known as the Socialist 
Commonwealth' to dealing with obligations and commitments in more distant parts of the 
world.168 Dimitri cites Kissinger’s views, which indicate that the US was slipping in terms 
of global power and influence in the face of a Soviet advance:
there is a historical inevitability that if present trends in the military balance 
are not arrested and reversed, the United States will have to take new 
strategic realities into account in some future international crisis and either 
retreat or risk confrontation from a position of perceived weakness.169
Indeed, apart from the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt at Camp David, prospects for 
US foreign policy successes in the Middle East remained bleak. As Newell stated ‘from the 
Golan Heights to South-West China... the ruins of US policy lay strewn across the path of 
potential Soviet advance’.170 Even the Camp David treaty itself was not a total success, 
since it was to result in the creation of a split in the Arab world between Egypt and other 
Arab States firmly opposed to peace with Israel. The Arab split also provided the USSR
with opportunities to increase influence in states which were against the peace deal, and 
Syria, the PLO and Libya were just some of the players which formed the no-compromise 
front and hence became susceptible to increasing Soviet influence.
The greatest fear in the US, however, was that at the end of the 1970s the Persian 
Gulf had become the central focus for the Soviet Union. As Fred Halliday wrote at the time, 
the ‘Persian Gulf is where the West was now said to have its major strategic interests... and 
it was here that the full blast of the Soviet threat is stated to be most evident... Almost as 
certainly as did Europe in the 1940s, the Gulf provides the critical source of conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union’.171 In addition, it could be argued that han 
was perceived by US political leaders to be a likely region outside Europe where there was 
the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union.
Consistent Soviet interest in the Middle East traditionally centred around two 
factors, the proximity of the Middle East to the USSR and the Suez Canal, and the region’s 
extensive resources.172 In addition to ensuring Soviet interest in the Middle East, these 
factors meant that Superpower rivalry became more intense, culminating in the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and its attempts to gain influence in Iran after the 1979 
Revolution.
One view amongst some Western countries (the US and Britain for instance) at the 
time of the invasion was that this represented a decisive Soviet move towards a warm water 
port, and also an attempt to control Persian Gulf wealth and Western oil and trade sea 
lanes.173 There were those who argued, however, that ‘concern about the Soviet threat 
appeared to be based upon questionable assumptions and sometimes facts; taking individual 
events out of their local and historical contexts; ignoring the limits of Soviet power and the 
setbacks encountered by Moscow’.174 As regards other possible motives, Valenta argues that 
Islamic fundamentalism was a major concern in the Soviet Union, especially in light of the 
Iranian Revolution, combined with the fact that over 50 million of the Soviet Union’s own 
population was Muslim.175
Western fears were also heightened by the fact that the future oil-export market 
would increasingly be dominated by fewer and fewer nations primarily centred in the 
Persian Gulf.176 Although the Soviet Union had been a net exporter of oil and self sufficient 
in meeting its own energy requirements there was a ‘growing disjunction between the
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location of fuel reserves and major areas of consumption’.177 The fact that the ‘availability 
of easily extracted resources located in the Western part of the USSR was rapidly 
diminishing’, combined with the fact that most of the Soviet Union’s resources were 
increasingly ‘concentrated in inhospitable areas of Siberia and Central Asia’ meant that the 
Soviet Union stood at the edge of becoming a net importer of energy.178 These prospects 
were full of serious implications since, as Cobb stated, ‘the entrance of the Soviet Union into 
competition for the world’s increasingly scarce energy resources was likely to significantly 
alter Soviet strategic policies, particularly with respect to the oil*rich Persian Gulf, thus 
raising the possibility of direct confrontation with the West.179
Whatever the Soviet motives behind the invasion, accounts seemed to suggest that 
there was a real threat to the Persian Gulf, and that there was evidence to show a ‘persistent 
and systematic Soviet effort to spread her influence southward’.180 Various events during 
the 1970s had tripped the alarm about the growth of Soviet power,181 and fear of Soviet 
adventures had been increasing since their support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. 
The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, influence in Ethiopia and Somalia, the invasion 
of Afghanistan and lastly Soviet attempts to gain a foothold in Iran, all pointed towards the 
possibility of confrontation and a perceived Soviet desire to encircle the Persian Gulf.
The timing of the Iranian Revolution was also of central importance in relation to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the West’s concern regarding stability in the Persian 
Gulf. Events seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union believed that the revolution had 
provided them with an opportunity to increase influence in Iran as, in line with their support 
for revolutionary movements, they welcomed the undermining of the Shah’s pro-Western 
stance. They saw this as a development which was likely to make Iran more susceptible to
1 RO 
Soviet overtures and believed that the weakened US position would be a gain for them. 
Although it later became clear that the new Iranian regime was as hostile towards the Soviet 
Union as it was towards the US, it must be remembered that the loss of US influence in Iran, 
combined with Soviet overtures towards Iran’s new rulers, reinforced the fear in the West of 
Soviet attempts to extend its influence southwards, which would have brought it to the 
Gulfs doorstep.
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Section 4: The British Response: an introduction to the discourse
The above analysis has provided a general introduction to the elements which 
subsequently define the parameters of the case study. The extent to which these elements 
influenced British foreign policy towards the GCC States will be analysed later in the 
case study but it may be worthwhile, by way of an introduction, to identify some central 
factors of the British response. This analysis confirms the connection between ideational 
and material structures as specified by constructivist theory in that Thatcherite discourse 
was dominated by economic interests and this consequently provided some form of 
structure to the British response.
The history of British foreign policy had been one of attempting to reconcile the 
differences between the resources available and the wide range of commitments. Defence 
had become closely associated with the Thatcher administration and all too often took 
centre stage during the election campaigns. Thatcher was seen as adopting a particularly 
robust view on maintaining defence capabilities and, as Freedman states, this often meant 
that she was ‘twinned with Ronald Reagan as the architect of the more hard-line policies 
adopted by West during the 1980s’.183
Jones confirms that defence as an issue influenced voting behaviour during the 
election both in 1979 and 1983, and this further suggests that the inter-party consensus 
which had dominated defence issues since 1945 had indeed broken down. Although there 
were significant differences between the main parties over specific defence issues 
‘...what was not at issue cither between the parties or amongst the electorate as a whole 
was a strong and positive commitment to the broad objectives of British defence policy 
...[which] was to be, on the one hand, opposed to the Soviet Union and, on the other, 
Atlanticist and particularly pro-American, pro-Nato, pro-nuclear and ... predominantly 
orientated towards Europe’.184
The advent of Thatcherism signalled a debate over defence issues, and despite the 
emphasis on the maintenance of strong defence, the discourse reveals a certain tension in 
this field in light of the limited resources available. As Freedman states, despite the 
commitment to a 3 percent growth in the defence budget in the early 1980s the 
Government ‘still found it necessary to take hard decisions on defence priorities. After a
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sharp debate in the spring of 1981, the Secretary of State announced a revised defence 
programme that came out in favour of sustaining the British Army of tire Rhine at the 
expense of the maritime contribution... ’185
In 1979 the new Conservative Government had appeared to stress a renewed 
interest in military involvement outside the Nato area and as a consequence devoted 
space in its first Defence Estimates to the question of greater intervention capabilities. As 
Freedman states ‘In February 1981, the Prime Minister even appeared to promise 
substantial involvement in the Rapid Deployment Force planned in the United States’.186 
The Defence Estimates of the following month, however, played down the issue, 
stressing that ‘Reinstatement of the former British presence East of Suez is no longer 
either a political or economic possibility ... Resource constraints and our primary 
responsibility to Nato rule out any idea of creating a substantial standing intervention 
force’.187
The 1981 Defence Review, (Cmnd 8288 - ‘The Way Forward’), confirmed that a 
reduction in defence commitments was necessary in light of the economic situation and 
as a consequence ‘resisted the temptation to expand Britain’s defence commitments 
overseas. This ensured that the budgeting problem if faced was not exacerbated ... and in 
June 1981, it was decided that there was to be a reduction in the numbers of destroyers 
and frigates’.188 Capitanchik confirms that the Government was concerned to hold 
militaiy expenditure in check. In analysing the 1981 Defence Review he states
In 1980, when costs seemed to be running out of hand, it actually 
imposed a moratorium in defence spending. In 1981, Mr. Nott’s “The 
Way Forward”, although devised mainly with an eye to allocations within 
defence, implicitly recognised that defence should stand on the same 
footing as any other major item in the government’s spending 
programme. It acknowledged cash limits and the need to check cost 
escalation. In other words, the Conservative Government ... has no 
intention of mounting a defence effort incompatible with the resources 
available.189
In light of the Government’s decision to reduce defence expenditure, the question of the 
British military presence in the Persian Gulf arises. As chapter 2 will indicate, Britain 
retained a naval force (the Armilla Patrol) in the region throughout the 1980s, in addition 
to numerous naval visits and tri-service exercises conducted with local Gulf State forces.
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Furthermore, as chapter 4 will demonstrate, the trend to deploy sizeable tri-service forces 
to the region continued in light of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The maintenance of a 
military presence in the region therefore indicates that, despite the overall restructuring of 
defence priorities, certain commitments (such as contributing to the stability of this 
particular region) were added to the list, thus providing some basis for the claim that the 
region was of importance to Britain.
In addition to the deployment of the Armilia Patrol the British Government was 
forced to reconsider central elements outlined in “The Way Forward” in light of the 
Falklands War, which reopened the debate on the future defence position and enabled the 
Navy in particular to restate its case, namely, the restoration of its extra-Nato 
dimension.190 The war also encouraged a ‘revisionist’ critique which argued that a way 
had to be found to maintain and even enhance the surface fleet; ‘...the unexpected nature 
of this war and the reliance on the service that the Government was about to run down 
inevitably led to accusations of strategic myopia. The Falklands war was presented as a 
lesson in the “nick of time”, before the senior service was rendered wholly incapable of 
coping with such eventualities’.191 As chapter 2 will demonstrate, important decisions 
taken by John Nott in 1981, such as the one to scrap HMS Intrepid and Fearless (which 
made up a significant portion of Britain’s amphibious capabilities) were reversed. As 
Freedman states. ‘Nott’s successor at the Defence Ministry, Michael Heseltine, in 1983 
and 1984 presided over a steady retreat from some of the harsher judgements of 1981’.192
The Government itself acknowledged the case for some revision as Heseltine, 
Defence Secretary after John Nott, stated:
The Falklands campaign showed that we must be prepared for the 
unforeseen and that we must be ready to defend our vital interests 
outside the Nato area. We have already announced - in the 
Falklands White Paper - a number of improvements in the ability 
of our forces to operate outside Europe, such as the purchase of a 
fleet of Tristar strategic tankers and the upgrading of our out-of- 
area formation, 5 Infantry Brigade.19’’
It can be argued, however, that Britain's action in defending the Falklands went against 
the general trend of withdrawing from overseas commitments, and that the war did not 
represent a policy of general military intervention overseas. Despite this, however, the 
Guli naval deployments were clearly the most sustained British involvement in an out-of-
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area region during the 1980s and consequently this raises the question of whether this 
involvement itself was an aberration and against the general trend of reducing overseas 
commitments. This question arises again following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the 
subsequent sizeable British increase in its military presence, this time of a tri-service 
nature, but aberration or not, the emphasis on economic interests in the GCC States 
revealed by the discourse of the era seems to indicate that some type of response was 
likely.
Section 5: Sources defining the Thatcherite Discourse
There is to date no secondary source literature which specifically analyses British foreign 
policy towards the Persian Gulf during the Thatcher period. For this reason, although 
secondary sources such as books and articles have answered many questions, it has been 
necessary to construct an argument based predominantly on primary sources in five 
specific categories, namely, the British Government's Official Record, Commons Select 
Committee Reports, Command Papers, United Nations Documents and Personal 
Interviews with selected officials. Research of the Official Record (Hansard) has been 
particularly detailed, spanning the entire Thatcher period. This not only provided an 
insight into Government policy towards the Persian Gulf, but also highlighted important 
statements by central politicians throughout the period in question. Research of this 
particular source has also identified individuals who played a leading role in the 
formation of policy towards the region and aided in the interview selection process.
Commons Select Committee Reports have formed the second tier of primary 
sources and in themselves have provided a more detailed assessment of relevant issues. 
They have been particularly useful in gaining an insight into issues such as Government 
policy during the Iran/Iraq war, policy with regard to the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, analysis into questions of economic decline, Anglo-Soviet relations, 
policy following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, defence implications of the 
improvement in East-West relations and issues relating to out-of-area operations. A 
comprehensive list of the Select Committee Reports used is provided in the bibliography.
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The third set of Official British Government Publications have been the 
Command Papers which are actual Government statements of policy and act as replies to 
specific Commons Select Committee investigations. These have, therefore, been 
especially useful in providing information on Government policy in cases where the 
Select Committees have been unable to provide detailed conclusions. These Papers cover 
the whole range of government, but in the case of this thesis a narrower range concerned 
with relevant issues such as out-of-area operations, expenditure plans, and various facets 
of defence policy have been consulted. As in the case of the Select Committee Reports 
details of the relevant Command Papers have been provided in the bibliography.
Fourthly, Personal Interviews with specific individuals have been conducted and 
these have been for the express purpose of either confirming or disputing the findings of 
other forms of research. Interviewees have included Lord Douglas Hurd, Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs during the first Thatcher Administration 
and subsequently Secretary of State in the same Department during the crisis following 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
A second interviewee was Sir Alan Munro, who was Head of the Middle East 
Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1979. Sir Alan Munro’s period 
in office spanned the change in Administration which brought Mrs. Thatcher to power 
and he was, therefore, particularly useful in highlighting the difference in emphasis 
towards the Persian Gulf region between the two Governments. In addition, Sir Alan 
Munro was the Regional Marketing Director (Middle East) affiliated to the Ministry of 
Defence between 1981-1983 and was therefore able to shed light on the importance of the 
GCC States as markets for British defence equipment.
Similarly, Stephen Day, as Ambassador to Qatar (1981-1984) and Head of the 
Middle East Department (1984-1986), was able to provide useful information concerning 
the importance of the GCC States in economic terms. Furthermore, his (and Sir Alan 
Munro’s) comments on the Iranian Revolution were particularly useful in understanding 
the extent to which the Government viewed the consequences as disastrous for the 
stability of the region. Although Sir Frank Cooper (Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 
Ministry of Defence, 1976-1982) appeared less convinced of the value of British exports 
to the Persian Gulf region he nevertheless confirmed Mrs. Thatcher’s high profile in
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advocating stability in the region and encouraging British companies to sell their products 
there.
Sir Colin Chandler (Head of Defence Sales, Ministry of Defence, 1985-1989) was 
the central player in negotiating the Al Yamamah contracts with Saudi Arabian officials 
and interviewing him was particularly important as the information he provided 
confirmed Britain’s economic pre-occupation with the GCC States, and in particular with 
Saudi Arabia. As its largest ever defence contract Al Yamamah ensured that Britain 
retained an important role in Saudi defence procurement plans, and provided a base for 
political and military co-operation with Saudi Arabia during the second Gulf War.
Sir Derek Boorman (Chief of Defence Intelligence and Deputy Chairman of the 
Joint Intelligence Chiefs, 1985-1988) was able to highlight the importance which Mrs. 
Thatcher attached to intelligence reports concerning the threat posed by Iraq to the 
stability of the region. Furthermore, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine and Group 
Captain A.P.N. Lambert were able to provide detailed information on the conduct of 
operations against Iraq itself. Sir Patrick Hine as the then Air Officer Commanding-in- 
Chief, United Kingdom Air Forces, was well placed to gain an insight into Mrs. 
Thatcher’s perceptions and attitudes towards the invasion. During the interview he 
confirmed that Mrs. Thatcher had been instrumental in persuading President Bush that 
something purposeful had to be done in confronting the Iraqi threat. Furthermore, David 
Nicholls, as the Assistant Sec. Gen. for Defence Planning and Policy, NATO, 1980-1984, 
and Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Policy), Ministry of Defence, 1984-1989, not only 
threw light on the international factors surrounding Britain’s decision to support the 
coalition, but also indicated the extent of divisions between Departments over the extent 
and reasons for British action in the Gulf.
Finally Dr. David Kay was, at the time, Head of the Evaluation section of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and during this time he led a number of inspections 
of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. Furthermore Colonel Terence Taylor had been 
one of the 21 inspectors connected with the United Nations Special Commission between 
1992-1995 and had also been a Chief Inspector. Both were able to highlight the 
importance which the coalition (in particular Britain and the United States) attached to 
the ongoing monitoring and verification process of Iraq’s industrial capabilities.
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The final set of primary sources used have been United Nations Documents. In 
particular the speeches made by the British Permanent Representative, Sir David Hannay, 
during the Security Council Debates have been crucial in highlighting the Government’s 
official stance towards Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Access to Security Council Closed 
Documents was also possible following requests to the Dag Hammarskjold Library at the 
United Nations. A series of Closed Sessions (defined as debates away from Press 
scrutiny) were held during the conflict against Iraq and were strongly supported by 
Britain. The debates included speeches by Sir David Hannay which confirmed the 
importance attached by the Government to Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal. Details of 
United Nations Documents have also been provided in the bibliography.
Of course, primary sources are crucial in establishing firm conclusions on policy, 
however, secondary sources inevitably form part of the discourse of a particular historical 
period and so have been used extensively to support the central arguments. Articles, 
books and newspaper reports (details of which are in the bibliography) have been 
particularly useful in understanding some of the general academic debates surrounding 
important issues concerning the Persian Gulf. The importance of the GCC States in terms 
of oil and markets for western products in general has been established using secondary 
sources. Primary sources have then been used to confirm or dispute elements of the 
hypothesis in the case study itself. Other issues such as the general consequences of the 
Iranian revolution, the Iran/Iraq War and the Soviet threat to Western (in general) 
interests in the Persian Gulf following its invasion of Afghanistan have also relied 
heavily on secondary sources. Such issues have formed the basis for subsequent analysis 
of British foreign policy towards the region.
Conclusion
The hypothesis laid down in this chapter has been that the central elements of 
Thatcherism created a framework for approaching foreign policy, and that the nature of 
British foreign policy during the Thatcher era was constructed by the positivist discourse 
of economic interests. This statement has led to the establishment of a central question 
for this thesis, namely, to what extent were material economic interests responsible for
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the formation of British foreign policy towards the GCC States during the period 1979- 
1991?194 Consequently, much of the chapter has been concerned with explaining the 
factors behind this statement. Closely linked to this has been the crucial observation that 
the research into Thatcherite discourse has shown economic emphasis and imagery to be 
dominant, and this has been instrumental in the decision to adopt constructivist theory as 
the basis for analysis at the expense of other mainstream theories such as neo-realism or 
neo-liberal institutionalism.
As a consequence, the chapter began with a general survey of the main debates in 
international relations theory, the first of which, that between the realists and idealists 
(otherwise known as utopianists), focused on the nature of man, with realists seeing the 
world as it was and the latter as they wished it to be. The dominance of classical realism 
came about as a result of international events as World War Two and the ensuing Cold 
War ensured that state-centric explanations and a focus on power politics took centre 
stage. It is this emphasis on security, state-centricity, the relegation of domestic processes 
and the inability to analyse the role played by ideas in the construction of national 
interests which placed limitations on realist thought as a basis upon which to analyse the 
thesis. Many of the subsequent theoretical approaches since the establishment of realism 
as orthodoxy were concerned with challenging realist dominance. Keohane and Nye with 
their “complex interdependence”, for instance, sought to demonstrate the ineffectiveness 
of state-centric explanations by advocating multiple access channels, interdependence 
and transnationalism.
The debates since tire 1970s, the neo-realists and the neo-liberal institutionalists 
over the question of extent of co-operation under anarchy, the structuralists in Michael 
Banks’ inter-paradigm debate and Lapid’s characterisation of the third debate as a 
discourse about the nature of analytical frameworks, namely positivism against post­
positivism have shown the rich yet confusing nature of the discipline’s development. 
This chapter raised the question of why, for instance, structuralist approaches with their 
emphasis on economic relations within and among states were rejected as a basis for the 
thesis. Structuralism’s focus on economics at the expense of other factors ultimately 
meant it had to be discounted as a basis for the thesis since, despite the emphasis on 
economics in the Thatcherite discourse, a deconstruction would inevitably lead to the
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identification of alternative factors contributing to an explanation of British foreign 
policy. The issue concerning the deconstruction of the disourse will be further analysed in 
the final conclusion to the thesis.
The debate between positivist and post-positivist theories is of particular 
relevance when trying to categorise constructivism. Positivism, with its unified view of 
science and adoption of methodologies of the natural sciences, has tended to dominate 
international relations since the discipline’s emergence. Debate over epistemology itself 
was stifled in the face of an acceptance of positivist assumptions by all mainstream 
theories, and this in turn gave the impression that the debates between realism and 
idealism and the inter-paradigm debate were merely debates between different versions 
of the international system rather than genuine alternative views.
The arrival of post-positivist thought, however, stimulated epistemological and 
ontological debate as first critical theory and then post-modernism sought to reject 
rationalist meta-narratives such as realism, Marxism, neo-realism and even neo-liberal 
institutionalism. The distinction between the “explainers” and the “understanders” was 
firmly established as constructivism began to make significant inroads into the discipline. 
There were numerous debates during the 1980s, including the debate between the neo­
realists and the nco-liberal institutionalists, both of whom sought to apply the logic of 
rationalist economic theory to international relations. But this period also saw other 
debates such as between the interpretivists (for instance critical theorists) and rationalists 
where the former challenged the very foundations of rationalism and the latter accused 
the former of having little to say about Teal world’ international relations.
The discussion between the interpretivists and rationalists soon evolved, however, 
to incorporate the emerging constructivists who challenged both the rationalism of 
mainstream theories and the overly meta-theoretical emphasis of early critical theory. It is 
in this context that constructivism increasingly claimed the “middle ground” between the 
rationalist and interpretive approaches with a further qualification that it is a broad 
theoretical approach spanning positivist and post-positivist frameworks. It was in this 
light, therefore, that the chapter analysed the key principles of social constructivism with 
the claim that its intersubjective character and its emphasis on ideas, language and
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discourse make this theoretical approach ideal for conducting and analysis of the 
Thatcher era.
Constructivism’s roots in critical theory provide it with reflective and interpretive 
characteristics while at the same time its acceptance of certain positivist principles has 
meant that it is a suitable vehicle for conducting empirical research on international 
relations issues. It sees international relations as being socially constructed by the 
identity, meanings and the assumptions of the actors themselves. In order to explain this 
aspect further, the chapter has compared constructivist principles with those of neo­
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Like neo-realism, constructivism accepts that 
structures are able to constrain the behaviour of agents or units, but whereas neo-realism 
emphasises material structures only, constructivism argues that systems of ideas, shared 
beliefs and values also have structural characteristics. It does not dismiss material 
structures and it accepts that both ideational and material structures have a role to play in 
constraining behaviour, but for constructivists how the material environment is 
interpreted depends upon the systems of meanings that are constructed by the actors. In 
this sense anarchy is indeed what states make of it, and therefore even die neo-liberal 
institutionalist position that the effects of anarchy can be mitigated against through 
increased levels of co-operation can be surpassed. Constructivism, therefore, clearly goes 
beyond the rationalist accounts.
This emphasis on discourse, language and ideas has profound implications for this 
thesis in the context of the central questions being asked and the statement of hypothesis. 
Firstly, in light of the claim that Thatcherite discourse was characterised by economic 
imagery, the language of the research material itself now plays a crucial role. Secondly, 
the chapter has analysed the phenomenon known as “Thatcherism”, and claimed that 
despite the problems with definition it is possible to identify core elements of the belief 
system which were based upon interests, economics and incentives. It is this rationalist, 
material element within Thatcherism which then constitutes the discourse of the era itself 
and in turn gives rise to a framework for foreign policy. Finally it is the analysis of the 
discourse which ultimately leads the observer to draw conclusions on the central question 
- i.e. the extent to which economics influenced the formation of British foreign policy.
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The chapter has also established parameters for the case study which will revolve 
around a detailed analysis of the Thatcherite discourse itself, and has analysed the 
dynamics of the Persian Gulf region in an attempt to isolate certain issues which will be 
relevant to the case study. These include both an explanation of the material interests that 
outside powers had in the Persian Gulf region and of die threats besetting the region. 
Material interests are explained in the context of the peculiarity of the Gulf States 
themselves, their oil exports and the fact that they represented a lucrative market for 
Western defence and other exports. Similarly, threat perceptions are characterised in 
terms of revolutionary changes, self assertion and the threat posed by the Soviet Union. 
This analysis stemmed from some of the secondary source material which, in the context 
of the intersubjective nature of constructivism, is also part of the discourse and therefore 
cannot be ignored.
The claim that the conclusions are to be found within the discourse itself leads to 
the assumption here that the image of the GCC States as lucrative markets and as 
strategically important oil exporters would contribute to the formation of a framework for 
policy. Constructivist emphasis on discourse remains an important factor in attempting to 
determine what that policy may have been and so the chapter has also considered some of 
the questions relating to the defence of the region and Britain’s out of area military 
presence.
Defence was to become closely associated with the Thatcher Administration and 
whilst appearing to adopt a policy towards maintaining strong defence capabilities, the 
Conservatives after 1979 came up against the age old problem of reconciling the 
differences between the resources available and the wide range of commitments. 
Although the harsher pronouncements of the 1981 Defence review may have been 
reversed following the Falklands crisis, the trend during the 1980s remained towards 
working within increasingly limited defence budgets, and this undoubtedly had an effect 
on Britain’s out-of-area capabilities. It is in this light, therefore, that the British action in 
the Falklands could be labelled as an aberration that went against the general trend. 
However, one must not ignore the fact that the Armilla Patrol was the most sustained 
British out-of-area involvement during the 1980s, and that it eventually led to Britain 
contributing the second largest force to the international coalition against Iraq.
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The following case study, therefore, adopts the constructivist principles 
highlighted in this chapter to conduct a detailed analysis of Thatcherite discourse and the 
issues that the Government discussed vis-à-vis the GCC States. Ultimately it will be 
necessary to return to an examination of the hypothesis statement and ask whether 
Thatcherite discourse reveals enough to either prove or disprove it. In light of this goal it 
will also be necessary to ask some questions about constructivism itself, specifically 
whether it enables the observer to identify alternative explanations for British policy 
towards the region or whether the discourse is clear enough to endorse the possibility that 
economics did indeed shape that policy.
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Chapter 2:AnaIysis of Thatcherite Discourse: 1979-1988
Introduction
In light of the importance attached to perceptions and ideas, constructivist theory has 
been adopted to confirm that the conclusions of the thesis have been drawn from 
within the discourse of the Thatcher era. This closely relates to the hypothesis which 
has claimed that Thatcherite discourse was dominated by an image based on 
economics and material interests and that this in turn provided a framework for 
foreign policy towards the GCC States. Chapter 1 ’s analysis of the phenomenon of 
“Thatcherism” is also highly relevant in that this links in with the importance that 
constructivism attaches to ideas, beliefs and perceptions. This analysis was to 
conclude that Thatcherism was indeed a belief system dominated by notions of 
economics and interests, and that it was this element of Thatcherism which appears to 
have been the dominant element within the discourse. Whether or not there was a 
discursive emphasis on material economic interests and whether these interests then 
contributed to the shaping of British foreign policy towards the GCC States during the 
period 1979-1991 is now a matter for the case study and the final conclusions of the 
thesis.
Internationally, 1979 was a momentous year. Events such as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, attempts to take 
the Arab-Israeli dispute one step further towards peace with the Camp David Accords, 
and Iraq’s move towards rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, all had a specific effect 
on the formation of British policy towards the region. Domestically, for the first time 
since 1974, Britain had a government with a secure majority, and the country had 
voted decisively for change. The Tory campaign had made quite explicit the Party’s 
intention to break with post-war policies, and specifically with those followed since 
1964.
This chapter will consider the question of Britain's interests in the Persian Gulf 
region by assessing several issues prevalent in the discourse, namely, Britain's 
continuing dependence on Middle Eastern (particularly GCC) crude oil, Britain's 
general economic decline (particularly in manufacturing industry), and the British 
government's attempts to increase exports as a way of alleviating some of the 
economic problems. The chapter will also examine British threat perceptions in the
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context of self-assertion, revolutionary changes, conflict within the Persian Gulf 
(notably the Iran-Iraq war), and the Soviet threat to the GCC States. Finally, it will 
consider Britain's military presence in the region and analyse to what extent the 
British presence could be perceived as an active military role.
These factors for analysis, namely oil and markets, have been constructed in 
this way in light of their prominence in the discourse of the period in question (1979- 
1988). They gain significance in view of the fact that analysing them provides an 
insight into Britain's perceived material interests in the GCC States, and they are 
therefore central in the process of proving or disproving the hypothesis. However, 
they must also be placed in the context of the perception that Thatcherism was a belief 
system based upon the notions of economics and interests, and it therefore becomes 
necessary to analyse issues which are clearly linked to the concept of Thatcherism. 
The section on British threat perceptions which highlights the Iranian revolution, 
conflict in the region and the Soviet Union is also relevant to an understanding of 
British policy, since these issues all feature prominently in the discourse, thereby 
demonstrating the British preoccupation with stability in the region. This in turn raises 
questions regarding why Britain was so concerned that the area should remain stable.
Section 1: Britain’s Material Interests in the Persian Gulf: Thatcherite 
Discourse: 1979-88
To understand the extent of Britain’s economic interests in the Persian Gulf region, 
they must be analysed in the context of a continuing reliance on the region’s oil 
exports and the emergence and development of the GCC States as markets for British 
civilian and defence products. Chapter 1 highlighted the continuing dependency of 
Western States on the Gulf region’s oil exports and Section 1.1 here, therefore, places 
this in the British context by analysing a number of factors that demonstrate the 
importance of the region’s oil to Britain.
Section 1.2 then highlights the importance of the Gulf markets to Britain by 
developing three main points. Firstly, there was significant evidence to suggest that 
Britain’s manufacturing sectors were in severe difficulties, which brought about the 
inevitable symptoms of increasing unemployment, rising import penetration, balance 
of payments problems, and a significant decrease in exports of manufactured 
products. Faced with these recessionary trends exports were given a greater priority.
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Secondly, therefore, British industry and elements within the government (dealt with 
later) became increasingly concerned with the need to develop export opportunities. 
Defence equipment in particular was seen as providing greater scope for companies to 
export their products. Finally, there was the question of the continuing search for 
export markets, an area in which the Arab members of the Oil and Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) were increasingly seen as providing opportunities, not 
only for civilian products but in particular for defence related equipment. Taken 
together these factors demonstrate the extent of Britain’s economic interests in the 
Persian Gulf region.
Section 1.1: The importance of Persian Gulf oil for Britain
The West’s obvious reliance on Middle Eastern oil is demonstrated by the following 
table:
Table 2: Middle East Oil Imports as a Percentage of Total Oil Imports, 1978.
USA Canada Japan EEC France Germany UK OECD
Saudi
Arabia 13 20 28 20 32 10 20 20
Kuwait - - 8 6 2 2 15 4
Iraq 1 4 3 9 17 2 11 5
Iran 10 15 16 14 9 12 15 13
UAE* 6 - 9 5 8 5 6 6
Qatar 1 - 2 1 3 - 1 1
Total
Above 31 39 66 55 71 31 68 49
(♦ United Arab Emirates)
Source: Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee: Session 1979-80, 6 
February 1980, p.119.
Despite its increased self-sufficiency since its own North Sea Oil had begun to be 
developed, this table shows that the UK continued to import Middle Eastern crude oil 
which also meant that it could export its own higher-grade crude to countries such as 
the USA, France and West Germany.1 The importance of Middle Eastern crude to
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Britain was confirmed by the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, Lord Carrington, who in referring to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (dealt 
with later) made the following statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee:
... we obviously cannot accept it as it now is ... [we are] faced with a 
situation in that part of the world which is that much more dangerous 
and in which certain vital interests are at stake, notably the West’s oil 
supply. Two-thirds of the free world’s oil supplies go through the 
Straits of Hormuz ...2
Further evidence of British reliance on Middle Eastern oil can be provided by a brief 
analysis of North Sea oil depletion policy. During the first ten years of development 
in the North Sea oil fields the Government’s intention was to develop the resources as 
fast as possible. The then Public Accounts Committee concluded:
... that the balance of advantage to the United Kingdom lay in 
exploiting and extracting [the] reserves of gas and oil as quickly as 
possible. In arriving at this decision [the Government] took account of 
relevant factors including balance of payments savings, security of 
supply, possible future fuel shortages, as well as the purely economic 
advantage ...3
A review of policy in 1973 brought in the first definitive signs of policy change, when 
Trade and Industry witnesses told the Public Accounts committee that it would, in 
certain circumstances, be of advantage to delay exploitation of Britain’s own 
resources. Subsequently, by 1974, the Labour Government was to become quite 
explicit in its pronouncements of the need for depletion control. The decision which 
was eventually taken was to develop rapidly the discovered fields for a few more 
years followed by greater governmental control over oil production. Up to 1980, 
however, control remained largely procedural and it was not until July 1980 that the 
first development delays were actually announced. The then Secretary of State for 
Energy (David Howell), stated that ‘this Government believes that on strategic and 
security of supply grounds it is in the national interest to prolong high levels of UK 
Continental Shelf production to the end of the century’.4 It was obvious that European 
oil (Norwegian and British in particular) was not subject to the same political 
uncertainties as oil from the Middle East and as a consequence its conservation as a 
strategic reserve was advocated. The implications of this are clear. Even though 
Britain was, at this stage, self-sufficient in oil resources,5 the fact that the Government 
was considering the possibility of introducing some form of depletion control so that
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Britain’s own indigenous resources could be conserved for later use further 
strengthened the reliance on Persian Gulf oil.
Finally, a memo submitted by the Department of Energy to the Energy 
Committee in 1984 highlighted the rationale behind another mechanism designed to 
ensure a secure oil supply. Concern over the disruption of internal distribution lines, 
brought on by the possibility of threat of ‘serious hostilities in North-West Europe’6 
resulted in the imposition of obligations on the oil industry to hold a minimum level 
of petroleum stocks. It also highlighted the importance of a flexible and diverse oil 
supply system, thus increasing yet again the importance of Middle Eastern oil.
Section 1.2: Britain’s markets in the Persian Gulf
a) Britain ’s economic difficulties
There are those such as Morgan who have argued that at the start of the 1980s the 
British economy was declining at a serious rate. As Morgan states, economic growth 
was lower in Britain than among its competitors, profitability had deteriorated in 
manufacturing sectors to a greater extent than in other EEC countries, and industrial 
innovation was relatively sluggish.7 Others like Hanaghan, however, argue that it was 
an exaggeration to suggest that British industry as a whole was in a phase of de­
industrialisation. He went on to suggest that the export sales ratio of all manufacturing 
sectors had risen during the 1970s, resulting in a significant amount of import 
penetration being offset by rising exports. However, he is unable to dispute the 
possibility that de-industrialisation was a real phenomenon insofar as areas of 
manufacturing industry were experiencing a pronounced fall in output. The 
percentage of manufacturing contribution to the economy had in fact fallen from 37 
percent in 1950 to 29 percent in 1980.8
The analysis continues with Grant specifying low growth, high inflation, 
decreased cost competitiveness, high unemployment, a fall in non-price 
competitiveness of exports, a poor record of productivity growth, and lower rates of 
return from investments as factors in the structural weakening and consequent 
impoverishment of the country.9 He goes on to express concern at Britain’s increasing 
dependence on the depleting asset of North Sea oil to sustain its external account 
balance.10 Although much of the debate appeared weighted on the side of decline,
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Thain argues that this was not readily apparent, as economic growth in Britain since 
World War Two had been higher than during earlier periods, although he goes on to 
admit that there had certainly been relative economic decline.11
Elements within the Thatcher Administration were not immune to the effects 
of this decline. As the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe, stated:
Over the past five years or so, and partly reflecting the poor level of 
competitiveness, UK industry has lost share in both overseas and 
domestic markets. Between 1977 and the first half of 1982, the volume 
of world trade rose by a total of about 18 percent, while UK exports of 
manufactures were unchanged. In the domestic economy over the same 
period, the demand for manufactures changed very little, but import 
volumes rose by 40 percent while output of the UK manufacturing 
sector fell by 14 percent.12
During the same period the Industry and Trade Committee concluded that, as Britain 
lacked many raw materials and self-sufficiency in food, it depended more heavily 
than most other nations on the export of goods and services. Recently there had been a 
greater tendency to import, but this was not being matched by corresponding 
increases in British exports. These conclusions were drawn following the assimilation 
of a significant amount of evidence from various sectors of government, academia, 
and industry. In one memorandum submitted by the Machine Tools Economic 
Development Committee, for instance, it was stated that:
Machine tools has been one of the hardest hit sectors of UK 
mechanical engineering during the recession ... Forecasts for the next 
cycle anticipate only a moderate upswing in the home demand to 1984, 
to be followed by a downturn to below the 1982 level by 1986. Import 
penetration - already over 50 percent - is forecast as edging still 
higher...13
Furthermore, the British Steel Corporation, while admitting that total demand in most 
of the main sectors of the UK economy had gradually regained some ground lost in 
the 1979-81 recession, complained that the supply side continued to suffer, with 
manufacturing activity hardly recovering at all.14 Subsequently, Britain was to record 
an overall trade deficit in manufactured goods of nearly £5 billion, the first ever­
peacetime deficit in such goods.15
Thatcher also, although quick to blame the previous Labour Government’s 
experiments with democratic socialism when addressing the question of Britain’s 
economic decline, nevertheless acknowledged that Britain’s economy was failing: 
‘...it was a miserable failure in every respect. Far from reversing the slow relative
80
decline of Britain vis-à-vis its main industrial competitors, it accelerated it. We fell 
further behind them, until by 1979 we were widely dismissed as the “sick man of 
Europe”4.16
The belief that the recession of 1979-1981 had harmed Britain had therefore 
permeated various segments of Industry and the Thatcher Administration, and there 
was an emerging realisation that Britain had to export more to counteract the rising 
import penetration of its domestic markets, particularly in manufactured products. As 
the Industry and Trade Committee stated, ‘Irrespective of the contribution made to 
our balance of payments by North Sea Oil, which some consider may be relatively 
short-lived, it is essential that the UK’s industrial base should be strong in order to 
meet home demand and to compete successfully in increasingly competitive world 
1 “J markets’.
b) The importance of exports for Britain and its defence export development
These recessionary trends, the decline in British manufacturing industry, import­
penetration, increasing unemployment, decreasing exports, and adverse effects on the 
balance of payments, all provided the Thatcher Government with opportunities to 
show that it was serious about reversing Britain’s economic decline. One such 
opportunity came about with the government’s emphasis on the export of defence 
equipment. Defence exports were to become increasingly important, as were attempts 
to search for markets, since the benefits of developing them were visible in a variety 
of ways which will be discussed below.
As Asteris states, ‘the spectre of de-industrialisation manifest[ed] itself more 
starkly in the absolute decline in manufacturing employment since the 1960s. The 
total loss of jobs during the past ten years in manufacturing industry had exceeded 
three million’.18 He goes on to state, however, that although employment in defence 
related industry had also declined during this period it had ‘proved more resilient than 
[employment] in the rest of industry’.19
The discourse of the era seems to reveal that the Thatcher Administration 
actively encouraged the sale of defence equipment to overseas customers and, on the 
face of it, this approach did seem to pay dividends. The Government’s own defence 
spending in 1980-81, for instance, supported over 200,000 jobs directly in British 
industry, and the exports of defence equipment supported a further 140,000. Overall,
81
as Asteris claims, 570,000 jobs were supported both directly and indirectly by the 
defence industry. A Government defence document, published in 1981, highlighted 
similar figures, stating that some 242,000 jobs were supported directly, with a further 
145,000 being supported by exports. The document went on to state that at any one 
time there were more than 10,000 British companies working on defence contracts 
either for procurement purposes or for the export market.21
Furthermore, with regard to contributions to the balance of payments made by 
the export of defence equipment, official government figures revealed a healthy 
overall trade balance. Even so, Asteris argues that this still greatly understated the 
final impact on the visible account since ‘there [was] a huge trade in military goods 
which it [was] not possible to distinguish from similar goods for civilian purposes’, 
estimated at some £1,138 million in 1981.22
The beneficial effects of these factors were further reinforced by Colin 
Chandler, who stated:
... trade follows the flag. One of the points that was true then and 
became increasingly obvious to government was that when you got a 
big defence sale, not only did that provide benefits to the economy here 
in terms of jobs and foreign exchange, it provided influence as well, 
because clearly defence inevitably involves governments as well. And 
secondly, you do find in countries like that where the decision-making 
process finishes up after some filtering through into the hands of a very 
small number of people, once you do succeed in a major defence sale 
you get other trade as well.23
According to Jones and Rees, Britain’s history of arms exports is closely tied to its 
need to retain some form of independence in domestic and international affairs.
Having an indigenous arms industry was seen as a necessary attribute of a major 
power and much of British foreign policy in the post World War Two era revolved 
around a wish to revive its pre-war great power status.24 The British defence industry 
therefore undoubtedly fared better overall in terms of performance, employment 
resilience, exports, and quality of products than other manufacturing sectors.
Defence production was, firstly, particularly research and development (R&D) 
intensive, and this meant that highly trained, expensively educated personnel were 
employed within the industry. Secondly, the Soviet-American military competition 
contributed to a large extent to the “need to keep up” syndrome. Thirdly, there were 
those who believed, as Jones and Rees state, that civilian sectors benefited because of 
the high pace of technological development in defence related R&D. Finally, there
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were larger economies of scale to be gained not only in the production of defence 
related equipment but also in the design and development phases. Development costs 
formed a large portion of overall defence production costs, and one acknowledged 
method of reducing these unit costs was to significantly lengthen production runs 
which, during the time in question, was enabled by the export of defence equipment.25
According to Sir Ronald Ellis, Head of the Defence Export Services 
Organisation (DESO), it remained difficult to assess the benefits of defence sales 
because of the problems of definition. Official figures for instance excluded the so- 
called “invisible” benefits, such as technology transfers, and the employment of those 
people actually sent abroad to work on particular projects. However, he confirmed 
that ‘Exports of defence equipment can ... help both to keep in business those firms 
which supply our own armed forces, and also to keep down the cost of their 
equipment by means of longer production runs and other economies of scale’.26 He 
also insisted that an active indigenous defence industry able to find contracts abroad 
was able also to open enormous gateways to other civilian related projects, such as 
opportunities for construction industry when building the infrastructure usually 
needed for sophisticated defence systems.27
Hartley also regarded the broad economic and social benefits from defence 
sales as impressive. He claimed that the military sector provided over a million jobs, 
supported the health of the nation’s balance of payments, contributing over £1 billion 
in 1979-80 and saving over £3 billion by dispersing imports for domestic 
consumption. It also led to considerable technical fallout due to its intensive research 
nature, provided additional jobs in high unemployment areas such as shipbuilding and 
contributed to other social expenditures.28
A brief analysis of the Administration’s defence procurement policies will 
shed further light of the importance attached to defence exports under the Thatcher 
government. During the early 1980s much attention was devoted to securing better 
value for money when procuring defence equipment for the armed forces, as defence 
equipment expenditure was accounting for an ever-increasing proportion of the 
defence budget. It had, for instance, increased from 35 percent to 45 percent during 
the 1970s, and according to the then Minister for defence procurement, Geoffrey 
Pattie, there was a limit to how much further this could continue.29 The decline in the 
defence budget combined with rising equipment expenditure meant that it was of 
paramount importance to halt and reverse this trend.
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One important way of achieving this was to place much greater emphasis on 
the marketability of defence products. As Geoffrey Pattie stated at the time:
Increased stress is being placed on adjusting operational requirements 
and technical specifications within acceptable limits to make the 
prospective equipment more saleable abroad, thus assisting firms to be 
less dependent on MOD for their markets and profits, and benefiting 
MOD directly through the reduced unit costs which can result from 
longer production runs.30
John Peters (the then Assistant Under Secretary of State, Air Staff) confirmed this 
strengthened emphasis on marketing defence products while giving evidence to the 
Defence Committee in 1980 by stating, ‘... from now ... we shall be more and more 
in the red as far as ... costs of British forces are concerned. The only effective way we 
have of offsetting this is by increasing sales of British defence equipment...’31
It was apparent that changes in the procurement process would lead to 
successive governments giving increasing support to defence exports. As G.H.Green 
(Deputy-Secretary of State (Policy), Procurement Executive, under the Callaghan 
Government) stated, ‘the increasing complexity and range of weapon systems, the 
vastly increased cost of research, development and production, and smaller purchases 
by the British Services have meant that industry has to rely increasingly on the 
overseas market’32. Green also stated that ‘... in choosing between different methods 
of procurement we have to bear in mind balance of payments considerations and the 
effect on our exports [and] ... weigh the effect[s] on employment...,33 This statement 
further highlights the importance of foreign markets in relation to Britain’s domestic 
economy.
Subsequently, the Thatcher Government’s support for defence exports was 
explicitly declared in the House of Commons itself when Douglas Hurd (the then 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) stated in June 1981 that the 
‘... Government’s policy is to support the sale of defence equipment unless there are 
strong reasons on security or foreign policy grounds for refusing a particular 
licence’.34 This was reconfirmed by Michael Heseltine (the then Secretary of State for 
Defence) in 1985 when he stated that ‘The Government continue to provide strong 
support for the sale of British defence equipment overseas wherever this is compatible 
with our wider political and security interests’.35
Amongst the factors assisting the development of defence exports was an 
undertaking by the government, through “Memorandum of Understanding”
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agreements to ensure the supply of spares for defence equipment sold. Since these 
contracts meant that defence contractors could export defence equipment with the 
support of the British government, to which they remained answerable, they 
contributed to the role played by the government in facilitating arms exports. Such 
govemment-to-govemment contracts under which the defence contractor became 
responsible for its overseas commitments to the British Government had been 
increasing in number and in some cases represented the only method of securing 
orders for equipment. The British Government’s willingness to extend this type of 
understanding obviously encouraged foreign governments to buy British equipment.36
The MOD’s main role in assisting industry to promote its own defence 
products revolved primarily around the Defence Exports Sales Organisation (DESO), 
later known as the Defence Sales Organisation (DSO) which was established in 1966 
under a Head of Defence Sales. He in turn was supported by an extensive number of 
people and ‘able to draw upon the resources of the [MOD] as a whole and on the three 
services with direct access to and personal support of MOD Ministers’.37 As Sir Colin 
Chandler (Head of Defence Sales from 1985-1989) stated:
[The job] was started by a Labour Government in 1966 ... when Denis 
Healey was the Secretary of State for Defence. He thought that our 
defence sales effort was too fragmented so he commissioned a study 
into how we could improve it, and one of the main recommendations of 
the subsequent study was that defence sales should be headed by an 
industrialist on secondment from the private sector - someone that 
knew about industry, knew about trade, knew about exports and so on, 
and I was the fifth person to do it. The job was basically to bring a 
focal point in Whitehall for support of our defence industry in selling 
overseas and that meant getting approvals for sales, getting Foreign 
Office support through the Ambassadors and High Commissioners, 
getting credit terms if they were needed from the ECGD [Export 
Credits Guarantee Department], getting our armed forces to act in 
support of a sale. If the army had bought a piece of kit then trying to 
sell it elsewhere was a lot easier ... It was a job that was given a fair 
amount of scope by the Conservative Government ... you had a fairly 
free reign within the constraints, it was a very senior job - it had to be, 
to be able to go and see the Defence Minister in Saudi Arabia as an 
Emissary of the British Government.
Other than its role in industry the MOD itself was involved in exports via the Royal 
Ordnance Factories (ROFs) which manufactured tanks, guns and ammunition. During 
the 1970s, for instance, the MOD’S exports to Iran were to increase considerably and 
this is where the role played by the IMS (International Military Services), another
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mechanism to aid the expansion of exports, became crucial. Because of the 
predominance of military business, in particular with Iran, the Secretary of State for 
Defence assumed responsibility for this company in 1977 and subsequently ownership 
of it in 1979. Under the MOD’s instructions the company was expected to operate in a 
commercial fashion (subject to certain guidelines), and in light of this ‘all IMS 
business thus carrie[d] the ultimate backing of the MOD’.39 It was used increasingly 
as the commercial arm of the DSO, and its role was to
... develop both the sale of defence equipment itself, whether ... from 
the public sector, products from the Royal Ordnance Factories in 
particular - and also to provide the requirements associated with the 
supply of such equipment, such as maintenance, training and 
infrastructure; and it is in that area that [IMS] ... made a particular 
contribution in bringing together inputs from both the public and 
private sectors in a package which [was] an attractive proposition to an 
increasing number of customers ...’40
Iranian contracts formed by far the biggest part of the company’s business 
(predominantly in the form of contracts for tanks until the mid-1980s), and exceeded 
£2 billion in value. Furthermore, at the end of the 1970s, 30 to 40 percent of the entire 
output of the ROFs was being sold to Iran. The Iranian Revolution and subsequent 
political crisis, however, resulted in considerable loss of business, which in tum 
created severe problems for the ROFs, especially ROF Leeds where the tank orders 
were expected to provide about 80 percent of the workload until the mid-1980s.41 
Despite the repercussions of the Iranian crisis, the MOD saw a continuing need for the 
IMS, which, as an incorporated company, had much greater flexibility in controlling 
and organising its functions and objectives than a government department, and was 
better placed to respond to customer preferences.42
Other mechanisms for encouraging exports included the placing overseas of 
Development Divisions, whose primary purpose was to carry out aid management 
functions. Although the direct promotion of British commercial interests was not an 
explicit role of the Divisions it was common practice for them to liaise closely with 
the commercial sections in local missions. Of direct relevance in this context was the 
Middle East Development Division (MEDD) which was set up in Beirut in 1952 and 
later transferred to Jordan in 1975. This Division played an important role in ensuring 
that British commercial and industrial sectors were aware of various projects in 
countries such as Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.43
86
This brief mention of the Development Divisions demonstrates that it was not 
just the MOD which was concerned with the export of defence equipment. The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) also had a bearing on the export promotion 
process, as it was common Whitehall practice to consult the FCO closely about all 
proposals to sell arms overseas. The FCO’s general policy was to support the sales of 
arms abroad, unless there were compelling reasons for not doing so, and its Heads of 
Missions and staff were available abroad to help promote British defence equipment.
The FCO had a number of important reasons for promoting defence sales. 
These included, firstly, the fact that assistance to friendly countries enabled them to 
resist aggression or encroachment from other hostile and anti-Western countries more 
forcefully. The FCO regarded this as a cost-effective way of providing continued 
support for pro-Western regimes. As a memorandum stated: ‘this applies particularly 
in areas where Britain has important political and economic interests but where we 
and our allies cannot provide direct military support’.44 This view is of particular 
importance in relation to the GCC, where Britain had crucial interests but could not 
maintain an overt military presence (see Section 3).
Secondly, arms sales were seen as a way of maintaining good political 
relations with countries of importance, and finally, as the memorandum stated:
... to deny countries which are important to us the right to buy our 
equipment would be to risk opening up opportunities for countries 
hostile to British interests to gain footholds in the Third World. All 
countries have a right ... to self-defence and all exercise this right by 
purchasing the means to defend themselves. If they are prevented from 
buying arms from Britain or other allied countries they will look 
elsewhere.45
The Department of Trade was more general in its remit of promoting British exports, 
as the British Overseas Trade Board (BOTB) was under its jurisdiction. The BOTB’s 
roles were to advise the government on strategy for overseas trade; to direct and 
develop the government’s export promotion services on behalf of the Secretary of 
Trade; to encourage and support industry and commerce in overseas trade; and to 
contribute to the exchange of views between government and industry in the field of 
overseas trade. In addition to this, one of the most important forms of government 
assistance under the remit of the Secretary of State for Trade was the facility provided 
by the Export Credit Guarantee Department. This Department was the only
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organisation in the UK which insured exporters against the possibility of financial loss 
due to the political risks endemic in many Third World countries.
c) The role of the Gulf markets and British economic interests: Thatcherite 
discourse
US President Carter’s proposals in May 1978 to restrain Western arms transfers to the 
Third World received a muted response from most European states, including Britain, 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, shortly after announcing his arms restraint policy 
Carter bowed to US Air Force pressure and approved the sale of 7 AWACs to Iran 
and evidence emerged that the US was considering the sale of its advanced F-l attack 
aircraft to Saudi Arabia.46 There was a clear perception that even if defence exports to 
Less Developed Countries (LDCs) were not terribly important to supplier nations, 
they were of immense value to important individual companies such as British 
Aerospace (BAe) and the French firm Dassault Breguet (renowned for its Mirage 
exports).47 The importance of companies like BAe to the British Government was 
more apparent at the time of recession because the ‘structure and prominence of these 
[companies] transform[ed] any increased unemployment ... into apolitical question 
... [and] ... decisions to lay off workers in ... defence industries necessarily 
involve[d] direct and visible governmental responsibility’.48
Such domestic concerns, combined with worries over the recession, Britain’s 
overall economic decline, and the prominence of British defence industries, made the 
search for overseas export markets all the more important. One such area where the 
British effort was particularly prominent was the Persian Gulf region, and the 
members of the GCC in particular were targeted as potential markets. Here the views 
of John Nott, Secretary of State for Trade in 1980, are especially useful. He 
acknowledged before the Trade and Industry Committee that the British economy had 
performed disappointingly in 1979 in the sense that the trade in manufactured 
products had grown very little in volume, and factors such as the loss of markets in 
Nigeria and Iran had been of particular importance in this respect. Furthermore, as an 
oil and gas-producing nation, the likelihood that Britain would import more 
manufactured products further confirmed the need for export markets. He also 
indicated before the Committee that the foreign earnings of the Arab oil producing 
countries had doubled over the past decade and that British exporters were well
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placed to benefit from that increased spending power. He further stressed that his 
Department’s aims were to encourage British firms to seize these opportunities.49
At the start of the 1980s the Persian Gulf had become the epicentre of regional 
conflict, in which a number of elements were of relevance. Analysis of the Iran/Iraq 
war reveals factors such as resurgent Islam, historic conflict between the Arabs and 
the Persians, and rivalries between the Shia and Sunni sects of Islam as key issues 
(see Section 2). Consequently, the Gulf monarchies gave increasing priority to their 
defence capabilities, and in view of their considerable wealth and high vulnerability it 
is not surprising that Gulf security became their prime focus. Each of the GCC States 
faced similar internal problems, namely small populations, large oil revenues, military 
weakness, and similar political systems, and the formation of the GCC in 1981 itself 
indicated tentative steps towards integration. Externally the possibility of Soviet 
incursions and the implications of the Iranian Revolution were further sources of 
instability, and after 1980 the widening of the Iran-Iraq war remained a constant 
threat. In the face of these threats the Gulf States had to define their security needs 
which meant turning, in most cases, to the West for arms supplies, thus making the 
Gulf region a lucrative market. The high levels of publicity that surrounded the 
subsequent defence deals also meant that there was significant political interest in 
such purchases.
The FCO, for instance, welcomed the formation of the GCC, knowing that the 
possibility of arms sales existed. As Minister of State (FCO) Douglas Hurd stated on 
28 October 1981,
At the Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels last month Foreign 
Ministers of the Ten welcomed the increased co-operation among the 
six member states of the newly formed GCC, with all of whom the Ten 
have close and friendly relations. We have also welcomed the valuable 
contribution that the formation of the GCC will make towards 
enhancing regional stability and security. We believe that it should be 
primarily for the Gulf States to determine their own security needs, and 
[we] have expressed willingness in principle to help should the states 
of the region ask us to do so.50
Richard Luce, also a Minister of State in the Foreign Office at the time, confirmed 
this by stating ‘we have close and friendly relations with all these states and we have 
therefore welcomed the formation and development of the [GCC]. We believe that it 
can make an important contribution to the peace, stability and prosperity of the
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Gulf.’51 Furthermore, another statement by Richard Luce confirms the importance of 
the Persian Gulf to Britain:
The preservation of the stability and prosperity of the Gulf region is a 
major British interest. It is an area with which we have long had close 
links, and which is one of our most important overseas markets. It is 
equally important in the context of maintaining a predictable pattern of 
world oil supplies, to which this area makes a major contribution .. .52
Although the UK maintained informal contacts with the GCC, substantial dealings 
were predominantly with the individual member states themselves. Further analysis 
reveals a significant number of contracts which indicated the salience of economics in 
the formulation of British foreign policy towards the region. Firstly, in Oman it was 
clear as early as 1978 that Britain had already conducted a considerable amount of 
business as the Gulf State’s armourer. Lord Beswick, the then Chairman of British 
Aircraft Corporation (BAC), was to describe British arms sales as ‘the new way 
modem Britain [was] finding of making a living’ now that the colonial role was 
over.53 In 1974, for instance, BAC was to secure an order for 12 Jaguar Internationals 
and batteries of Rapier low-level missiles. A subsequent study of Oman’s overall 
defence requirements provided the BAC and the MOD with a substantial contract to 
develop a master Command and Control network, the purpose of which was to 
provide Oman with an early warning and tactical control system for the Jaguars. 
Success in securing this contract led to substantial other military and civilian-related 
projects, such as a contract secured by BAC in 1976 for the construction of a network 
of more than 70 facilities for technical training, maintenance and servicing of defence 
equipment throughout Oman.54
By 1979 it was obvious that Oman was spending heavily on modem weapons. 
In 1978 over 30 percent of its GNP, representing approximately $770 million, was 
spent on defence equipment.55 Although its industrial ambitions were to remain 
modest compared to other wealthier Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, it was clear that 
Oman was preparing to ‘embark on a selected range of industrial projects in the 1980s 
which offer[ed] business potential to Western contractors and suppliers’.56 Of 
particular interest were copper extraction and smelting plant projects. Significantly, 
contracts for evaluating the geological and mining aspects of the various projects went 
to UK companies such as Golden Moffitt and Associates. This shows that British 
involvement in the Gulf States was not confined to purely defence exports.
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However, importantly, Britain was also Oman’s main arms supplier. Between 
1974 and 1978, for instance, Britain supplied $330 million worth of military 
equipment, while the US supply came to only around $5 million worth. Although 
indications were that the US would ultimately outstrip Britain as the main supplier, at 
this stage British companies continued to rely heavily on Omani contracts.57 For 
instance after the initial 12 Jaguars were delivered in 1977-78 indications emerged of 
the possibility of further orders by Oman from the now newly formed British 
Aerospace (BAe). Contracts also extended to such companies as Vosper Thomycroft 
(UK) for naval vessels, for instance the Province Class fast strike craft and other lead 
ships.58
The levels of competition between, for example, Britain and the US also 
indicate how important these markets were to the West in general. For instance 
Oman’s search for additional fighter jets to supplement its force of 40 Jaguars brought 
the US and Britain into direct competition, as the US built F-16 and the British 
Tornado (BAe) fought it out until Oman appeared to settle in favour of the Tornado. 
BAe announced this decision on 14 August 1985 and hailed it as the Tornado’s first 
major export success.59 Even though later in February 1986 Oman asked for a delay in 
the delivery of the aircraft (because of financial difficulties) defence relations between 
the two countries remained close. The value of the Omani market did not escape the 
higher echelons of the British Government, as indicated by Sir Geoffrey Howe’s (the 
then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) statement in 1984:
[it] is right to emphasise that British industry and expertise have a 
formidable and important part to play in the development of Oman, as 
they have been doing for the last 14 years. The United Kingdom is the 
second largest supplier of Oman. British exports to that country last 
year were just under £450 million, which represents an increase of 
almost 70 percent during the last 2 years.’60
Mrs Thatcher’s own role and activities on a visit to Oman (and other GCC States) at 
the start of the 1980s indicated how important these markets were. Members of 
Parliament (MPs) went so far as to question her conduct when in Oman, arguing that 
she specifically went there to lobby for a £300 million contract for the building of a 
new university. In the event, the contract was won by ‘Cementation International, a 
subsidiary of Trafalgar House, a known supporter of the Tory Party, and a massive 
contributor to its funds’. Accusations that Mrs Thatcher’s son, Mark Thatcher, would 
benefit significantly from this particular contract were also made.61 Whether or not
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Mrs Thatcher was “batting for her son” while putting forward British industrial and 
commercial interests is irrelevant however, since the visit resulted in significant 
successes in other areas. As Richard Luce stated at the time:
... My Rt. Hon Friend the Prime Minister went to the Middle East at a 
very important time for Britain politically and commercially ... This 
was the first time any Prime Minister of this country had visited these 
countries while in office. The purpose was to discuss a range of 
important political issues. At that time the Gulf War had started and 
there was the problem of Afghanistan. There was the Arab-Israel 
dispute and there were many other problems that... [the PM]... needed 
to discuss.
Of equal importance was the great value of commercial 
relations that we have with that part of the world. In 1982 5.5 percent 
of all British exports went to the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia 
... A number of significant contracts have flowed from [the] ... visit - 
the National Guard hospital in Saudi Arabia with a total contract value 
of £120 million; the Hawk Trainer Aircraft for Abu Dhabi, Dubai and 
Kuwait valued at approximately £160 million; a major defence 
contract in Qatar worth ... £70 million; and an agreement for the 
exploitation of the North-West Dome gasfield in Qatar. These 
contracts provide jobs for Britain [and] ... we have exceedingly 
important ties in Oman. Last year, our exports ... were £450 million, 
having increased by 70 percent in the past two years.62
Oman continued to rely heavily on Britain in military matters since over a thousand 
British officers (over 200 on secondment as loan service personnel) were based in 
Oman. Consequently, Oman’s value for Britain should not be underestimated as 
Thatcher herself was to state in connection with the Iran-Iraq war: ‘Sultan Qaboos has 
always been one of Britain’s closest friends in the Gulf... He was always a source of 
valuable information about events in Iran. We too were concerned that the war 
remained confined to those two states and to the northern end of the Gulf.63 Britain’s 
concern for stability in the region was also shown by the staging of an exercise 
involving Oman’s armed forces and nearly 5000 men from the British Army, Navy 
and Airforce. Code-named SaifSareea (Swift Sword), the purpose of the exercise was 
to ‘test Britain’s ability to mount a rapid strategic deployment outside the Nato area’, 
and was held between 16 November and 8 December 1986.64 Later, in October 1987, 
British officers seconded to Oman were also involved in border clashes with South 
Yemen. Although the incident was played down and remained unreported, it 
demonstrated Britain’s commitment to Oman. According to Thatcher, such military 
co-operation between the two countries was to lay the groundwork for British action
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in the Straits of Hormuz when the Iran-Iraq war threatened shipping, and for when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.65
Similarly in Kuwait, Britain was well placed to capitalise on market 
opportunities. In 1981 the Kuwaiti Government was to announce that it had allocated 
an additional $1,835 million for defence equipment, representing about 9.4 percent of 
the general budget.66 Kuwait was quick to express an interest in the possibility of 
purchasing the Tornado and the Hawk Trainer from Britain. Subsequently BAe won a 
contract for 12 Hawk jet trainers and light combat aircraft worth over £60 million 
including spares.67
Additional factors helped Britain secure certain civilian and in particular 
defence contracts in Kuwait as well as in other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia. 
One issue in particular is important in that it had a tremendous effect on British 
exporting opportunities. The opposition of the powerful Jewish Lobby in the United 
States to the sale of sophisticated defence equipment to Arab States meant that 
countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia began to diversify their sources so as not 
to rely solely on one supplier. This in turn enabled Britain to secure large defence 
contracts. For example, a request by Kuwait to purchase US Stinger missiles received 
an icy response from the US on the grounds that they might fall into the hands of 
terrorists.68
Kuwaiti fears over the possibility of the Iran-Iraq war spreading and increased 
Iranian attacks on shipping prompted Kuwait to seek Western and Soviet help to 
bolster its defences. Initial US refusal to supply sensitive defence equipment such as 
Stinger missiles persuaded Kuwait to attempt to diversify its sources of supply. 
British Defence Secretary George Younger’s visit on 11 July 1988 indicated British 
concern for Kuwait’s stability and its attempt to capitalise on the problems faced by 
the US Administration in supplying defence equipment. The US Senate’s refusal to 
supply Kuwait with advanced FA-18 Hornet fighters prompted Kuwait to consider the 
British, German and Italian Tornado and the French Mirage 2000. David Mellor (a 
Foreign Office Minister at the time) accompanying Younger stated that Whitehall had 
rejected Israeli objections to an arms deal with Saudi Arabia. This indicated that 
Britain was prepared to sell arms to Kuwait without attaching any conditions. Kuwait 
was also reported to be looking to purchase British tanks, and Sandown Class 
Minesweepers, built by Thomycroft.69 Even though by August 1988 the US appeared 
ready to sign the fighter deal with Kuwait, the fact that Britain was prepared to offer
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to sell its own advanced defence equipment indicated strong British commercial and 
defence interests in the Emirate.
Apart from the lucrative market for defence and other products, the huge 
levels of Kuwaiti investment in the UK market represented another factor which 
ensured that Britain’s interests in the country continued to be of primary importance. 
Sitting atop 70 billion barrels of oil71, with an annual revenue of more than $10 billion 
and a tiny population, Kuwait was able to increase its investments in overseas, 
particularly Western markets, to a very significant level.72 By 1980, for instance, the 
investment income of ‘KD 1,620m was almost sufficient to cover the total imports of 
KD 1,647m. In 1981 this income will be well into the KD 2bn range - an indication 
that Kuwait will be independent of oil income in respect of meeting its import bill and 
Government expenditure’. The Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), based in London, 
was cited to be the ‘second most important generator of commission income in the 
City’.73 In addition, in 1986, the Kuwait Petroleum Company bought a network of 
petrol stations in Britain, making it the seventh European country with KPC outlets, 
and in 1987 Kuwait completed the purchase of British Petroleum operations in 
Denmark, indicating its importance to other European states.74
In Saudi Arabia Britain played a significant role and benefited tremendously 
despite periodic problems in relations between the two countries. Three issues are of 
importance when analysing Saudi Arabian Defence contracts in the British context. 
Firstly, there were differences of opinion between the US Congress, prone to being 
influenced by the powerful Jewish lobby, and the US Administration, with regard to 
the sale of sophisticated defence equipment to Saudi Arabia. Closely linked to this 
were Saudi Arabia’s decisions to diversify its sources of supply, which had a 
profound effect on the already intense levels of competition between arms suppliers. 
In other words, these decisions enabled certain states, which might not have benefited 
had Saudi Arabia remained reliant on the US, to secure important contracts. Finally, it 
is important to assess briefly how important the contracts themselves were and the 
efforts that went into securing them.
Saudi Arabia’s defence purchases were based on a multiple sources policy. 
Traditionally heavily reliant on the US for most of its defence equipment, the Saudi 
decision to loosen its ties was based upon two overriding political considerations. The 
first concerned Saudi Arabia becoming disillusioned with the US’s commitment to its 
security. Embarrassing episodes such as the debacle over the sale of the F-15s and
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AWACs to Saudi Arabia at the end of the 1970s set in motion events and decisions 
which were to lead increasingly towards a Saudi diversification policy. The 
opposition by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in the US 
Congress and elsewhere in the Administration persuaded the Saudi decision-makers 
that the US was not a reliable ally, particularly in the face of a powerful Jewish lobby.
The issue was made a test of US friendship, and after considerable 
Congressional objections the US did finally undertake to provide 60 F-15s at a cost of 
£2.8 billion and $2 billion for backup services. However, the damage in the 
relationship had already been done. Further problems emerged later when the Saudis 
requested extra fuel pods for the aircraft, which would have given the F-15s far 
greater range and striking power.75 The AIPAC was to object again on the grounds 
that the fuel pods would enable the Saudi F-15s to strike deep into Israel.
The second factor influencing Saudi moves away from the US concerned the 
latter’s policy of support for Israel. The US was to see the Camp David Accords 
between Egypt and Israel as having strengthened the possibilities for peace between 
Israel and the Arab World. Saudi Arabia, however, regarded the Arab-Israeli dispute 
as the most destabilising factor in Middle Eastern politics, and did not share US 
optimism over the accords. Saudi reasoning was based on the fact that other, less 
moderate, Arab States such as Iraq and Syria strongly opposed the accords, and Saudi 
Arabia had no wish to antagonise them.
In applying diplomatic pressure on Saudi Arabia to accept the peace accords, 
the US demonstrated a serious failure to understand Arab politics. Saudi Arabia 
wished to improve its relations with radical regimes such as Saddam Hussain’s in 
Iraq, particularly since Iraq had been gradually moving out of its isolation and had 
become more influential in Arab politics. The Saudis, therefore, had no desire to 
confront such a powerful neighbour ‘especially after the disappearance of the Shah’s 
Iran as a counterbalance to Iraq’.76 Closely linked to this factor was the Saudi fear that 
too prominent a US presence on its soil would create difficulties in its relations with 
the more radical Arab States such as Iraq. This was another aspect of Gulf politics 
which the US failed to understand.77
Saudi anxiety over Washington’s support for Israel was to increase further 
following Reagan’s failure to make a stand over Israeli West Bank settlements. Such 
factors were to provide King Fahd of Saudi Arabia with the confirmation that the 
Saudi decision to distance itself from the US was the correct one.78 This gradual
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loosening of ties had a profound effect on Saudi Arabia’s defence procurement policy, 
as it now sought to diversify its sources, and this in turn enabled other arms suppliers, 
such as Britain, to step in and significantly increase their share of the enormous Saudi 
. 70market.
Britain took significant steps to ensure that it could capitalise on these 
problems, thus enabling it to “steal” business away from the US and increase its own 
exports to Saudi Arabia. The US Administration, in being prone to influence from the 
AIPAC, was either not able to sell the weapons to Saudi Arabia or attached 
unacceptable (to the Saudis) conditions on their placement and use, thereby enabling 
Britain to strengthen its position.
The Saudi Arabian and American viewpoints also diverged considerably when 
it came to assessing the greatest threat to Middle Eastern security. Whereas the US 
believed the Soviet incursions into the area were of paramount importance, Saudi 
Arabia, despite its anti-communist credentials, held the view that the Arab-Israeli 
dispute constituted the main threat to the region. Here again the British position needs 
to be analysed.
In view of the fact that Saudi Arabia was reluctant to rely on the US any 
longer for its arms supplies, Britain was careful to adopt a more pragmatic line on 
both fronts so as not to antagonise the Saudis, and this approach did pay dividends in 
the form of large defence and civilian-related contracts. Firstly, on the question of the 
sale of sophisticated defence equipment, Britain ensured that it did not make the same 
mistakes as the US had over the AWACs and the F-15s. Although the contract for the 
sale of Tornados to the Saudis was not finalised until 1985, the British ensured that no 
obstacles were placed in the path of such an agreement.80 The Saudi interest became 
apparent as early as 1981, but this caused some concern in West Germany, as the 
initial requests had come through Panavia, the Munich based company which 
controlled the Tornado programme. Under West German law it was not permitted to 
sell arms to areas of tension, and so one suggested solution was that Britain would 
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handle the sale, with aircraft being delivered from the BAe factory in Warton.
An article in the Observer at the time provided further proof that Britain was 
not concerned with attaching conditions to the sale of its own equipment. This stated 
that, because of the embarrassing objections raised by the AIPAC, Saudi Arabia was 
considering shifting its attentions to the British Nimrod and dropping its request to 
buy the American AW AC altogether.82
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One main US concern over the sale of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia was their 
placement, as their positioning at forward bases would have meant a strike at Israel 
could be possible in the event of conflict.83 This in itself contributed to Saudi 
reluctance to remain solely dependent on the US for its front-line strength. Britain, 
however, ensured that no such conditions were attached, and instead repeatedly 
stressed the strong trade links between the two countries. This attitude was confirmed 
by a quotation from Flight International which stated that any Saudi request for 
equipment would be treated ‘extremely favourably, as would any Saudi order for any 
British weapon system’. Further statements by officials in the Department of Trade 
confirmed such sentiments, as can be seen by Mr Channon’s comments in the House 
of Commons in November 1984 and 1985 respectively: following a visit to the Gulf 
States The Middle East ... is an extremely important market for the United 
Kingdom, and businessmen seem satisfied with what the Government are doing to 
help ... and in 1985, ‘Trade with the Gulf States is about £3 billion annually. We are 
mounting a special programme in conjunction with British trade associations and 
chambers of commerce to increase awareness of export opportunities in the Gulf 
markets ... the [GCC] are now our third largest trading area after Europe and the 
United States’.85 Furthermore, in being questioned about markets in the Middle East, 
and specifically in Saudi Arabia, Richard Luce stated in February 1985, ‘it is certainly 
the case that we have good relations with many Arab countries ... we hope that it will
RA be possible to sell certain equipment to them ... ’
The British aerospace industry had traditionally been closely involved in the 
arming of the Royal Saudi Arabian Airforce (RSAF) and the latest contract, a £500 
million extension of a government-backed air defence agreement, had been signed in 
1981. This contract was for the maintenance, training and related services for the 31 
British Lightning Interceptors and 40 Strikemaster trainers which had been in service 
with the RSAF since 1966. It had been due to expire in August 1982 but, following 
the 1981 agreement, it was extended till 1985.87 There was concern amongst British 
Aerospace officials and the government, however, that unless the company secured 
another order after the expiry of this final extension for the maintenance of now 
considerably aged Lightnings, there would be a significant reduction in the British 
presence and influence in Saudi Arabia. A major effort by British Government 
officials in the form of numerous ministerial visits to Saudi Arabia resulted in general 
export figures increasing by £216 million to a high of £946 million at the end of 1981.
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As Keatley stated at the time, ‘Mrs Thatcher’s ambition was to increase this figure to 
well over £1.2 billion and to see that big British firms [achieved] a larger share of the 
no 
contracts being awarded under the Saudi 5-year plan, budgeted at £107 billion’.
Another article at the time claimed that Saudi Arabia was Britain’s largest market 
outside Europe and the United States. Although the defence sector was one of the key 
areas: ‘more than half Britain’s exports to the Kingdom [were] capital goods in the 
form of plant and equipment’, there were also other important sectors such as 
chemicals, telecommunications, processed foodstuffs, and electricity power supply.
The second area in which the British were able to capitalise on the American 
position was the Middle East peace process between Israel and the Arabs. Even 
though there was no great divergence in views, there were factors which suggested 
that Britain had adopted an independent approach. The British adopted the position 
that the PLO would have to be associated with the negotiations of any eventual peace 
settlement, and this was a far more acceptable viewpoint for the Saudis than the US 
position, since it refused to have any dealings with the PLO, and had made its position 
clear in 1975.90 It had also been indicated by Mrs. Thatcher herself that the Foreign 
Secretary might have to meet the PLO leader Arafat at some time in the future. 
Ultimately, therefore, the British recognised that the PLO could not be ignored. As 
Hurd stated in July 1981, ‘... we believe that progress towards a negotiated 
comprehensive peace settlement cannot be made without taking into account the 
political support that the PLO has among the majority of the Palestinian people’.91 
Also, by her own admission, Thatcher’s own views coincided to some extent with 
those of Saudi Arabia: in comparing the dangers of the Iran-Iraq war to the Arab- 
Israeli dispute Thatcher was to state, ‘...I always felt that the Arab-Israeli dispute 
was of even more abiding importance. For it was this which time and again prevented 
the emergence ... of a solid bloc of more or less self-confident pro-Western Arab 
states, no longer having to look over their shoulders at what their critics would make 
of the plight of the landless Palestinians’.92
The British viewpoint, therefore, led the Arabs to believe that they could 
expect a slightly different attitude from Britain. Although Britain agreed with the US 
that the Soviets posed a major threat to the region, it was nevertheless prepared to 
adopt a more pragmatic approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute: ‘the twin principles in 
the European initiative announced at Venice [stated] that the legitimate rights of the
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Palestinians should be recognised and at the same time, that the security of Israel 
should be recognised’ ,93
The Camp David agreement was generally acknowledged as a significant 
breakthrough for Israel’s security with regard to Egypt. However, the British 
Government recognised that further steps needed to be taken: ‘The achievement of the 
Camp David agreements in bringing peace between Israel and Egypt was enormous 
... It is true [however] that there has not been parallel process in the negotiations on 
the Palestinian part of the agreements, and something more than [Palestinian] 
autonomy may well now be required ...’. Furthermore, despite the Government’s 
support for American efforts over the peace process, there was obviously a body of 
opinion which questioned the American approach: ‘obviously we shall discuss this 
matter with our American allies, but I do not think it does any good to criticise them 
This attitude was also prevalent with regard to the Soviet threat: ‘although there 
is an East-West aspect to most of these subjects, the problem on the ground is what 
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matters .
The divergence in opinions between the US and Britain was also apparent over 
a number of Israeli actions in the region. This was particularly the case when 
President Reagan failed to make a stand over Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 
The British Government’s viewpoints were clearer: ‘...I hope that we can all agree 
that we regret the speeding-up of settlements on the West Bank. As the House knows, 
the Government and earlier British Governments have always believed that those 
settlements are illegal and are an obstacle to peace’.95 In addition, as Douglas Hurd 
stated: ‘... it is recognised that Israel’s security needs exist, that they are real and that 
any negotiations for peace must take them into account. Equally the Government of 
Israel must ask themselves whether Israel’s security needs are best based on military 
occupation of Arab lands’, and as he later commented in the event of Israel’s 
occupation of the Golan Heights: ‘There are genuine differences of view between the 
British and Israeli Governments ... we have made clear at the UN and elsewhere our 
rejection of the Israeli action over East Jerusalem and, more recently, the Golan 
Heights’.96
In addition, at the time of the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, Francis 
Pym (the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) not only 
criticised the Israeli action, but also indicated clear support for the PLO:
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‘... the [Israeli] destruction of the PLO’s organisation in Beirut will not 
... enhance Israel’s security ...[they] are men who have tried to lead a 
disparate movement towards a diplomatic solution to their grievances. 
They may not always have done so consistently, but that has been their 
purpose ... and as well as representing our views to Israel we have 
taken the opportunity to represent them strongly to the United States’.97
British commercial persistence and a pragmatic approach in its dealings with Saudi 
Arabia resulted in considerable rewards. Of particular significance was the securing of 
the Al Yamamah contract. With the BAe Lightnings maintenance contract coming to 
an end in 1985, it was imperative that Britain secure a sizeable contract in Saudi 
Arabia, particularly in the face of French competition.98 Securing the contract would 
guarantee British influence and involvement in Saudi Arabia’s (amongst other GCC 
States) highly lucrative defence sector while losing the contract would have resulted 
in Britain’s exclusion from significant portions of the Saudi market for the foreseeable 
future. By September 1985, however, it was clear that Saudi Arabia wished to buy 
Tornadoes and other aircraft from Britain. Known as the Al Yamamah deal, this 
purchase marked one of Britain’s largest ever contracts and was widely hailed a 
success in the press, receiving personal attention from Mrs. Thatcher , and featuring 
prominently in the discourse. Sir Colin Chandler’s views on the Al Yamamah contract 
are as follows:
First of all, Britain probably has the best armed forces in the world and 
it follows that we have got good equipment - also during the early part 
of the ‘80s there had been a lot of effort in the MOD to make our 
defence more competitive and more efficient through a competition 
policy which our main competitors (the continentals) didn’t have - so 
all these factors plus the strategic interests of Britain in the Middle East 
meant that this was an obvious trade to be involved in [with] friendly 
countries - every country has the right to defend itself and this is 
followed by the fact that it has got to have the means to do it, and if we 
didn’t sell the equipment it was clear that someone else would have. So 
all these reasons came together and Mrs. Thatcher was very strong on 
defence anyway and she saw what it did for the UK and what it did for 
relations with other countries - bringing us closer to some of these 
foreign customers - not just in the defence area but also politically 
closer relationships quickly led to trade in other areas. So she saw that 
and was very strong on it. Whenever we asked for help, provided the 
case was made properly and it was the right time for her to intervene 
(you can’t play the Prime Minister’s card every other minute) she was 
happy to do so and she was happy to write to King Fahd in the summer 
of 1985 the famous letter which said “yes you can have Tornadoes and 
yes we will take Arabian oil in return” ... she was also happy to see a
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leading Saudi Emissary off while on holiday and nobody disturbed the 
Prime Minister when she was on holiday ever.100
There was also no doubt about the importance that the British Government attached to 
the preservation and creation of jobs in Britain which such defence contracts brought 
about. In addition to jobs it was clear that such deals generated expansion in other 
areas of trade with the Middle East. This was further indicated by the parallel efforts 
being made by the MOD to lead an attempt to sell tanks and other armoured vehicles 
worth at least £500 million to Saudi Arabia, as a result of which two Challenger tanks 
were dispatched to Saudi Arabia for field trials. This example in particular 
demonstrated the close co-operation between the MOD and the defence industry (in 
this case BAe). There was evidence to suggest that the vehicles were to form part of 
the huge package of defence equipment, including the Tornadoes, that Britain was 
hoping to sell to Saudi Arabia.101
The importance of Al Yamamah became apparent in reports as early as 1986 
which suggested that the contract could be worth much more than the original £5 
billion. Even the various contracts signed in 1985 were expected to provide several 
years' work for various British firms, secure over 18,000 jobs directly and provide 
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benefits for a further 50,000 in the British aerospace industry. Clearly, the 
implications for British industry were considerable. At the time it was estimated that 
the initial contract itself would mean a lengthening of production lines until at least 
1991. The fact that Britain was to supply most of the weapons systems for the 
Tornadoes meant significant knock-on benefits for BAe’s sub-contractors. Hunting 
Engineering, for instance, was to supply the JP233, a runway-cratering weapon, and 
BAe itself provided its own new anti-radar Alarm missile. In addition, the very large 
maintenance, spares and training programme should not be overlooked as this led to 
final estimates of the contract's worth exceeding the £10 billion mark over the 
following decade.103
Expectations regarding the widening of the contract came to fruition in July 
1988 with a major new phase of Project Al Yamamah ‘involving the supply to ... 
Saudi Arabia of additional aircraft, a construction programme and specialised navy 
vessels’.104 The contract was now deemed to be even more ‘staggering both by its 
sheer size and strategic importance’ and was expected to be worth over £10 billion, 
last over 20 years and seal British-Saudi defence relations well into the next 
century’.105
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The sheer scale of the contract meant that Saudi Arabia was keen to establish a 
method for offsetting some of the costs. However, the British Government’s inability 
to force British companies to set up joint ventures in Saudi Arabia meant that 
additional contracts came under threat.106 This was demonstrated by the Saudi 
hesitation to order submarines from Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering (UK) in 
1987, since it was believed at the time that the problem over Al Yamamah offsets was 
threatening the Vickers package.107
The importance of Al Yamamah meant, however, that the British Government 
made a conscious effort to encourage offset investment in Saudi Arabia. As David 
Mellor stated at the time, ‘So far the MOD Offset Office has been in touch with 200 
British firms and a number of leading Saudi businessmen and they have had a very 
positive response both from the Saudis and from the British private sector, and they 
are actually discussing at the moment venture ideas with the companies concerned’.108 
An agreement, valued at over £1 billion, was subsequently signed in July 1988 with 
the express purpose of assisting projects in both the civilian and defence sectors. This 
was seen as a compromise, since the Saudis finally recognised that the British 
Government could not force British firms to invest in Saudi Arabia, but would 
actively encourage them to do so, thereby setting a precedent for future trade 
relations.109
The securing of defence contracts in the highly competitive international arms 
market was clearly not easy and it is important to stress the degree of effort expended 
by various British officials including Mrs. Thatcher, Lord Carrington, John Nott, and 
Douglas Hurd. There are also examples of events which suggest that success was not 
always assured. For instance, the British refusal to allow a PLO member to be part of 
an Arab League mission visiting London to hold talks with Mrs. Thatcher had the 
effect of angering Saudi Authorities, and this in turn threatened British contracts in 
the Kingdom.110 This indicated the close connection between political and 
commercial interests. Similarly, following the showing of the “Death of a Princess” 
on television, relations deteriorated to such an extent that the British Ambassador 
(James Craig) had to be recalled.111 The importance which the British Government 
attached to commercial and political relations with the Saudis was later indicated by 
the frantic apologies conveyed by various officials such as Mr. Hurd, when he visited 
Saudi Arabia in June 1980, and also by Lord Carrington, when he visited shortly after 
in August of that year.112
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The competitive nature of the international arms market was another problem 
faced by British defence exporters. Saudi Arabia’s own policy of supplier 
diversification compounded this problem. The connections with the United States 
have already been mentioned, and France and Germany were other strong contenders 
for defence contracts. West Germany, however, followed restrictive arms practices 
which meant that the sale of German Leopard tanks, for instance, was problematic,113 
but there were indications that the embargo on direct weapons sales was weakening, 
which could, therefore, enable the sale of the tank. France, on the other hand, suffered 
from no such restrictive practices and was therefore another major European arms 
supplier. In 1980 France won defence contracts worth $3.5 billion to supply four 2000 
tonne frigates, two 17,000 tonne naval replenishment ships, 24 Dauphin helicopters 
and ship-to-ship and air-to-air missiles. Another huge contract worth £2.9-3.3 billion 
to supply a low altitude aerial defence system was secured in 1984.114
Al Yamamah and other deals showed, however, that despite the competition 
and other problems such as those outlined above, British commercial interests in the 
Gulf States were of significant importance. This interest extended right up to Mrs. 
Thatcher whose visits at the start of the 1980s were intended, as Fay claimed, 'as a 
prelude to a closer alliance with the leading power in the Gulf.115 He went on to 
comment on Mrs. Thatcher’s belief ‘that perhaps Britain had neglected the region 
since the British withdrawal in 1971, but it [was] intended to put that right in 
future’.116
The above analysis has relied heavily on Thatcherite discourse during the 
period 1979-1988 and has drawn extensively on both primary and secondary sources 
to present evidence in support of the view that economic interests cannot be dismissed 
when considering the factors which influenced British foreign policy towards the 
GCC States, namely the hypothesis stated in chapter 1. Further support for this notion 
was provided during a personal interview by Stephen Day:
‘The Gulf was enormously important for Britain throughout the period 
... I can’t remember the figures we used to quote -1 think it was in the 
region of 100,000 British people who lived and worked in the Gulf and 
there was a much greater number whose jobs depended on contracts in 
the Gulf. And that covered a pretty broad spectrum of employment 
sectors ... [including] engineers, a lot of them working for American 
companies. A number of American companies based their operations 
source for a lot of their material out of UK enterprises, the obvious one 
was ... Bechtal. The construction industry also depended heavily on 
that area even though the boom was beginning to tail off -
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nevertheless, there remained a great deal of work ... down, of course, 
through to the armaments industry.117
Economic elements have been shown to be prominent in the discourse of the era, and 
this prominence would seem to gain added significance if one subscribes to the 
viewpoint that Thatcherism was indeed a belief system based on ideas of economics. 
Apart from demonstrating the importance of the Gulf, the above analysis has shown 
that because of the general decline in the British economy, particularly in the 
manufacturing sectors, a significant degree of importance was placed on exports. The 
Gulf States undoubtedly provided lucrative marketing opportunities for British 
products, with defence equipment leading the way. In addition, Mrs. Thatcher’s role 
as campaigner for British exports to the region has also been highlighted.
It may be useful here to pause and consider the implications of the above 
analysis for British foreign policy towards the GCC States. The discursive analysis 
has shown the prominence of economic factors; however, constructivist principles 
advocate the asking of reflective questions. In this light, therefore, a reflective 
question would be whether it was likely that British foreign policy was shaped 
entirely by economic factors despite Thatcherite emphasis on material economic 
interests. This type of question must be asked because, unlike positivist analysis 
which is based upon objective scientific methodology, constructivism argues that 
understanding international relations relies on perceptions, understanding, and 
reflecting upon what constitutes the social, namely a subjective emphasis.
This reflection must be placed in the context of Sir Frank Cooper’s comments. 
In his position as Permanent Under-Secretary of State (MOD), he appeared less 
convinced of the value of British exports to the region. He regarded British interests 
in the region as predominantly historical with commercial interests being over-played 
somewhat: ‘... I think the oil interest had diminished quite significantly - It was 
important - but I don’t think it ever was, either in the Government or within industry 
the main interest’.118 As regards other general commercial interests, Sir Frank Cooper 
appeared equally non-committal, claiming that they were not a mainspring of British 
policy but rather an element of it. This, in his opinion, was rather an after-effect
... of our moving out of those places. If you look at Southeast Asia I 
would take the view that we ... held back on keeping trading 
relationships’ and ‘as far as the Gulf was concerned - of course trade 
was important in a commercial sense - but I don’t think that trade 
followed the flag or really dictated the course of events ... The
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Conservatives wanted good relations - we didn’t want a Gulf in flames 
... So I think we were taking a more pragmatic rather than gainful 
[view] - it was like getting the most out of a situation without putting 
in too much cost or effort’. He went on to state that Britain certainly 
wanted to keep the contracts achieved and get more but ‘we had given 
up the idea that we could control the situation in overt competition with 
France, to some extent Italy and the United States ... our political 
motivation wasn’t very high to be frank - nor would we go all that far 
to defend contracts and this, that and the other beyond what we were 
already doing. We were very pragmatic about it’.11?
Despite having these views, Sir Frank Cooper nevertheless confirmed Mrs. Thatcher’s 
high profile in pushing both for making a contribution to stability in the Gulf region 
and increasing her support for companies selling their products there. Her attitude 
undoubtedly increased the level of the threshold, ‘... as much as anything else there 
was a recognition that... they could be trading partners so that we could make a lot of 
money that way which would help to get our economy moving again ... she did make 
a significant contribution [and] was at great pains when any rulers of those States 
came to England, she would go out of her way - her opinion was that these people 
had a lot of money and historically Britain knew a lot about them and had had 
relations with them for a long time, and so we ought to get more than our fair 
share’.120
The discourse analysed has already demonstrated the prominence of economic 
factors, as was also shown by Mrs. Thatcher's attempts to cultivate and encourage 
relations with the GCC States. As Lord Hurd commented during a personal interview:
She was always very good at seeing people over here - now that is very 
important for the Gulf because a lot of the people concerned came to 
London and they wanted to see the Prime Minister - her time was very 
scarce - but she was always very good at that - and very good at 
handling the events.121
What light does evidence such as this throw on possible conclusions, therefore? On 
the one hand it has been argued that economic material interests influenced the shape 
of policy, but here clearly multiple factors of explanation begin to emerge. Sir Frank 
Cooper’s insistence that historical factors were at least as important as commercial 
interests prepares the way for a fuller consideration of multiple explanations in the 
final conclusion.
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Section 2: British Threat Perceptions
Whatever the motivating factors, as Sir Frank Cooper highlighted, the British 
government was concerned that the Gulf region should remain stable. It is useful to 
identify elements within Thatcherite discourse, therefore, which point to this 
objective. This analysis is relevant given that any examination of British foreign 
policy towards the GCC States has to be considered in the context of the perceptions 
held by the government of any threats that faced the region. As highlighted in chapter 
1, threats facing the region can be categorised as both internal, such as revolution in 
Iran and the Iran - Iraq war and external, such as the British perception of the Soviet 
threat to the region.
Section 2.1: Internal Threats
a) Political changes
Analysis of secondary sources pointed to the belief that the Iranian Revolution 
constituted a threat to general Western interests in the Persian Gulf. Its virulently anti- 
Western nature, its territorial claims on Gulf States such as Bahrain, and its calls on 
other Shi’ites in the Arab world to revolt against their own governments increased the 
Western sense of insecurity. Under threat were the Gulf markets, and the oil and trade 
routes through the Straits of Hormuz.122 The immediate implications of the Iranian 
Revolution were to cause a number of problems for the British Government. But to 
what extent did the British government perceive the revolution in Iran to be a threat to 
its interests in the region? In order to answer this, the viewpoints and statements of 
various government officials on a number of issues must be analysed. Firstly, the 
implications of the Revolution for the British economy need to be assessed. Secondly, 
what were the effects of Iran’s detention of British missionaries? Thirdly, to what 
extent were the British concerned over Iran’s persecution of its own Baha’i 
community? Fourthly, the question of whether the academic community’s belief that 
Iran’s Islamic viewpoints were a threat to Western interests needs to be placed in the 
British context. Finally, in view of the recent invasion of Afghanistan, how concerned 
were the British about the possibility of the Soviets developing close connections with 
the new Iranian regime?
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The effects on the British domestic economy as a result of the Revolution 
were significant. The oil price rise (a rise of over 30 percent) had an increasingly 
detrimental effect on the international economy and, as Thatcher stated, also had a 
damaging effect on the domestic economy due to Sterling’s position as a petro­
currency. Being tied in to oil prices meant that its value appreciated accordingly, 
which in turn brought with it all the symptoms of a high value currency such as 
increasing interest rates and problems for British exporters.123
There also seemed to be some tension in the British - US relationship, since 
although Mrs. Thatcher supported President Carter over the imposition of economic 
sanctions against Iran as a response to the US hostage crisis, in light of domestic 
considerations Britain felt unable to comply with all that the US requested. This was 
particularly apparent when Britain refused to freeze Iranian financial assets (as the US 
had done), as this ‘would have had a devastating effect on international confidence in 
the City of London as a world financial centre’.124
Furthermore, the difficulties which the Iranian economy faced following the 
Revolution appeared to have had a detrimental effect on the employment prospects in 
certain British industrial sectors. During the 1970s, for instance, the MOD’S exports 
of tanks and ammunition (manufactured by the Royal Ordnance Factories) were to 
increase considerably. Iran’s decision to terminate various contracts resulted in the 
loss of considerable business that the uncompleted orders represented. 30 to 40 
percent of the ROFs entire output was being sold to Iran. As John Graham 
(Ambassador to Iran at the time of the Revolution) stated: ‘On the tanks, the contract 
[was] terminated by the Iranians ... we were left with hulls and partly constructed 
tanks and long lead items ordered, and are obviously looking for another buyer ... I 
am aware that there were other defence contracts which were also terminated, for 
construction particularly ... and we are owed a great deal of money ... we will have 
very great difficulty, I think, in negotiating a satisfactory settlement’.126
Certain individuals such as David Howell (the then Energy Secretary) also 
indicated that Britain was likely to face problems with the supply of oil as a result of 
the disruption of supplies from Iran, As he was to state: ‘Following the disruption of 
oil supplies from Iran from the early part of the year, a tight world oil situation has 
developed, with total supplies on present estimates likely to be well short of expected 
demand world-wide. The position in Iran could easily worsen again and the prospect 
from the other suppliers is at best fragile’.127 As far as the UK was concerned it was
107
clear that supplies were at the same level as the previous year, but demand for oil had 
increased considerably, so in actuality supplies to the UK as a whole were around 5 
percent below what was expected.128 This confirms that Britain continued to rely on 
Persian Gulf oil despite having its own indigenous supplies.
The second factor concerned the Iranian seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran 
and the taking of hostages which provoked bitterness and condemnation in the United 
States and ultimately led to the embarrassing and failed rescue attempt.129 Britain 
adopted a similar position by supporting the US in the Security Council over the 
imposition of economic sanctions against Iran. These sanctions were later lifted, 
however, following the release of the hostages, but obstacles to better relations 
remained because of Iran’s detention of British subjects. This was confirmed at the 
time in the following statement: ‘we hope that the release of US hostages will pave 
the way for a better overall relationship between Iran and the West. We for our part 
wish to build a normal relationship with Iran in the future, but the continuing 
detention of 4 British subjects ... places an important obstacle in the way of this’.130 
Also a more forceful statement by Douglas Hurd indicated the degree of frustration 
felt by the British Government in its dealings with the new Iranian regime. Since their 
arrest, the Foreign Office had had no contact with the hostages, and Britain insisted 
that, despite Iran’s obligations under international law, it had brought no formal 
charges against the detainees except the ‘most general and wild accusation against the 
Anglican Church of spying and counter-revolutionary activities’.131
Thirdly, Britain’s position at the United Nations over Iran’s human rights 
abuses was clear. Throughout the period 1980-1988, numerous statements by British 
officials condemned Iran’s persecution of members of its own Baha’i community. For 
example, Malcolm Rifkind stated in March 1983: ‘Representatives of the Ten have 
made three demarches to the Iranian authorities, most recently on 27 December, to 
express our concern at the human rights violations against the Baha’is. We continue to 
believe that the best hope of persuading the Iranian Government to respect human 
rights is to take further action in the United Nations’.132
The fourth factor concerns the deposition of the Shah and the formation of the 
new government in Tehran. This caused deep concern in Britain, as the British 
Government had previously enjoyed close relations with Iran. When discussing the 
Iran-Iraq war Sir Frank Cooper stated:
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I think Britain had a lot of difficulty in deciding whether to be pro-Iran 
or pro-Iraq or neutral. I also think that at the beginning of that period 
when the United States’ relations with Iran were deteriorating ... we 
tended to be more pro-Iran rather than pro-Iraq quite frankly. 
Strategically we had had a very long relationship with Iran as indeed 
we had with Iraq, but due to our commercial interests in the Persian 
Gulf, we saw Iran very much as a bulwark against the expansion of 
Soviet communism ... we had been a major supporter of the Shah, we 
sold a lot of goods, military and civilian ... [but] ... Yes I think we 
were worried ... but I think we hoped to contain the situation by 
keeping a relatively low profile - and we hoped that this way we might 
re-establish a relationship.133
In view of Iran’s key position in the Gulf, the British Government was anxious to 
preserve good diplomatic relations with the new Iranian regime. However, Iran’s anti- 
Western attitude meant that it failed to respond to British advances, and the analysis 
of Iran’s “fundamentalist” nature as a threat to the Gulf region and, therefore, British 
interests (also recognised by the academic community) were apparent in numerous 
statements by Government officials.
As Hurd stated:
Iran is an important country in the Middle East, an important country 
in our eyes, and we would wish to return to our traditional friendship 
with it. But it is necessary to say ... that it is not possible to return to 
the kind of friendship that we would like while certain things are 
happening’ (a reference to the detention of British subjects).134 In 
addition, when questioned about the threat of Iranian expansion in the 
Gulf region, Hurd’s response confirmed the British Government’s 
concern: ‘we have certainly been worried by some aspects of Iranian 
activity ... in the Gulf.135
And during a personal interview he stated:
Threats to the region were taken very seriously - our analysis was that 
the Gulf was threatened - Iran and particularly its dispute over the 
Islands with the UAE (Abu Musa) clearly was a threat which to some 
extent started under the Shah - his position over Bahrain was never 
very clear - and the threat continued and certainly became more 
practicable136
Lord Carrington is more specific about the threat of Islamic Fundamentalism in his 
memoirs:
‘There was the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, which had found 
violent expression in the overthrow of the Shah and which was causing 
explosive polarisation throughout most of the Arab lands - polarisation 
between ‘moderates’ and others, but by no means eliminating conflict
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between different ‘immoderates’, as was soon evident in the Iran-Iraq 
war’.137
Francis Pym in The Politics of Consent identified the creation of the state of Israel and 
the effects of that on the Arab world, and the upsurge of Muslim fundamentalism as 
the two main problems confronting the Middle East ‘...I feel that the second poses 
the greater medium term threat... ’138
There was also concern in the West at the time of the Revolution that links 
between the Soviet Union and Iran might be forged. As Hiro observed, economic ties 
between the two neighbours had gradually strengthened over the 1960s and 70s. 
These culminated in a ‘five-year economic agreement between Tehran and Moscow 
signed in 1976 [that] visualised transactions worth $3 billion’.139 Immediately 
following the Revolution, Moscow called on leftist groups within Iran (such as the 
Tudeh) to support Khomeini in his drive to oust the last supporter of the Shah. As 
Hiro went on to state: ‘During the subsequent days and weeks while Western media 
gave an impression of chaos prevailing in Iran, Soviet media stressed the positive 
side’ and in giving support to Khomeini ‘Moscow hoped that [he] would steer Iran 
away from the Western camp and into the non-aligned community of nations’.140
The possibility of a warming of relations between the Soviet Union and Iran 
did not escape politicians in Whitehall, who were already concerned about the wider 
implications of the Iranian Revolution. As Minister Hurd was to state in 1980 when 
answering questions on Iran’s internal situation: ‘I think that this is a very worrying 
aspect of the situation. Obviously, these centrifugal forces have been going on for 
some time. They have received an added impetus since the Revolution and they are 
difficult to deal with. They do provide an opportunity to the Soviet Union ... ’141
The subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, changed the 
situation considerably. Iran saw this as a hostile action, not only against Afghanistan 
itself, but also against the Islamic world in general. This led to Khomeini’s 
declaration on the eve of the Iranian New Year that: ‘We are the enemies of 
international communism in the same way as we are against the world predators of the 
West, headed by the United States’.142 Such statements by Khomeini were welcomed 
by British politicians as signs that Iran did not favour Moscow, but they were aware 
that there was considerable internal turmoil in Iran and wary of the possible influence 
of the more organised leftist groups such as Tudeh: As Hurd was to state: ‘There are 
several left wing groups. The Tudeh party, which is the best known, obviously does
no
have, and has had for a long time, close links with Moscow. It is highly organised and 
active’.143
b) Conflict in the Region
Conflict in the region in the form of the Iran-Iraq war constitutes another important 
internal threat, which from the moment of Iraq’s invasion in September 1980 till the 
ceasefire in 1988 threatened not only neutral merchant shipping but was also in 
danger of spilling over into the important GCC states. This section will seek to 
examine some key issues in a general context. To what extent was the British 
government concerned that the war would destabilise the entire region? This was 
particularly relevant since, as long as the war continued, Islamic fundamentalism, as 
manifest in the Iranian Revolution, was seen as posing a threat to the integrity and 
internal stability of the GCC States and Iraq. A further factor was that the closure of 
the important Strait of Hormuz through which were transported most of the free 
world’s oil supplies remained a possibility as long as the war continued. Iran and 
Iraq’s attacks on neutral merchant shipping through the Gulf of Oman and the 
remainder of the Persian Gulf meant that the principle of the freedom of navigation of 
international waters had come under threat. The discourse will be analysed, therefore, 
in order to highlight to what extent Britain felt that its considerable investment and 
trade interests in the GCC States could be threatened both by an extension of the war 
and by the possibility of political upheaval as a result of internal subversion, as 
manifest in the Iranian Revolution.
Chapter 1 established some of the background to the Iran-Iraq war. This 
section will now highlight the most critical features of the conflict and their effect on 
British policy. The official British stance was one of declared impartiality, centring on 
attempts to end the war through their support for various UN Resolutions. As Sir 
Geoffrey Howe stated: ‘We remain strictly impartial in the conflict between Iran and 
Iraq - the underlying cause of tension in the Gulf - and are working for immediate 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 598, which provides for a ceasefire 
and negotiated settlement’.144 President Carter’s declaration in the form of the Carter 
Doctrine indicated the strategic importance of the Gulf and reflected a belief that the 
oil supplies and trade routes needed to be protected. The continuing anxiety in 
London, Washington, and other Western capitals and Gulf States was also based upon
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a fear that the Gulf war could possibly spread to the moderate pro-Western States in 
the Gulf. In Britain’s case there is considerable evidence to confirm this anxiety. As 
Francis Pym stated: ‘This is a conflict over which we can claim little or no influence, 
but it is still a potential threat to our interests and to the security of some of our 
friends in the region ...,145 A memorandum from the FCO to the Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee confirmed this view: ‘Only when fighting by land, sea and air 
stops, achieving a total ceasefire, will the present dangerous instability in the wider 
region be removed ... soundly-based economic, and political growth in the region and 
security of oil supplies at stable prices is in everyone’s interests and remains a prime 
objective for the UK’.146
Another wider consequence of the war was its direct threat to British shipping. 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 the war proceeded through 
various phases, each of which had an effect on British policy in view of the threat to 
neutral shipping. The initial invasion resulted in the setting up of the Armilla Patrol, 
the original purpose of which was to provide reassurance to British merchant shipping 
in the Gulf. Iraq’s conduct of war, however, subsequently centred around attempts to 
bring economic pressure on Iran by limiting its oil output and increasing the costs of 
its exports. From 1984 this was attempted by attacking foreign vessels serving Iran’s 
main export terminal at Kharg Island. When Iran moved these port facilities further 
away to Larak Island in 1986, Iraq shifted its attack there. Iran’s response to these 
attacks at sea was to target, contrary to International Law (according to British 
statements), shipping serving neutral countries, thereby endangering merchant ships, 
including British vessels. Iran’s attack methods included fixed wing aircraft, 
helicopter gunships and, from 1986 onwards, surface-to-surface missiles, mainly off 
the coasts of Kuwait and the UAE, thereby highlighting the wider dangers of the 
conflict. In early 1987 Iran also began to use Chinese manufactured Silkworm 
missiles and subsequently planted mines off the coasts of Kuwait and Fujairah. It was 
these Iranian activities which particularly threatened the Gulfs wider stability and 
consequently were a main cause for concern for Britain (and other Western States). 
The extent of this concern was demonstrated by the British Government’s extension 
of the Armilla Patrol’s mode of operations (see Section 3), and is further confirmed 
by the following statement: ‘Attacks on shipping are at present the most dangerous 
symptom of that tension ... [there is an] urgent need not only for a settlement of the 
conflict as a whole, but also for a halt to attacks on ships in the Gulf. It is vital to
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uphold the principle of freedom of navigation, and the Armilia Patrol continues to 
play its part by providing protection for British vessels’.147
The perceived threats posed by Iran’s anti-Western fundamentalist regime 
were dealt with earlier. In the context of the war these came to be considered even 
more serious. The Shi’ite revolutionary regime was considered as being more of a 
threat than the Ba’thists in Iraq. The danger to the region was particularly manifest in 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s expansionist policy, since his declared objective was to 
establish an Islamic community which transcended state boundaries. There was the 
possibility of appeal for the revolution in all GCC States: 30 percent of Kuwait’s 
population of 1.7 million was Shi’ite; there was a significant Shi’ite minority in the 
key oil-producing eastern province in Saudi Arabia; Shi’ites were a majority in Iraq 
and Bahrain; and the UAE was highly exposed to influence from Iran because of close 
trading links and the sizeable expatriate Persian communities.148 As is apparent from 
the following FCO memorandum, the British Government therefore saw Iran as 
posing a significant fundamentalist threat: ‘Important circles in Iran are committed to 
the export of those Islamic principles on which the Iranian Revolution was based. 
This involves both propaganda and material support for selected dissident 
(particularly Shia) elements abroad’.149 In view of the unpredictable outcome of the 
war, these fears were heightened, as it was possible to foresee serious consequences 
for British interests in the case of an Iranian victory.
The conflict lasted for nearly eight years, during which Britain expressed its 
concern in a number of ways. Most of these will be dealt with in Section 3, but here it 
is important to highlight Britain’s support for UN Resolutions, particularly Security 
Council Resolutions (SCR) 582 and 598. Resolution 582 called, among other things, 
for an immediate ceasefire. The war was to continue, however, and most British 
Government statements reflected the frustration felt, both as a result of the failure of 
the belligerents to agree to a ceasefire, and as a result of the lack of any British or 
Western influence over the two warring nations.150 The war in fact continued until 
Iran finally agreed to sign Resolution 598 in 1988. Sir Geoffrey Howe stated in 1987 
that the adoption by the Security Council of this particular Resolution owed ‘much to 
British initiative and [was] the culmination of many months work’, thus indicating the 
efforts expended by Britain in attempting to arrange a ceasefire.151 In addition to 
demanding an immediate ceasefire, the Resolution was designed to demonstrate the
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impartiality of the international community, as it was claimed that SCR 598 was 
balanced and favoured neither of the parties.
Nevertheless, the British Government clearly blamed the Iranian regime for 
the continuation of the war. Iran’s refusal to accept SCR 598, even though by this 
stage Iraq had agreed to abide by its guidelines, centred around Iran’s attempts to 
persuade the international community that since Iraq had instigated the initial invasion 
there ought not to be any question of Iranian war reparations. As the following 
statement shows, however, Iran was blamed quite early on during the conflict for 
wishing to continue the war. Pym’s statement also hints at the premise that the British 
Government had begun to regard Iran as the more serious threat.
It seems that Iran and Khomeini are determined to continue with the 
war. They have recovered most of their country which was taken by 
Iraq earlier on in the campaign and only a few pockets of Iraqis remain 
in Iran. The Iranians have moved into Iraq and occupied some of their 
country and they are determined to continue the war ... there does not 
seem any way of stopping their desire to fight this war ...152
In the event of non-compliance with the principles of SCR 598, Britain and the other 
permanent members of the Security Council agreed, at a meeting in New York on 25 
September 1987, on a “twin track” approach to ending the conflict Iran’s refusal to 
sign led to work on the second track of enforcement measures, namely the 
establishment and subsequent imposition of a mandatory arms embargo in an attempt 
to enforce compliance. The emphasis on Iran in the following statement by Sir 
Geoffrey Howe further supports the argument that Iran was considered a more serious 
threat than Iraq.
We have impressed upon Iraq the need to refrain from attacks upon 
shipping in the Gulf, and it has done so for periods of several weeks at 
a time. Subsequently, it has also been clear that Iraq accepts and will 
implement resolution 598 if the Iranians do so, but Iran has neither 
accepted nor rejected the resolution, which is why all of us ... 
recognised the need to maintain the pressure for an arms embargo in 
relation to Iran primarily, although not exclusively.153
By the FCO’s own admission, Iran saw Britain as a major Western power to be 
distrusted because of its close association with the Shah and the US. The UK was, 
therefore, seen by Iran as being increasingly pro-Iraq, and the fact that there was an 
element of truth to this belief is demonstrated by the following quote by David 
Mellor:
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... of course we try to be impartial ... but that does not mean ... that 
our judgements on both sides have always got to be the same ... there 
is no pre-built in tilt against Iran but facts increasingly have driven us 
to make statements that are critical of Iran...
and
... in terms of our support for moderate, sensible governments in the 
region we are not in any sense impartial... we are bound by strong ties 
of friendship with the Gulf countries, all of whom are moderately and 
sensibly led. It is plainly a key part of our strategy to do all we can to 
maintain support for those governments [which] are fundamentally 
opposed to fundamentalism...154
Statements such as those highlighted in this section show that key politicians were 
increasingly concerned that the war was destabilising the region and therefore could 
be seen as constituting a threat to British interests in the GCC States. Not only was the 
war geographically close, other factors such as Iran’s form of Islamic fundamentalism 
and its reluctance to sign UN Resolutions also formed part of the matrix which could 
have heightened Britain’s anxiety. Attention now turns to external threats, in 
particular those associated with the Soviet Union, which were also causing 
considerable concern during the period in question.
Section 2.2: External Threats
The discourse includes regular and prominent references to the British government's 
perception that a Soviet threat existed had to be taken seriously, and one aspect of this 
was Britain's perception that there was an actual Soviet threat to its interests in the 
Gulf region. The British Government’s concern with Soviet expansion stemmed from 
two inter-linked factors, the first being the West’s belief that, despite detente, the 
Soviet Union ‘continued to pursue a policy of expansion and subversion wherever 
they ... felt they could do so with impunity’.155 The second was a direct consequence 
of the Soviet Union’s failure to accumulate further power in Europe in the face of 
NATO’s resolve. The British Government saw this as the reason behind the attention 
which the Soviets had begun to focus on the Third World. As Peter Blaker stated at 
the time, ‘I think it is because NATO has shown determination and solidarity in 
Europe ... that the attention of the Soviet Union has increasingly been diverted to the 
possibilities for expansion in the Third World’.156 The 1980 Defence White Paper, for 
example, highlights the aggressive motive behind the Soviet Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy, a basic tenet of which was to extend communism to every nation by
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military means if necessary. The Soviet Union had already demonstrated the use of 
force in Eastern Europe and its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the ‘first example 
of military intervention to ensure a Soviet hold on a country outside the Warsaw 
Pact’.'58
Indeed, Afghanistan could be perceived as the culmination of a series of proxy 
interventions undertaken in a number of Third World countries, since it followed 
Soviet support for the MPLA in Angola, for Colonel Mengistu against the Somalis in 
Ethiopia, their backing for the pro-Soviet South Yemeni attack on North Yemen in 
1979, and the joint invasion of Kampuchea with Vietnam. Therefore, as Williams 
pointed out to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the main reason that Afghanistan 
‘caused such alarm in the West was the change in Soviet tactics: Moscow, for the first 
time, had gone beyond the use of proxies to direct military intervention outside 
Eastern Europe’.159 An FCO memorandum, also to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
confirmed this, by stating that Afghanistan represented a departure because ‘for the 
first time since 1945 Soviet combat troops were used in large numbers outside the 
Warsaw Pact’.160
According to Williams, Britain’s security interests and foreign policy 
objectives revolved primarily around Europe, and Soviet-British relations were 
merely an element of this. However, he went on to stress that Soviet actions in the 
Third World could also impinge upon the relationship and so could not be 
overlooked.161 One contributing factor was the significant Soviet military build-up, 
not just in Europe, but also elsewhere. It was normal practice for the Conservative 
Government to draw detailed comparisons between the forces of NATO and Warsaw 
Pact nations in all annual Defence White Papers.162 No further discussion of these 
details is necessary here, therefore, but there had been a three-fold increase in the 
Soviet navy since 1968: during this time it had developed into a major ocean going 
fleet and this was seen as a major indicator of growing Soviet interests in the global
1 A7 projection of power.
The Soviet threat was no longer confined to Europe, therefore, and its invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979 could be construed as representing an attempt by the Soviet 
Union to shift its attention to regions other than Europe. Sir Clive Whitmore, who 
admitted that it was natural enough to translate the threat from the Warsaw Pact into a 
threat to Europe because of Britain’s geographical position, also stated that ‘the 
Soviet Union operate[d] on a global basis, and from time to time [Britain would]
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undoubtedly see its interests threatened outside Europe by the activities of the Soviet 
Union’.164
It is possible to understand, therefore, that East-West relations had begun to 
deteriorate even before 1979. Concern over factors such as differing perceptions over 
the meaning of détente, continuing Soviet pressure on the Third World, and the Soviet 
failure to implement the Helsinki Final Act was heightened following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Not only did the invasion seem to confirm Western 
disillusion with the détente process, it also appeared to represent a Soviet attempt to 
extend rather than merely entrench Soviet hegemony. The invasion brought the 
process of détente to a halt and led to President Carter’s decision to withdraw the 
SALT II Treaty from consideration by the US Senate. As Malcolm Rifkind was to 
state at the time: ‘The Soviet Union has always been opportunistic and whenever it 
has found an opportunity to extent its power and influence without too heavy a price it 
has been happy to take it ...’l65 In addition the 1981 Defence White Paper stated that 
it was the association of immense military power with a hostile and expansionist 
Marxist-Leninist ideology which still determined Soviet official attitudes. In addition, 
‘The Soviet leadership continually reaffirms its adherence to the teachings of Lenin, 
whose recurring theme is the inevitable triumph of communism over capitalism ... 
Experience suggests ... that we cannot be confident the Soviet Union will be content 
with peaceful competition’.166
Statements such as these show that the British Government perceived the 
threat from the Soviet Union to be serious and its invasion of Afghanistan needs to be 
seen in the context of a general global extension on the part of the Soviets during the 
1970s. However, it is also necessary to place this in the context of the belief within 
the British government that the invasion was a more specific threat to the Gulf region 
than any previous Soviet action. As statements by Mrs. Thatcher herself will show, 
the Government appeared concerned that the Soviet Union was extending its 
influence towards this region.
The traditional arguments for the invasion of Afghanistan revolved around 
Soviet sensitivities to instability on its borders, its northerly position depriving it of 
warm water ports, and culminating in the argument that since the 1960s the Soviet 
Union had sought base facilities in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. In 
addition, certain academics raised the possibility that, despite having extensive 
petroleum reserves, the Soviet Union would be faced with a shortage due to its
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inability to access such fields as those in Siberia. As Gill argued, the ‘Kremlin may, 
therefore, take a more urgent interest in securing oil from the Middle East. Soviet 
policy-makers know the economic advantages of importing oil from the Middle East, 
and must be considering ... an active turn towards external sources’.167 Beyond these 
traditional viewpoints Williams identified two specific schools of thought. The former 
emphasised opportunism in Soviet policy but the absence of a master plan. This 
viewpoint suggested that a series of events during the 1970s had provided unique 
opportunities for the Soviet Union to extend its influence. The latter, on the other 
hand, regarded the Soviet threat as much more serious. Although it accepted the 
opportunistic nature of Soviet policy during the 70s and early 80s, it saw this 
‘opportunism as occurring within a framework of Soviet expansionism through both 
direct and indirect means...’ arguing that ‘ideological impulses [had] once again 
come to the fore’.168 This viewpoint is further supported by Conquest, who saw no 
reason to doubt that the ultimate Soviet aim was the extension of socialism and that 
their moves in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan were ‘certainly part of a Soviet 
decision, apparently reached around 1965, to act on a world scale’.169
Various elements within the British Government appeared to subscribe to one 
or the other of these viewpoints. The Defence White Papers for instance referred to 
the continuation of expansionist Marxist-Leninist ideology through the use of force if 
necessary170 and Williams had also pointed out that this ideology had recently 
resurfaced. This would seem to be adherence to the alarmist school of thought, as 
would the following statement by Mrs Thatcher:
... The West had for some time been anxious that the Soviets would 
make a drive for the oil in the Gulf. And the energy crisis gave them 
still a stronger reason to do so ... Perhaps I was less shocked than some 
... I had long understood that détente had been ruthlessly used by the 
Soviets to exploit Western weakness ... What had happened in 
Afghanistan was only part of a wider pattern ...171
On the other hand, there was also a view that the invasion was essentially defensive in 
nature arising from a desire to protect boundaries and that, although there was a basic 
expansionist tendency in Soviet actions, opportunism was the guiding force. 
Warhurst confirms this by stating that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not a 
threat to Western interests, and that the West had over-reacted by ‘ignoring the 
significance of the invasion for it proved the failure of Soviet foreign policy in an area 
that the Soviet Union considered vital to its interests. In addition, the Foreign
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Affairs Committee concluded that, while carefully planned, the invasion did not 
represent part of a grand strategy to reach warm water ports in the Middle East or 
control Western oil and trade routes.173
When Peter Blaker was questioned about the significance of the invasion, he 
replied, ‘... the Soviet action in Afghanistan ... gives the Russians more opportunities 
for activity in South West Asia, which, of course, is ... sensitive ... in relation to the 
supply of oil’, and his response when questioned further about the possibility of the 
Soviets taking over the oil by force highlights the fact that British politicians were 
aware of the differing interpretations of Soviet motives: ‘It depends what view you 
take about Soviet motivation. I am inclined to be rather cautious in my interpretation 
... I believe that they are inclined, if presented with the opportunity of taking action 
which is detrimental to the non-communist world, to be unable to resist the temptation 
to take that action’.174
As the above illustrates it is impossible to be conclusive about Soviet 
motivations in Afghanistan. However, there is no doubt that the British Government 
collectively viewed the Soviet invasion as a seriously destabilising factor for the 
Persian Gulf. The FCO suggested that ‘The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could 
undermine stability in the surrounding region. There is now a palpable threat to the 
integrity of the neighbouring states ... ’175
The Government’s reply to the voluminous Fifth Foreign Affairs Committee 
Report of Session 1979-80 concluded that there had been no evidence to suggest that 
the invasion of Afghanistan had been part of a Soviet grand strategy to extend its 
influence to the Persian Gulf. However, the reply also advocated the need for Western 
policy to take account of the Soviet Union’s willingness to use force to further its own 
objectives at the expense of Western interests. Furthermore, with the Soviet Union in 
control of Afghanistan, the Government admitted that it was now ‘better placed to 
promote instability in South Asia and the Gulf area. Soviet forces are closer to the 
Gulf and this has made a significant difference to the balance of forces in the 
„ 176region .
In a speech in New York in December 1979 Mrs Thatcher also confirmed that 
it was not possible to determine Soviet motivations but went on to state that ‘the fact 
is that the Russians have the weapons and are getting more of them. It is simple 
prudence for the West to responsd’.177 She thereby highlighted the fact that whatever 
the motivation for the invasion, the Soviet Union was seen as representing a threat to
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British interests and some form of British response could be expected. Attention now 
turns, therefore, to the various British responses to the threats perceived in the Gulf 
region between 1979 and 1988.
Section 3: The British Response and developing Military Presence
The discourse analysed in this chapter has demonstrated how prominently commercial 
interests featured in many sources during the period 1979-1988. The discourse has 
included statements by politicians, including key government figures such as Douglas 
Hurd, Francis Pym, Geoffrey Howe, amongst others and also Mrs. Thatcher herself. 
Though there is no doubt that the Government regarded the region as important, the 
question of whether economic factors alone shaped British foreign policy has not been 
proved. The importance attached by Britain to the region, however, calls for further 
analysis of the discourse of this period to identify suggestions that this invited some 
form of British military connection with the region.
At the time of Mrs Thatcher’s first trip to the Gulf States at the start of the 
1980s Douglas Hurd was to state:
Britain has not been taking a friendly and intelligent interest in that 
part of the world. We have let it slip ... commercially, others have 
come in and snapped up the big opportunities. Politically, we have 
taken it for granted. We have not kept in close touch with the rulers ... 
[but Mrs Thatcher] was received with enthusiasm. I do not doubt that 
the effect of the visit... will be substantial. It is an example of a timely 
and successful visit to a part of the world that is enormously important 
to us.178
Both chapters 1 and 2 have highlighted that the region was beset by considerable 
turmoil in the form of internal and external threats, which invited some form of 
British response. Personal interviews with both Lord Douglas Hurd and Sir Alan 
Munro were very useful sources of information in this context Sir Alan Munro, who 
in his position as the Head of the Middle East Department in 1979, spanned the 
change in Government from Labour to Conservative and was therefore in a position to 
witness at first hand the change in policy towards the Gulf region.
He described British policy during the Labour Government as one of 
‘coasting, of riding in neutral’, but from the beginning of 1979 when Khomeini 
returned to Iran Sir Alan Munro specified that ‘to us [Middle Easterners] in the 
Foreign Office there was a renewed cause for nervousness, on the part of the Arab
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States in the Gulf, in the face of this new burst of ... Islamic radicalism ... both in 
terms of stability of those states themselves and of our considerable economic 
(including access to oil) and trading interests’.179 In his opinion, Labour politicians, 
such as David Owen and Frank Judd, who were responsible for Middle Eastern 
affairs, had reservations about too close a political association with the Gulf States.
In fact ‘it wasn’t until the changeover to a Conservative Government and the 
appearance of Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary and Douglas Hurd as Minister of 
State, that these ideas for a shift in policy were given support at the political level’.180 
He went on to state, that had there not been a change in Government, the shift in 
policy towards the Gulf States would have taken considerably longer. This change in 
policy took a definite form, as it was believed that a higher profile in military advice 
and supply was necessary in order to strengthen the Gulf States’ defence capabilities. 
The British had already played a significant advisory role in Saudi Arabia and were 
eager to emulate this elsewhere in the Gulf.181
Further indications that Britain was to play a more significant role in the 
Persian Gulf region with the arrival of the Conservatives were provided by Lord 
Douglas Hurd during a personal interview. As he was Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs at the start of Mrs. Thatcher’s Administration he is 
particularly well placed to confirm this shift in policy:
I think there is some truth in it - that Conservative Ministers tend to be 
rather more sympathetic to the Gulf and the people around the Gulf -1 
went there myself with Ted Heath in 1969/70 and so I knew it a bit and 
Peter Carrington gave it to me as the Minister of State - as actually the 
main area of my responsibility ... and I did travel there quite a lot 
during 1979-83, and always with great pleasure - I went to all the 
Emirates of the UAE - which I don’t think had been done before and I 
think it is true we were more active and of course there is the 
commercial angle to that - we were in very keen competition with the 
French and the Americans - but there was the feeling on our part that 
this was a very important part of the world where there were a lot of 
British people involved and rightly we encouraged that.
In comparing the Conservative administration with the previous Labour government 
he stated:
It is true we wanted to be rather more active than our predecessors ... 
and Mrs. Thatcher encouraged that - she went there herself early on - 
in’81.182
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British responses to the internal and external threats revolved primarily around five 
issues. Firstly, British support for the US decision to establish a Rapid Deployment 
Force (RDF); secondly, Britain’s own physical presence in the region in the form of 
naval deployments; thirdly, the deployment of Naval Task Groups and the carrying 
out of various military exercises within the Persian Gulf region and Indian Ocean; 
fourthly, the provision of military assistance to GCC States in the form of defence 
sales, and secondments of military personnel; and fifthly, the provision within the 
British Armed Forces of elements specifically designed to conduct out-of-area 
operations.
The US decision to establish the RDF had its roots in US military thinking. 
The Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) was established in 1958 and was assigned the 
XVIII Airborne Corps HQ and the 82 Airborne Division. These ultimately provided 
the core for the RDF and subsequently the US Central Command. US involvement in 
Indo-China during the 1960s and 70s had meant the relegation of Middle Eastern 
issues. In 1978, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the ‘Review of US 
strategy related to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. This document highlighted 
the following as major US interests: continuous access to oil, the survival of Israel, 
and the prevention of other powers from establishing hegemony in the region. 
Consequently, the JCS were to recommend the expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia 
(a British owned territory in the Indian Ocean), Oman, Djibouti, and if possible Saudi 
Arabia. These steps were to be complemented with the projected naval force to 
include increases in carrier battle group deployments.
The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan also prompted President Carter to 
warn against further moves towards the Persian Gulf region, stating that any such 
‘assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force’.183 As part 
of its “twin pillar” policy the US encouraged both Iran (while under the Shah) and 
Saudi Arabia to police the Gulf and ensure the smooth flow of oil (see chapter 1). 
After the Shah, however, it was unlikely that Saudi Arabia could act alone, and the 
RDF filled the vacuum as US and other Western navies arrived in the Persian Gulf.184 
There were also reports that the US was in the process of negotiating with various 
Gulf States regarding the setting up of bases on their territory. In particular, US 
discussions with Oman resulted in a military and economic agreement which gave the 
US access to Omani air and seaport facilities following consultation, such as those on 
Masira Island off the coast of Oman.185 It was apparent that both Britain and the US
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wished to maintain stability in Oman because in the face of increased potential for 
Soviet subversion the Sultanate was increasingly perceived as a maritime barrier 
between East and West.186 The British connection with Oman was strengthened by the 
fact that Britain had loan service personnel actually integrated into the Omani armed 
forces.187
Britain’s support for the US decision to increase forces in the Persian Gulf was 
reiterated during Mrs. Thatcher’s trip to the US in early 1981. As stated by the Prime 
Minister ‘...I said that Britain shared the determination of the United States ... to 
prevent Soviet encroachment in the region. We discussed the possible creation of a 
rapid deployment force, which would be available for use ... in an emergency in this 
or other areas of the world ... I made it clear ... [that] the United Kingdom would be 
ready to contribute to it... ’188
The Soviet Union’s presence in Afghanistan meant that they now had an air 
strike capability covering the approaches to the Gulf. There were also large 
contingents of Soviet and Cuban troops in South Yemen, and geographically this gave 
the impression of a Soviet encirclement of the Gulf region, particularly since there 
were substantial Soviet air and naval detachments in the area. The recognition in 
Western capitals of the gravity of the situation prompted a NATO-wide debate over 
an appropriate response. As Lord Carrington was to state: ‘... unless we can remedy 
the situation, and neutralise Afghanistan there will always be that constant threat in 
that part of the world’.189 The extension of NATO’s remit beyond its traditional 
borders was not, however, considered appropriate, but there was a recognition at the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in December 1980 that there 
was no reason why individual NATO members could not contribute to the RDF. 
Britain’s decision to extend facilities at Diego Garcia for use by American forces, for 
instance, was frequently referred to as an important British contribution to the 
operations of the RDF in the Indian Ocean.190 Runways on the island were enlarged to 
enable handling of the US long-range B52 bomber, since although at over 2,000 miles 
from the Straits of Hormuz the Island was not close, it was envisaged that a base there 
could provide support for any operations in the Persian Gulf.191 Furthermore, reports 
in a December 1985 issue of Jane’s Defence Weekly indicated that Britain itself had a 
smaller equivalent of the RDF, a brigade based in Saudi Arabia, to which Oman was 
contributing. This reinforced the extent of Britain’s co-operation with Oman and the 
British presence in the region.192
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Despite various statements indicating British support for the RDF, Britain’s 
commitments have to be considered in the context of limited resources. As Lord 
Carrington was to state at the time: ‘I think it is ludicrous to suppose we can do big 
stuff. We have our forces committed to NATO. What we would be doing, if we could 
do anything, would be on a comparatively small scale ..,’193 Despite limited 
resources, however, because of the serious threat to Britain’s interests in the Persian 
Gulf caused by both the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there 
was a recognition that provisions had to be made for out-of-area operations. The steps 
that were taken revolved around increasing the flexibility of existing resources, with 
the main objective being to minimise costs. These measures will be analysed in detail 
later, but the first major step that the British took was the establishment of the Armilla 
Patrol.
The outbreak of the Gulf war in September 1980 led to the British 
Government reviewing the situation in the Persian Gulf, as the safety of British 
shipping in the region was causing considerable concern, and it was decided to 
provide reassurance to such shipping by dispatching 2 Royal Navy warships to the 
area. These warships were part of a task group which had been visiting the Far East at 
the time, and were now to take up position in the Gulf of Oman, thereby assuring any 
British shipping under threat that assistance was at hand. The first ships were in place 
by October 1980 and the British Government later deployed replacements together 
with afloat supplies. This was the beginning of Operation Armilla (see Appendix 5 for 
a map of the region).
Initially the role of these ships was merely to remain in position, and provide a 
visible naval presence to British merchant ships as they entered the Gulf. The 
knowledge that they would be prepared to move into the Gulf itself to provide 
assistance if necessary was an encouragement to shipping to continue to pass through 
the Strait of Hormuz.194
The increase in threat to shipping in November 1986 (see section 2.1 b), 
however, led to an announcement by the Defence Secretary that the Patrol would 
spend more time in Gulf waters. A further response to the increased attacks on neutral 
shipping came about early in 1987, when a third Royal Navy warship was assigned to 
the region. This reflected the decision to adopt a more direct form of protection for 
British merchant shipping as, from then on, Armilla vessels accompanied more 
regularly British or Dependent Territory owned or flagged merchant traffic through
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the most threatened areas. The extent to which this was considered necessary can be 
seen from the fact that in 1987 alone a total of 405 passages were made, a higher 
figure than in the case of any other Western navy.
Despite this raised profile, Armilia vessels did not convoy merchant ships or 
provide close escort for them, as their operations remained non-provocative and de- 
escalatory. They were prepared, however, to defend both themselves and any 
merchant shipping entitled to their protection, in addition to providing humanitarian 
assistance to foreign ships in distress following attack.
From mid-August 1987, a further consideration for the Patrol became the 
presence of Iranian mines in the region, and the British Government decided that 
Armilia should be equipped with mine-sweeping capabilities. This development, 
Operation CIMNEL, led to four Hunt Class MCMVs and support ships being 
dispatched to join the Patrol in mid-September 1987, where they subsequently carried 
out mine clearance operations at Fujairah, off Dubai and north of Qatar, detecting and 
destroying a total of 10 mines.195
The Armilia Patrol provided an actual British presence in the Gulf and 
demonstrated that the British government was concerned with contributing to the 
stability of the region. Although it consisted of only one duty ship, one standby, and 
one off-station,196 entitled shipping was accompanied through the Silkworm danger 
zone and the Iranian patrolled area to a point 40 miles north of Dubai. Armilla’s 
central role, therefore, was the protection of British merchant shipping, but it was also 
a valuable asset in terms of British relations with the GCC States.
The British government perceived that the patrol also provided political and 
commercial benefits. Politically, its presence underlined Britain’s commitment to and 
co-operation with the GCC States during an unstable period when support was 
valuable. Commercially, the benefits stemmed from the nature of the Gulf States’ 
highly personalised leadership systems, whose perceived view of the foreign policy of 
countries was crucial when trading. Britain already had a trade advantage in view of 
its established relationship with states in the region, but the awarding of major trade 
contracts depended on many factors and, as the reliability of a firm’s country and the 
political stand of its government were extremely influential, Britain’s continuing 
support in the form of Armilia was particularly important. Ian Stewart (the then 
Minister of State for Defence) reconfirmed Armilla’s roles and objectives by stating 
‘... we viewed the Armilla Patrol as a source of reassurance and a contribution to
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stability of that area ... The purpose of their presence [was] entirely defensive and 
fully in accordance with the non-provocative objectives to our mission. In protecting 
the right to freedom of navigation through international waters, we [were] operating 
in the interests of all seafaring nations.197
Finally, the effectiveness of the Armilla Patrol was openly stressed by British 
politicians as in the following quote by David Mellor: ‘... the persistent attempts by 
the Iranians to spread the hostilities across the Gulf, to attack international shipping 
that is simply using the right of passage to carry on international trade and to attack 
installations that belong to countries ... not participating in this war is wholly 
unacceptable. The only reason why we have not seen more of this Iranian action is the 
presence of [US], British, and other naval forces in the Gulf.198 It was also the case 
that since attacks on merchant shipping began no vessels being escorted by the 
Armilla Patrol had been attacked199.
The Armilla Patrol was set up as a direct consequence of the immediate threat 
to the Gulf. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had reflected an increase in the 
capability and determination of the Soviet Union to act on a world-wide scale, and led 
to the British Government reviewing its own forces’ ability to act outside the area of 
NATO’s jurisdiction. The need for such a review was reinforced by the 
commencement of the Iran-Iraq war, (and later the Argentinean invasion of the 
Falklands) and the combination of these events convinced the British Government 
that some out-of-area capability was necessary.200
The following analysis will highlight the main elements which contributed to 
Britain’s developing out-of-area ability, namely, the deployment of Naval Task 
Groups and the carrying out of military exercises, the provision of military assistance 
to GCC States, and the provision within the British armed forces of elements 
specifically designed for out-of-area operations. These three aspects will be discussed 
in conjunction with each other, as they were all interlinked, and were all seen as cost 
effective methods of protecting British interests abroad in the face of defence budget 
restrictions.
Mrs. Thatcher referred to Britain’s four defence roles as follows: 
commitments to the Central Front in Europe, the Eastern Atlantic, the defence of the 
home base and the strategic nuclear deterrent. She went on to state, however, ‘We are 
also strengthening our capability to deploy out of the NATO area at short notice’.201 
This was also stressed in Command Paper 8288 which identified Britain’s first three
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defence roles as, elements of strategic and theatre nuclear forces committed to the 
Alliance, direct homeland defence, and a maritime effort in the Eastern Atlantic and 
the Channel. The fourth role centred on exploiting the flexibility of Britain’s Armed 
Forces beyond the NATO area insofar as resources permitted.202
These references to out-of-area activities were based upon recognition that 
Britain had national defence commitments further afield. Amongst the reasons cited in 
the 1987 Defence White Paper as to why Britain had to retain an out-of-area 
capability were: firstly, Britain’s historical legacy which meant that residual 
obligations from an imperial past remained, including, importantly, certain 
agreements with the Gulf States (see Appendix 1). Secondly, the Command Paper 
also stressed the importance of regional stability because of Britain’s dependence on 
overseas commerce: ‘... we are still vulnerable to interruptions in the supply of 
certain commodities, such as oil and strategic minerals, from remoter parts of the 
world. Helping to maintain stability and ensure the free use of the seas is therefore 
very much in our interests’.203
Despite the commitment to NATO, therefore, the British Government had 
wider defence interests which went beyond the NATO boundaries, such as those in 
the Gulf. The existence of these wider interests was regularly referred to in the 
Defence White Papers published during the 1980s, and the importance placed upon 
them is confirmed by the steps that the Government took. The 1981 White Paper 
formalised these as being: defence assistance, deployments, and intervention 
capability.204
Defence assistance took several different forms including advisory visits, the 
provision of technical aid and the loan of service personnel to undertake training 
programmes in Britain and overseas. The scale of these training programmes becomes 
apparent when it is realised that in one year alone (1979-80) the number of students 
from non-NATO countries who were being trained at MOD establishments was as 
high as 4000.
In addition to their practical value, these training programmes were also an 
important means of maintaining good relations between the UK and the countries 
involved, and it is therefore not surprising that the British Government was eager to 
continue to use them. The loan of service personnel was beneficial not only to the 
UK’s own strategic interests, but also in terms of the UK’s defence relationship with 
various countries, and the Government openly admitted that the goodwill engendered
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as a result of such training programmes was an important cost effective element in its 
relationship with many countries, such as Oman, which lay outside NATO 
boundaries.
In reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, Carrington 
specified that Britain had increased the number of loaned service personnel and of 
military advisors to Oman in particular.205 Hurd later confirmed this by stating: ‘... 
Inside the Gulf we have a number of loan personnel, officers who are helping the Gulf 
States, including Oman, to organise their security. These are not enormous forces ... 
though we should continue to maintain them within our defence budget and in spite of 
the difficulties which we have with the defence budget'.206 A report as far back as 
1977 highlighted the continuing British presence in Oman. Despite the withdrawal the 
British presence was transformed into an unofficial one and, as the report suggested, 
the British military facilities were not to be dismantled and would ultimately be put at 
the disposal of the British and the US. As subsequent analysis has shown British 
officers retained positions of high sensitivity in the Omani Armed Forces and the US 
managed to negotiate the use of Omani facilities.207
In addition to the benefits which they provided in terms of the British 
economy (see chapter 2 Section 1.2 b), defence sales were perceived as an important 
means of establishing links with significant countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman 
and other GCC States. They were also believed to contribute to the general stability of 
the region by enabling the countries concerned to build defensive elements to protect 
their own interests.
A detailed examination of Britain’s practice of providing overseas military 
assistance appeared in the 1985 Defence White Paper. This stated that there were over 
1000 servicemen undertaking the training of foreign students in over 70 non-NATO 
countries with a sizeable number of 200 based in Oman. The importance of Britain’s 
relationship with Oman is further indicated by the fact that the British loan 
servicemen were actually integrated into the Omani Armed Forces and held a number 
of key operations and command appointments.208 Lord Carrington’s visit to Oman in 
1980 had resulted in a re-commitment to continue defence and strategic support for 
the Sultanate, which at the time included the delivery of another squadron of Jaguar 
multi-purpose fighters to complement an existing squadron. The visit also resulted in 
Omani requests for other naval and army equipment such as fast patrol boats, mine­
sweepers, sonic detectors and helicopters. Later, John Nott’s visit (in his position as
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Defence Minister) further strengthened Britain’s role in Oman as the number of 
British officers serving there was subsequently significantly increased. Also the 
Omani decision to switch from the US M60 tank to British Chieftains meant that new 
training and maintenance teams would be needed for the foreseeable future.209 
Furthermore, in 1981 the appointment of Sir Timothy Creasey - the former 
Commander of British Land Forces - as officer in charge of Omani defence 
operations, further indicated the British government’s wish to retain a role in the Gulf 
and with Oman. Later at the end of 1984, a former SAS Commander (of the 22 SAS 
Regiment), Major General John Watts, succeeded Creasey as the Chief of Defence 
Staff in Oman. This new appointment further consolidated the close defence relations 
between Britain and Oman.210 In addition, other service teams operated in the Gulf 
providing, for instance, assistance with the introduction of Rapier missiles in Qatar, 
and Hawk aircraft in the United Arab Emirates.2" The British government perceived 
such measures as a low cost method of retaining a degree of influence in the region.
Deployments of military forces around the world, including the Persian Gulf, 
constituted the second element in Britain’s arsenal for safeguarding its out-of-area 
interests. The declared purpose behind such deployments was to add to the Services’ 
annual training cycle, help maintain links with allies, and importantly, demonstrate 
Britain’s continued interest and support in particular regions.212 The Defence White 
Paper also stated that the Royal Navy task group undertook a major deployment 
outside the NATO area once a year.213 It was because of such deployments that 
Britain was able to respond to the need for a naval presence in the Gulf of Oman (in 
the form of the Armilla Patrol and Operation CIMNEL ) when the outbreak of war 
between Iran and Iraq raised the possibility of a threat to the freedom of passage for 
merchant ships through the Gulf.
Endnote 213 highlights some of the deployments and exercises which were 
carried out by the British Armed Forces outside the NATO area during the period 
1979-88. The intention of such exercises was to demonstrate Britain’s capability for 
rapid deployment overseas and joint operations with host countries. One such exercise 
formed part of Global 86’s circumnavigation of the world, namely Saif Sareea, held 
in Oman in conjunction with the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces, between 16 
November and 8 December 1986. As stated in Hansard the ‘Royal Air Force 
contributed Tornadoes, tankers and air transport aircraft [and] ... a fully loaded VC- 
10 passenger transport aircraft refuelled in mid-air from a VC-10 tanker en route to
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Oman, which it reached after a non-stop flight’, making RAF history.214 Such 
exercises confirmed that despite budget restrictions the British Government was 
serious in allocating resources for developing its out-of-area capabilities. Attention, 
therefore, now turns to some of these provisions.
Mrs. Thatcher, while on her 1981 US trip, stated that, in the event that a Rapid 
Deployment Force was created, the UK would be ready to contribute to it.215 In 
addition the 1980 Defence White Paper stated that ‘...the Government believes that 
the Services should also be able to operate effectively outside the NATO area, without 
diminishing our central commitment to the Alliance ... certain improvements in the 
Services’ world-wide capability are being considered ... [which] can be achieved at 
relatively modest cost, yet give the Services significantly more flexibility to undertake 
tasks outside the NATO area’.216 The cost efficiency of these improvements to 
Britain’s out-of-area capabilities was fundamental, as the Government was seeking to 
‘assume wider responsibilities without adding substantial extra resources ,..’217
The Government insisted that due to budget restrictions it was not possible to 
construct a separate force able to deal with all contingencies. ‘... In the case of the 
United States, they are going to have a substantial force of a mobile nature which 
could be used ... in different parts of the world, but with our resources I think it is 
difficult for us to do that...,218
Britain’s intervention capability was based on the belief that a response to any 
emergency would be carried out in conjunction with other allies. However, the British 
Government was also examining options for enhancing its own out-of-area 
capabilities, independently of NATO. The RDF set up by the US was likewise 
designed to be separate from NATO. John Nott identified, in 1981, a number of areas 
where improvement was being planned. Firstly, there was a need for a basis for 
command and control and for a continuation of training in certain areas. Parachute 
capabilities needed to be developed and in connection with this, there was a need to 
improve the RAF transport facilities for the 2 parachute battalions. Britain also had 
the Spearhead Battalion, which was available at 72 hours notice. There was also a 
need to provide a stockpile of the available equipment. These plans for development 
were confirmed by the 1981 Defence White Paper which included all these options.219 
This White Paper revealed plans to ‘stretch’ 30 RAF Hercules transport aircraft to 
increase die carrying capacity over short ranges by the equivalent of about eight new 
aircraft. These were to be fitted with station-keeping radar equipment to enable
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parachute drops to be made even in poor weather. It also specified that an existing 2- 
Star HQ would be nominated to take command of any contingency intervention. Its 
role would be to remain in close contact with all formations that might be called on 
for out-of-area operations.220
The 1982 Defence While Paper confirmed that the primary source of airlifted 
ground troops would remain the Spearhead battalion for deployment world-wide. It 
went on to state that, should further troops be required, these would be provided from 
units permanently stationed in the UK. For example the HQ of the Fifth Infantry 
Brigade was designated as the operational HQ for the training, preparation, and 
execution of out-of-area operations.
One of the lessons of the Falklands crisis was the importance of retaining an 
amphibious capability. In addition to continuing most of the above-mentioned 
improvements, Command Paper 8758 earmarked 3rd Commando Brigade, and 
specified that the two assault ships, HMS Fearless and Intrepid, would remain in 
service, thereby reinforcing Britain’s out-of-area amphibious capability. At this 
time the Government also announced that two carriers would be available for 
deployment at short notice. To ensure this, a third carrier was to be maintained in refit 
and the decision to sell HMS Invincible was postponed. The Falklands crisis also 
contributed to the decision to acquire wide-bodied tankers to enhance the capability of 
the RAF’s tanker force. This was designed to enhance the Armed Forces’ strategic 
mobility222 as the importance of air-to-air refuelling was emphasised. To facilitate this 
requirement, the first of the VC-10 tankers entered service in 1983, and a conversion 
programme to form a second squadron was also begun. Work also began to convert 
six ex-British Airways Tristar aircraft to provide a small force of strategic tankers to 
help meet out-of-area commitments.223
The 1984 Defence White Paper continued this trend and announced a series of 
further improvements to 3rd Commando Brigade. This was now to be equipped with 
the Blowpipe as well as further signals, medical and logistic units. The number of 
parachute posts in the Brigade were also increased. In view of these improvements, 
the Brigade was subsequently renamed 5th Airborne Brigade.224
The Royal Navy’s out-of-area role was also to be enhanced through the 
decision to make ‘use of commercial vessels not built to warship standards to conduct 
subsidiary fleet tasks at low cost. The acquisition of RFA Diligence, an oil rig forward
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support vessel, was to enhance the capability of the destroyer/frigate force operating 
out-of-area’.225
There are two important aspects, therefore, to the above improvements in 
Britain’s out-of-area capabilities: they had to be retained to safeguard British interests, 
but they also had to be carried out within budget restrictions. Their existence indicated 
that the British Government was committed to retaining out-of-area capabilities, albeit 
at a low cost. This combination of military assistance, deployments, and the 
development of an interventionaiy capacity ensured that Britain was able to maintain 
a presence in regions of importance such as the Gulf.
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed in detail elements prevalent within the Thatcherite 
discourse in the context of policy towards the Persian Gulf during the period 1979- 
1988. The hypothesis presented in chapter 1 claimed that economic factors formed a 
significant part of that discourse and, as already highlighted, since Thatcherism was a 
belief system based on notions of economics, interests and incentives, that would 
seem to confirm a contributory role for economic factors in explaining British foreign 
policy towards the GCC States. What evidence has been highlighted in this chapter, 
therefore, to support the hypothesis? This question must be analysed from a 
constructivist perspective in light of the intersubjective, ideational, social, discursive 
and linguistic credentials inherent in this approach.
Constructivism’s emphasis on ideational structures is highly relevant here, and 
has raised the importance of the notion of Thatcherism as a belief system espousing 
ideas in the context of economic interests. This chapter has sought to analyse 
Thatcherite discourse in an attempt to determine the extent to which economic factors 
featured during the period 1979-1988, as this is necessary in order to ascertain the 
validity of the hypothesis.
In this context, therefore, the materialist discourse identified that Britain’s 
North Sea Oil depletion policy regarded Middle Eastern crude as important in the 
Government’s goal to prolong high levels of UK continental shelf life production. 
Although the Labour Government had advocated the need for depletion control it was 
not until 1980 that the first actual development delays were announced. It is in this 
context, therefore, that the GCC States retained their significant identity as oil
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exporters. As constructivism specifies, identities shape interests and in turn interests 
provide the framework for foreign policy.
Of course, British foreign policy was not shaped exclusively by the fact that 
the GCC States were oil exporters. There are other important elements linked to the 
identity of these states, as the discourse has highlighted. One of the foremost of these 
was the GCC States’ importance as markets for British civilian and defence 
equipment, particularly in view of the problems which had beset manufacturing 
industry in Britain. Since British economic growth levels were the lowest in Europe, 
the chapter has demonstrated that numerous observers were unable to dispute the 
possibility that de-industrialisation was a real phenomenon in Britain. The inevitable 
symptoms of unemployment, import penetration, balance of payments problems and a 
decrease in exports of manufactured products were resulting in the impoverishment of 
the country. The discourse suggested that these symptoms were also recognised by the 
Government and led to the realisation that export opportunities needed to be 
developed. Indeed, the belief that Britain's economy was in decline provided the 
Thatcher Government with an opportunity to show that it was serious about 
improving the country's economic situation. The Government's drive to export more, 
therefore, needs to be seen in this context, since exporting defence equipment, for 
instance, appeared to pay dividends by supporting jobs and contributing positively to 
the balance of payments.
Colin Chandler’s statement ‘once you do succeed in a major defence sale you 
get other trade as well’, indicated that the prospects for developing other civilian 
related links with the importing country were also high. Benefits to indigenous 
civilian sectors were also cited as a major benefit given the aggressive pace of 
technological development. In order to reduce the high costs involved in defence 
R&D there was a need to lengthen production lines to the utmost, and one important 
means of achieving this was to market defence equipment for export purposes. 
Though it remained difficult to assess the overall benefits of exporting defence 
products the benefits accrued were said to be even greater since official government 
figures excluded the so-called invisibles such as technology transfers and the 
employment of people who actually went abroad to work on specific projects.
The Thatcher Government therefore firmly believed that the benefits of 
retaining an indigenous defence industry far outweighed the costs and this was further 
demonstrated by the Government’s defence procurement policies. During the early
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1980s much attention was devoted to securing better value for money in light of 
increasing pressures on the defence budget. As the chapter has shown, one way of 
achieving this was to place much greater emphasis on the marketability of the defence 
industry’s products with the result that the Government explicitly declared its support 
for defence exports. The MOD itself was heavily involved in assisting industry 
through the DSO, which in turn was able to draw upon the resources of the Ministry. 
The equipment being produced in the Royal Ordnance Factories was also geared 
towards export and the use by the FCO of Development Divisions showed that it was 
not only the Ministry of Defence which was involved in commercial activities 
overseas. The FCO saw defence exports as a cost effective way of providing support 
for friendly regimes and such exports were encouraged in areas where Britain had 
important economic and political interests but where it could not provide direct 
military support.
Domestic concerns, worries over recession and the prominence of the British 
defence industry made the search for overseas export markets even more crucial and 
the GCC States were seen as providing opportunities for both civilian products and 
defence equipment. Consequently, the chapter has shown that GCC markets played a 
central role in the British economy as defence and other companies attempted to 
compete for lucrative contracts.
Another important constructivist claim is that ideational and material 
structures constitute one another and the question here is whether the discourse 
revealed any such mutual constitution. The answer lies in understanding the nature of 
the Thatcher phenomenon which, since it was based upon material notions of interests 
and economics, clearly demonstrates mutually constitutive structures in that 
Thatcherite ideas helped maintain certain identities accorded to the GCC States. These 
in turn reinforced the importance of economic interests thereby contributing to a 
cyclical process of mutual constitution. This also highlights the highly social nature of 
the foreign policy making process as argued by constructivists. Interests for states are 
not exogenous as highlighted by positivist theories such as neo-realism, rather, due to 
the social context within which states relate to one another, these interests are shaped 
and formed by the identities accorded to the self and other.
Here domestic concerns over recession and the prominence of the British 
defence industry, amongst other factors, helped accord certain identities to states such 
as those in the GCC, thereby contributing to certain interests in these states, which in
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turn provided a context for foreign policy. In this highly social environment therefore, 
interests cannot be pre-established irrespective of space and time but are rather shaped 
within the social context and are therefore endogenous to the relationship between 
Britain and the GCC States.
Further analysis of the discourse during this period serves to strengthen the 
connection between the identity of the Gulf States as important markets and British 
material interests. At the start of the 1980s the Gulf region had become an epicentre 
for regional conflict, with resurgent Islam, hostility between Iran and Iraq, and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan providing both serious sources of instability and 
reasons why the Gulf monarchies gave increasing priority to their defence 
capabilities. Not only did Britain stand to gain commercially from the resulting 
exports, but also, as the chapter has attempted to demonstrate, the Thatcher 
government viewed the preservation of stability in the region as an important goal.
The analysis of Britain’s export attempts in Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, a 
sample of countries deemed to be an adequate representation of the situation across 
the GCC States, showed that Oman was spending heavily on defence equipment at a 
time when Britain was still its main arms supplier, and similarly Kuwait’s fears over 
the possibility of the Iran-Iraq war spreading prompted it to seek Western help to 
bolster its defences. The initial US refusal to supply arms had persuaded Kuwait to 
diversify its sources, and as a result Britain was able to increase its own commercial 
interests in the Emirate. In addition to this, high levels of Kuwaiti investment in the 
UK market also contributed to ensuring that Britain’s interests in the country 
remained of primary importance.
Securing defence related and other contracts in the Persian Gulf was subject to 
intense levels of competition amongst Western suppliers, and Britain’s commercial 
and political interests in the region were confirmed, in particular, by Mrs. Thatcher’s 
own personal sales campaign as demonstrated by her numerous visits to the region. 
As the first British Prime Minister to visit the Gulf States (while in office), Mrs. 
Thatcher’s trips not only secured numerous sizeable contracts, but also were deemed 
to be of political significance, especially in light of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.
The intense nature of the intra-Western competition was highlighted in 
particular by the competition over the Saudi market, as Britain sought to capitalise on 
Saudi Arabia’s multiple sources policy. In fact Britain was able to secure significant
135
defence contracts in light of the US Congress’ opposition to sales of sophisticated 
equipment to Arab States. Furthermore, Saudi anxiety over Washington’s support for 
Israel, Reagan’s failure to make a stand over West Bank settlements, and the 
subsequent loosening of US-Saudi ties enabled other arms suppliers to increase their 
share of the enormous Saudi market.
Although Britain supported the US viewpoint that the Soviet Union posed a 
major threat to the region it was prepared to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the 
region’s problems. The Gulf Arab States, including Saudi Arabia, although concerned 
about Soviet action in the region, continued to regard the Arab-Israeli dispute as 
constituting the main threat to stability. Mrs. Thatcher’s acknowledgement that 
including the PLO in any negotiations would be inevitable, as opposed to the US 
refusal to have any dealings whatsoever with them, led the Arab States to believe that 
they could expect a more favourable attitude from Britain. Indeed, a more even- 
handed approach combined with commercial persistence brought considerable 
rewards for Britain such as the Al Yamamah contract with Saudi Arabia, which 
appeared not only significant in size, but was also accorded considerable strategic 
importance.
Given that the discourse reveals the role that economics was given in 
structuring foreign policy, the question arises whether the British government 
believed that its interests in the GCC States were threatened in any way. It was felt 
that the answer to this lay in identifying some of the threats confronting those states 
followed by an analysis of their prevalence in the discourse and the subsequent 
Government response. Chapter 1 argued that the revolutionary changes in Iran in 
1979, conflict within the region itself and the perceived Soviet encroachment on the 
area were seen as posing a threat to the stability of the Gulf region and this chapter 
has attempted to analyse these issues from the perspective of the British government.
Numerous factors prevalent in the discourse, including Lord Douglas Hurd’s 
comments during a personal interview, show that Britain saw the revolution in Iran as 
detrimental both to its interests in the GCC States and to the general stability of the 
region. Its effects were wide-ranging; the resulting oil price increases damaged 
Sterling’s position as a petro-currency, and the US hostage crisis strained Anglo- 
American relations as Britain refused to freeze Iranian assets (as demanded by the 
US) for fear of damaging international confidence in London as a financial centre. 
Iran’s decision to terminate various contracts with the Royal Ordnance Factories
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caused the loss of considerable business and the Iranian detention of British citizens 
and its human rights abuses meant that the restoration of normal diplomatic relations 
was not a possibility. In addition, the chapter has presented evidence to support the 
claim that Ministers such as Hurd were concerned over the possibility of links being 
forged between the Iranian revolutionaries and the Soviet Union, thereby heightening 
the Soviet threat to the region. Indeed, the fundamentalist nature of the regime, which 
was intent on exporting its vision of Islam to the Gulf States, was of considerable 
concern to the British Government
The effects of the Iran-Iraq war were also considerable and of concern to the 
Government. The danger of it spreading to the GCC States was on occasions a very 
real possibility as Iranian attacks included targets off the coasts of Kuwait and the 
UAE. Such action had the effect of persuading the British Government to extend the 
Armilla Patrol’s mode of operation and to include the protection of British merchant 
shipping within its remit. The threats posed by Iran’s fundamentalist regime were 
considered to be even more serious in the face of the war since there was evidence to 
suggest that Khomeini’s desire to establish an Islamic community was based upon an 
expansionist policy and that its aim was to transcend state boundaries.
Finally, the analysis of British threat perceptions referred to the belief that the 
Soviet Union posed a threat to the stability of the region and the Government’s 
interpretation of the aggressive motives behind Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy as 
evidence of the Soviet Union’s intention to extend communism by military means if 
necessary. Its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 represented the first example of 
military intervention in a country outside the European context, and Mrs. Thatcher 
herself held the view that the Soviet Union had used detente to exploit the West’s 
perceived weakness and that Afghanistan was therefore the culmination of a series of 
proxy interventions in a number of Third World countries. The FCO reached a similar 
conclusion, stressing that the invasion had the potential of undermining stability in the 
surrounding region, and indeed the Government as a whole regarded the invasion as 
having significantly altered the balance of forces in the region to the detriment of 
Britain and the West.
The chapter has also identified a number of additional factors prevalent in the 
discourse which, although not necessarily explanatory tools of great import, 
nevertheless do provide some suggestions as to governmental interests and response. 
For example, despite the increasing constraints on the defence budget, the chapter has
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shown that the Government sought to maintain a military presence in the region 
during the period 1979-1988. The first ships of the Armilla Patrol were in place by 
1980 and, despite their limited mandate, they remained in operation during the entire 
period and therefore demonstrated that the British government was concerned over 
the stability of the region. This continuing military presence gains added significance 
given the acknowledgement by the 1981 Defence Review of Britain’s reduced 
economic capabilities.
This difficulty in matching resources to commitments led to Mrs. Thatcher’s 
initial claims that Britain would contribute substantially to the US RDF being 
moderated, since providing large numbers of forces would not have been financially 
viable. However, despite this, there was the decision to expand facilities at Diego 
Garcia, and in Mrs. Thatcher’s subsequent trip to the US in 1981 she openly voiced 
her concern over Soviet encroachment on the region and reiterated British support for 
the RDF. Evidence of a smaller British equivalent of the RDF, a brigade based in 
Saudi Arabia to which Oman was contributing, has also come to light.
The chapter has also analysed other elements of Britain’s military presence in 
the region which included the deployment of Naval task Groups, the carrying out of 
military exercises in the region; military assistance to the GCC States, and the 
provision, within the British armed forces, of elements specifically designed for such 
operations. Military exercises such as Saif Sareea in 1986, the loan of service 
personnel to undertake military training programmes in various GCC States, including 
the extensive involvement in Oman, and the procurement of Hercules transport 
aircraft fitted with station-keeping radar amongst other modest provisions can all be 
seen as cost effective methods of retaining a military presence in the region. At a time 
when the Government insisted that it was no longer possible to construct a separate 
force able to deal with all contingencies, in light of the factors highlighted in the 
discourse the provisions outlined in this chapter are suggestive of the British 
government’s concerns regarding the Persian Gulf.
As has been seen, by the end of this period various developments had led to 
the need for a considerable reassessment of Britain’s threat perceptions. The 
improvement in Anglo-Soviet (and general East-West) relations, the end of the Iran- 
Iraq war with Iran’s acceptance of Resolution 598 in 1988 and the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, also in 1988, all contributed to a collective feeling of confidence in 
existing policy.226 This encouraged the British Government to believe that it could
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continue to support and facilitate trade links in light of the atmosphere of improved 
stability in the Gulf.
There are two final questions that need to be discussed here. The first is, 
having analysed Thatcherite discourse during the period 1979-1988, can any 
conclusions about British foreign policy be drawn at this stage and secondly, how 
useful has constructivism been as an approach in identifying key issues for analysis? 
It would be useful to develop some preliminary thoughts on this given that the period 
examined here represented the longest section of time covered by this thesis.
The constructivist approach claims the existence of an ideational component 
that can cause behaviour of a type that cannot be explained by rationalist accounts. In 
this context a constructivist perspective goes beyond merely allowing the formulation 
of causal explanations to the devising of constitutive arguments which are able to 
discuss much more than the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. In light of the material presented in this chapter, therefore, is it possible to 
identify key factors from which some discussion of conclusions is possible?
Discourse analysis has shown that during the period 1979-1988 economic 
factors featured prominently and from a constructivist angle this would suggest that 
Thatcherism played an ideational role, whereby this belief system structured a 
framework for foreign policy towards the GCC States. The evidence presented in this 
chapter in support of the hypothesis has been based on the Thatcherite discourse 
available and having analysed the material it is possible to argue that there were 
powerful connections between key variables based on economic interests and foreign 
policy.
Furthermore, a constitutive framework would entail some understanding of 
how the identities of the GCC States as markets for British defence and other exports 
were formed. Here evidence presented in section 1 of this chapter can be drawn upon 
whereby Britain's continuing reliance on Middle Eastern, especially GCC, crude oil 
led to the construction by the government of the view that the Persian Gulf region was 
of considerable geo-strategic importance. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to 
show that recessionary trends in British manufacturing industry provided the Thatcher 
government with opportunities to show that it was serious about what it perceived as 
Britain's economic decline. In this context key elements within the discourse 
suggested that the government believed that the defence industry had proved to be 
more resilient than other manufacturing sectors and that, therefore, it was prudent to
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adopt an aggressive stance towards the sale of defence equipment to overseas 
customers. Domestic employment concerns, worries over the recession, Britain's 
overall economic decline and the prominence of British defence industries may have 
further contributed to the government's construction of the GCC States as markets for 
British exports.
Constitutive questions can also be asked with regard to Britain's military 
presence in the Persian Gulf region during the period 1979-1988. Earlier it was asked 
whether the British government believed that its interests in the GCC States were 
threatened in any way. Revolutionary changes in Iran, conflict within the region and 
perceptions, held by the government, that the Soviet Union posed a possible threat to 
the region, provide a basis for the claim that there was a mutual constitution between 
threats and interests whereby the possibility of disruption to oil and trade routes 
through the Straits of Hormuz may have been presented as a rationale behind a British 
military presence.
Finally, in light of the discussion above, is it possible, at this stage, to endorse 
the statement of hypothesis that Thatcherism did indeed create a framework for 
approaching foreign policy and that the nature of British foreign policy during this 
period was constructed by the positivist discourse of economic interests? Though this 
appears to be a powerful argument in the context of the material presented in this 
chapter, there remains the assertion that constructivism straddles positivist and post­
positivist epistemologies, and this means that any empirical analysis of a case study 
such as this can be subject to reflection and interpretation where it is not possible to 
separate the observer from the observed. In this context, therefore, the opinions of the 
observer take on added significance. Despite the acceptance that Thatcherism 
represented a belief system based on economic and interests, it could be argued that it 
remains far from certain that economic factors shaped British foreign policy 
exclusively.
Indeed evidence has appeared within the discourse of possible alternative 
explanations for British policy, such as the comments made by Sir Franck Cooper, 
who in stating that commercial interests were not a 'mainspring of British policy but 
rather an element of it' and that historical connections were at least as important as 
economic interests, has raised the issue of alternative explanations.227 Furthermore 
Lord Douglas Hurd in stating '... I think it is true that we were more active - and of 
course there is a commercial angle to that... but there was also a feeling on our part
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that this was a very important part of the world where there were a lot of British 
people involved' highlighted the general geo-strategic value of the region.228
In addition, maintaining good diplomatic and defence relations with various 
GCC States highlighted historical connections. Apart from the commercial relations 
with Oman, for instance, Britain maintained very close defence contact through the 
integration of British loan service personnel and military advisors into the Omani 
armed forces. This was seen by the British government as an important cost effective 
method of maintaining defence links with the Emirate and in addition to these defence 
links Britain had longstanding treaties of friendship and co-operation with other GCC 
States (see Appendix 1) which once again highlighted Britain’s close diplomatic and 
historical links with these particular States.
Though Thatcherite discourse has seemed to be largely concerned with 
economic factors, such evidence, apart from highlighting the emphasis of the 
constructivist approach on inter-subjective discursive analysis does suggest that it 
may be possible to identify alternative explanations. More will be said on this issue in 
the final conclusion.
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Chapter 3: Changes to Britain’s threat perceptions: 1989-July 1990
Introduction
Chapter 2 drew upon Thatcherite discourse during the period 1979-1988 in an attempt 
to analyse the extent to which economic factors could be perceived as influencing 
British foreign policy towards the GCC States. The analysis showed that economic 
factors were indeed an important element in the discourse, as attention was drawn to 
numerous British politicians and defence industries, all of whom were active during 
this period in attempting to increase sales to the region. It is in this light that the 
chapter further considered the question of threats as perceived by the British 
government and reported on the effects of the Iran-Iraq war and the concern over the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In testing the hypothesis, therefore, it is possible to 
assert that the economic imagery prevalent in Thatcherite discourse did indeed 
provide a framework for British policy towards the region..
The purpose of this chapter is now to extend discursive analysis to July 1990, the 
month before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As in chapter 2, the range of issues to be 
considered includes the continuing scrutiny of British economic interests in the GCC 
States and a consideration of the changes that took place during this period. Of particular 
relevance were the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and the improvement in relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. 
These changes will not be complete, however, without a consideration of the emergence 
of a new range of threat perceptions, one of which was concern regarding the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The final section, therefore, will analyse 
the British Government’s assessment of this particular threat in the context of the Persian 
Gulf. This analysis is relevant as a precursor to the British Government’s active 
participation in establishing the conditions imposed on Iraq by Section C of Security 
Council Resolution 687, which was adopted after the Second Gulf War (see chapter 4 
and Appendix 4).
Section 1: Thatcherite discourse: 1989-July 1990, the prominence of economics
Chapter 2 contended that the prominence of material factors in the discourse suggests 
that encouraging defence sales was seen by the British government as a means of 
countering Britain's economic decline. Yates indicated that the image of British 
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economic decline continued into this period, and stated that the decline in Britain’s 
manufacturing outside the defence industrial base had the potential of undermining the 
country’s economic and national security: ‘We appear to have transformed ourselves 
altogether too rapidly into a service economy. One symptom of this is that we are unable 
to generate enough exports to pay for our own import bill’.1
The potential for reduction in East-West tension (see section 2) prompted the 
Labour Party to advocate the establishment of a Defence Conversion Agency whereby 
resources allocated for defence purposes could be switched to civilian sectors. However, 
the importance which the Conservative leadership attached to defence sales prompted 
the following statement by Alan Clark: ‘It is absolutely absurd that the most successfill 
parts of British industry in exports should be forced to desist from what they do well and 
be diverted into work that is thought to be socially acceptable...’ Similarly Yates 
advocated the need to develop a progressive defence industry and claimed that 
arguments that there were large immediate gains to be obtained by switching resources 
out of defence were wrong: ‘UK defence industries have a very strong positive balance 
of trade. If this did not exist, and if all of our defence equipment had to be imported from 
overseas, Britain’s overall trading position would be very much worse than the £20 
billion or so deficit predicted for this year’.3
In addition, the Public Accounts Committee was to conclude in 1989 that, 
although the prime responsibility for defence exports lay with industry ‘given the 
enormous economic and other benefits deriving from defence exports, it is government 
policy to support such exports whenever this is compatible with the United Kingdom’s 
wider strategic, political, economic and security interests’.4 Government support for the 
defence industry was provided by a number of central government organisations, with 
the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) acting as the focal point for all such 
activities. Its stated purpose was to ‘...assist [UK] companies to export more defence 
equipment and services within the guidelines of the Government’s foreign, military and 
economic policy’, and by being part of the Ministry of Defence it was recognised by 
potential foreign customers as the UK’s representative in the defence sales field.5
In addition to help from the DESO, the Government utilised Service Attachés, 
officers from the Armed Forces posted to British Embassies and High Commissions 
overseas, whose purpose was to undertake a wide range of defence-related duties 
including support for defence exports. Further help was provided by aiding the 
establishment of defence trade fairs in potential customer areas such as the GCC States.6
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Such sales promotion exercises were deemed to serve two inter-related uses. Not only 
did they aid the defence industry to sell its equipment overseas but, as Sir Peter Levene 
was to state, they enabled the MOD to recover up to £60 million a year in commercial 
exploitation levies.
... you must not forget that we are in a rather unusual position because 
the Ministry of Defence gets back very considerable sums of money ... in 
our commercial exploitation levy. So we are not doing this just to help 
industry. The more that they sell of equipment which we have designed, 
the more money flows back into the Ministry of Defence ... we get back 
some tens of millions, £50 or £60 million a year ... in royalties in effect. 
So we do get a fairly good payback for a lot of the work that we help the 
companies to achieve?
As specified in chapter 2, IMS Ltd. played a significant role in encouraging arms exports 
by acting as the commercial arm of the MOD, and this role continued to be expanded 
during this period. The reason for this was that, whereas previously the DSO (as it was 
originally known) had actually sold equipment to overseas customers, as more of these 
commercial activities went outside the ownership of the MOD and were put into 
commercial hands it was in the interests of defence companies that they themselves be 
closely involved in the negotiation of contracts. As Sir Peter Levene stated: ‘Most often 
the overseas governments would want to contract directly with industry [and] there [may 
be occasions] where they would like to have a direct contract with an umbrella 
organisation and in that sort of case [IMS] might be put forward as the people to do that. 
Increasingly today ... the overseas governments tend to go to a large British prime 
contractor to do that for them ...’8 It should be noted that the Government had taken a 
major step towards commercialising its defence sales activities earlier in the decade with 
the sale of Royal Ordnance to British Aerospace in 1987, thereby making that company 
the biggest defence manufacturer in the West outside the US.9 The use of such 
contractors as a first point of contact for overseas governments showed the extent of the 
belief in the MOD that commercialising its activities would aid the sale of defence 
equipment. However, the fact that there was a clear and continuing dialogue between the 
DESO and defence companies indicated the MOD’S continuing interest in the activities 
of the defence industry.10
During this period the export of defence equipment continues to feature 
prominently in the discourse. As Tim Sainsbury was to state in the House of Commons 
in February 1989: ‘The British defence industry has an excellent record of export 
achievement. We shall do everything possible within the necessary constraints of our
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national policies to ensure that this success continues’. Furthermore in March of the 
same year he went on to state, ‘The success achieved by our defence manufacturers in 
the past year maintains Britain’s position as a major world exporter of defence 
equipment’.11
As between 1979 and 1988, the States in the Persian Gulf region, and most 
notably the GCC member States, were seen as natural markets for British defence 
products and as an area where national constraints on such equipment did not apply. 
Numerous statements by politicians during the current period of analysis indicated that 
relations between Britain and the GCC States remained excellent, with contacts being 
maintained on a regular basis. The following statement by William Waldegrave (the then 
Minister of State for the FCO) supports this contention: ‘Our relations with the Arab 
States of the Gulf are, without exception, excellent’, and similarly, with regard to 
relations between the EC and the GCC Lynda Chalker stated: ‘The [EC’s] relations with 
the [GCC] are excellent. A first stage economic co-operation agreement and a political 
joint declaration were signed last June’12, thereby indicating the importance that 
Britain’s partners in the EC attached to their relations with the GCC members.13
One consequence of this continuing close contact between Britain and the GCC 
States was that the British defence industry continued to build upon the success of 
contracts such as the Al Yamamah deal with Saudi Arabia. The first part of this contract 
was signed in 1986 and covered the supply (amongst other equipment) of 72 Panavia 
Tornados (see chapter 2). As Cordesman specified, Middle Eastern States signed 75 
percent of all new arms agreements affecting the Third World during 1982-85, and the 
Persian Gulf region in particular was seen as dominating the world traffic in arms 
imports. Despite declining oil revenues, the Middle East remained the key market for 
virtually every major arms exporter and this trend was to continue during the period in 
• 14question.
The Saudi Arabian market remained crucial to the British defence industry since, 
in July 1988, a Memorandum of understanding was signed on an extension of the initial 
project, which came to be known as Al Yamamah 2. Although the contract was signed in 
1988 (within the remit of chapter 2) the effects of the extension were to be felt in the 
periods analysed in this chapter and the next, since it now included the supply of another 
46 Tornadoes, 48 Hawks, 90 Westland-built Black Hawk helicopters and 6 Vosper- 
Tomycroft minehunters of the Sandown-class. The implications of this were obvious 
since the links established between the Saudi and British economies were now expected
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to extend well into the 21st Century regardless of any further agreements.15 In addition to 
the aircraft, the contract covered the construction of two Tornado bases and naval 
facilities and the aircraft were to be armed with the full range of RAF equipment. This 
ensured that the implications of the contract were much wider, since a large number 
of other British companies would be involved and would consequently benefit.16
Chapter 2 highlighted the importance accorded to defence markets by several 
other nations and indicated that Britain had to contend with its Western allies, the US 
and France. A particularly important factor was the stormy nature of the US-Saudi 
defence relationship, which was one reason for the success of British defence 
companies and politicians in securing lucrative contracts. This also continued into this 
period: ‘Misunderstanding has been the hallmark of Saudi-US relations for the past 
few years ... ultimately US policy toward Saudi Arabia is based on neglect and 
ignorance by most policy-makers and subject to the “either-or” attitudes which tend to 
force Washington to think in terms of black and white’.17 The pressures exerted by the 
powerful pro-Israeli lobby on the US Administration meant that Washington had to 
continue to rebuff Saudi Arabia’s requests for arms, and this in turn led to a Saudi 
search for other suppliers. European States such as Britain were, therefore, well 
placed to reap the benefits brought about by US internal political division.
Anglo-Saudi offset negotiations also continued to dominate the defence 
relationship. Soon after Al Yarnamah 1 Saudi Arabia had specified that it would seek an 
increase in joint ventures between British and Saudi companies, the purpose of which 
would be technology transfer and an attempt to offset the value of Saudi arms purchases. 
While it was obvious that die British Government could not force British companies to 
invest in Saudi Arabia, the importance of the Anglo-Saudi defence relationship to the 
British Government meant that plans were drawn up by the MOD in response to Saudi 
demands for economic benefits to compensate for the expected outlay of more than £15 
billion on the two part purchase of British military equipment. Subsequently, George 
Younger underlined the UK’s commitment to establishing an offset programme for 
British companies and as Tim Sainsbury was to state in the House:
... the offset programme is aimed at encouraging and assisting the 
creation of viable and profitable joint and other commercial ventures in 
any sector between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabian companies. It 
is a broadly based and flexible programme designed to provide the 
maximum benefit to the economies of both countries, and is open to all 
United Kingdom companies, not just defence contractors.19
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Suggestions for potential collaborative projects between Britain and Saudi Arabia 
included proposals such as the involvement of Royal Ordnance in developing the 
Kingdom’s defence industrial infrastructure; the establishment of computer operator 
training centres; the development of manufacturing plants designed to produce specialist 
yam for use in agricultural and horticultural netting; the establishment of a support 
operation for the Hawk and Tornado aircraft; and the setting up of a centre to provide an 
overhaul and repair service for a range of missiles.20 Ultimately, by the end of 1989 
seven proposals (with a further two to follow) were submitted to Saudi Arabia by the 
MOD as part of the UK’s effort to provide offsets for the arms deals signed in 1985 and 
1988, Together the deals were expected to be valued at close to £1 billion and they 
demonstrated that the Al Yamamah Economic Offset Programme was not limited to 
defence sectors or to Al Yamamah contractors. Consequently, it had the effect of further 
strengthening the economic and defence links between the two countries.21
By April 1990 there were indications that Saudi Arabia was considering a further 
substantial arms deal with Britain for the supply of tanks to replace its ageing fleet of 
600. Although the favoured tank had been the American Abrams M1A2 the Saudis 
appeared keen to look at Britain’s Challenger 2 tank when the US raised the costs of the 
Abrams by $5 million per tank following the decision to halt its production for the US 
Army. Consequently, the Challenger 2, being developed by Vickers Defence Systems of 
Leeds, was back in the running and securing this contract was crucial for Vickers since it 
would assure the future of the tank and of the 1,600 workforce.22 Ultimately, the Saudi 
decision was taken after the Second Gulf War and is therefore considered in chapter 4. 
However, mentioning it here gives an indication of the importance of the market for 
British defence companies and the competition involved in securing defence exports.
One further example demonstrates the importance of Saudi Arabia as a market 
for British defence products. Following low demand for helicopters during 1988, the 
future of the Westland helicopter company was once again in doubt. Two years earlier 
Mrs. Thatcher had, against the advice of her Defence Secretary, firmly backed a bid to 
save Britain’s Westland with American involvement and the possibility of a further 
rescue package for the helicopter manufacturer was therefore likely to seriously 
embarrass the Government. The political controversy over Westland had begun in 
1986, when arguments about saving the company from bankruptcy had resulted in the 
resignations of Leon Brittan (the then Trade and Industry Secretary) and Michael
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Heseltine (the then Defence Secretary). The arguments concerned Heseltine’s 
insistence that Westland should link up with other European defence companies while 
others in the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, felt that the company should take 
the best offer, irrespective of its origins. Ultimately, the American helicopter 
manufacturer Sikorsky was allowed a minority stake which meant that Westland could 
manufacture the Black Hawk under licence and it was expected that large export orders 
would materialise. The failure to secure export contracts, however, meant that the latest 
gap in the order books was likely to lead to another serious cash crisis and this time it 
was unlikely that the Government would advocate a rescue package.23
The latest rescue for Westland, however, came about through the Saudi decision 
to purchase the Black Hawk helicopter from the company. As White stated, ‘Under 
Britain’s new govemment-to-govemment arms supply agreement with Riyadh, Westland 
is expected to obtain more than 80 orders, helping to fill a gap that was raising the what- 
to-do-about-Westland issue once again’.24 Although the orders did not alleviate 
Westland’s long-term problems, they demonstrate once again the importance of GCC 
markets for British defence industry.
Further evidence that close defence relations existed between Britain and Saudi 
Arabia was provided by the numerous trips that British politicians undertook to Saudi 
Arabia. The second part of Al Yamamah itself was negotiated by George Younger (the 
then Secretary of State for Defence) late in 1988 while on an official visit. Furthermore, 
following his appointment as Chief of Defence Staff in June 1989, Sir David Craig 
visited Saudi Arabia to familiarise himself with the defence relations between the two 
countries, thereby suggesting that the relationship extended beyond a merely economic 
nature.25 Further support for this is provided in the next chapter when the analysis shifts 
to a consideration of the extent of Britain’s military commitment to the GCC States, 
including Saudi Arabia, in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
British trade with the other GCC States also continued to develop during this 
period. Although not on the same scale as with Saudi Arabia, it included contracts such 
as the sale of BAe Hawk MK 100s to the United Arab Emirates and the upgrading of 
Qatar’s Westland Sea King Helicopters.26 Oman, in particular, continued to feature 
prominently in British defence plans for the region. In spite of the British withdrawal 
from east of Suez, the UK’s defence ties with the State were never broken. Two direct 
military interventions, supplies of military equipment and instructors for the Sultan’s 
armed forces, and military exercises (such as Saif Sareea in 1986 - see chapter 2) 
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ensured an uninterrupted British presence in the region which made a substantial 
contribution to the stability of the Straits of Hormuz. The British commitment to Oman’s 
stability also continued into this period. The Omani armed forces had been under British 
tutelage since the Dhofar rebellion and the accession of Sultan Qaboos, during the 
current period of analysis the commanders of both the Air Force and the Navy were 
British and, as Young stated: ‘.. .the connection has been enhanced by Sultan Qaboos to 
the point where it has become part of national defence strategy’.27
The importance of Oman had become apparent between 1980 and 1988 since ‘a 
global dimension ha[d] developed out of the strategic position of Oman in the context of 
world-wide dependence on the Gulf oil-flow, the pressure from Islamic fundamentalism, 
and the various forms of power-projection by both superpowers into the Southwest 
Asian region’. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war Oman’s need for powerfill allies 
and efficient armed forces was obvious, and it is in this context that the British role in 
contributing to Oman’s stability must be considered. The longstanding main defence 
requirement for the Omani Armed Forces was the ability to intercept foreign probe 
aircraft or any other infringement of Omani airspace, and this had now been extended to 
cover the entire country and its territorial waters.29 British Aerospace had been closely 
involved in developing the Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS), which had been set 
up as far back as 1974 but had been much improved during the 1989s. Oman’s 
acquisition of British aircraft represented a significant development in this context and 
although originally it planned to purchase RAF Tornados, Oman ultimately decided in 
favour of the cheaper Hawk jets.30
The above analysis has examined the discourse of the period between 1989 and 
August 1990, and has found that economic factors and British economic interests in the 
GCC States continued to feature prominently. This was most vividly demonstrated by 
the close involvement of both leading British politicians and defence industry officials in 
the negotiations to secure various lucrative contracts. Mrs. Thatcher herself, the various 
Defence Secretaries, and leading players from organisations such as DESO, all 
continued to pursue contracts throughout this decade. Intense competition between close 
Western allies such as Britain, the US and France over contracts further demonstrated 
the importance of the GCC States, and the internal political divisions in the US provided 
opportunities for other European suppliers, such as Britain, to capitalise and estabfish 
long-term defence links with important GCC Members such as Saudi Arabia.
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The analysis above has once again demonstrated the prevalence of economic 
factors in Thatcherite discourse, this time during the period 1989 - 1990. Although some 
of the analysis has been concerned with issues prior to 1989 their relevance has its basis 
in the continuing efforts by elements within the British government and industry to 
retain and build upon contracts secured in the earlier period, thereby reinforcing the 
ongoing importance of economic material interests. As in the first period analysed 
(1979-1988), Britain’s economic interests in the GCC States developed against a 
background of conflict and instability in the region. Revolutionary changes, invasion and 
conflict provided sources for concern during 1980-1988 and here attention now shifts to 
British threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf region between 1989 and August 
1990.
Section 2: Changing British Threat Perceptions
Chapter 2 contended that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, revolutionary change in 
Iran, and the Iran-Iraq conflict were perceived to be the main threats to British economic 
interests in the GCC States during 1980-1988. This section will now consider the 
changes which occurred at the end of 1988, and the ensuing effects on British threat 
perceptions in the context of the Gulf region.
The first dramatic change that had a bearing on the Gulf was the end of the Cold 
War, and arguably the impact of the changes which occurred in 1989 was to be felt 
strongest in the intra-European context. However, the process of change in the Soviet 
attitude towards the West had global implications and the Gulf was among the first of 
the world’s regions to be affected. The starting point in any inquiry into the changes 
therefore has to be the so-called “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy as developed by 
Gorbachev (the then President of the USSR). An assessment by the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in 1989 concluded as follows:
Mr. Gorbachev’s speech to the UN General Assembly on 7 December 
1988 announced a large unilateral cut in troops and armaments. The 
speech created an immediate impact not only because of the proposed 
troop cuts, but also because it sought to provide a new de-ideologised 
basis for Soviet foreign policy; and to claim that, as far as the Kremlin’s 
policies were concerned, confrontation and offensive military postures 
were at an end.
Furthermore
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The spirit of glasnost has encouraged an increasingly frank and public 
reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy. A desire for a period of external 
stability to allow the radical programme of reform to proceed at home 
has led Mr. Gorbachev to seek a better relationship with the West ... 
including reduced tensions in regional conflicts.31
The Committee also concluded that changes in the Soviet Union had occurred not only 
with regard to foreign policy, but also in substance, with the most dramatic action being 
taken in Afghanistan. Whereas the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had created 
conditions for potential conflict between the Soviet Union and the West (including 
Britain) in the region, the withdrawal at the end of 1988 can be seen to have dramatically 
altered British perceptions vis-à-vis the Gulf.
A major element in the better atmosphere between East and West has 
been the Soviet decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and the 
implementation on time ... of that decision. It represents the most visible 
move yet away from the concept of peaceful co-existence as a period of 
East-West stand-off under which Soviet ideological and other ambitions 
in different parts of the world could be pursued with impunity. It has 
been accompanied by signs of greater readiness to use Soviet influence in 
favour of peaceful political solutions in other regional conflicts rather 
than an inclination to see all such issues through the prism of East-West 
rivalry ... ’32
Statements by politicians in the House confirmed the new mood of optimism that had 
emerged. During a Foreign Affairs debate Minister for Foreign Affairs Lynda Chalker 
referred to the accelerated political reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and 
progress towards resolving long-standing regional conflicts as being of major 
importance.33 Later, Secretary Douglas Hurd confirmed the perception that the changes 
would last: ‘In 1989, as this astonishing pace of change continues, we have begun to 
hope that it may prove to be lasting. There may, of course, be halts and reverses, but it 
would be hard now to re-create the iron curtain’.34
Apart from the political changes that were occurring across Eastern Europe there 
was a further source of optimism - the announcements by Gorbachev of dramatic 
unilateral cuts in the Soviet troop deployments. At the end of 1988 Gorbachev 
announced the removal of 50,000 troops and the disbanding of numerous tank divisions 
from Eastern Europe.35 These announcements, combined with the political changes, led 
the Defence Committee to believe that the implications for British defence policy were 
likely to be far-reaching. Gorbachev’s demilitarisation and de-ideologisation of Soviet 
foreign policy undermined the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, and the subsequent 
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unilateral force reductions meant that the military threat to Europe itself had abated. As a 
result of this British politicians were to realise that the Soviet Union would no longer be 
able to launch a coalition war against the West.36 This was confirmed by Tom King in 
the House when he stated, ‘In military terms, that means that after the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces and the implementation of the reductions in conventional arms envisaged 
... it will be difficult to imagine any conventional attack of any strategic size by the 
Soviet Union across NATO territory’.37
Inevitably this changing relationship, progress in arms negotiations, the 
statements by Gorbachev, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a different approach 
towards regional conflict prompted the question of whether the Cold War was over. In 
1989 the Foreign Affairs Committee stated ‘...cumulatively there have been remarkable 
shifts in attitudes and approach by the Soviet Union which certainly justify us in 
concluding that interpreting the Cold War as it has been commonly understood for the 
last 40 years will require drastic revision, if not abandonment’.38
As chapter 2 noted, the Soviet Union had spent the two previous decades 
building up its military forces in the form of nuclear, conventional and in particular 
naval power so that it could operate globally. There were indications that it had 
shifted its attention towards the Third World in light of the dangers of confrontation in 
Europe, and its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was quoted as supporting this 
possibility.39 However, in the face of the withdrawal it appeared that the Soviet Union 
had renounced the political and strategic objectives which had led to the invasion. 
This had wider implications since, as chapter 2 indicated, although there were 
differing views over their motives for the invasion, occupying Afghanistan had given 
the Soviets ‘... more opportunities for activity in South West Asia, which, of course, 
is ... sensitive ... in relation to the supply of oil’.40 Although it is impossible to be 
conclusive about Soviet motivations in Afghanistan, there was no doubt that tire 
British Government collectively viewed the Soviet invasion as a seriously 
destabilising factor for the Persian Gulf.41 As a direct result of the Soviet withdrawal, 
however, the British Government had to drastically alter its perception of the threats 
to the region.
At the same time there were indications that the Iran-Iraq war was coming to an 
end when Iran accepted Security Council Resolution (SCR) 598. Indeed, as the Foreign 
Affairs Committee was to conclude, there was increased willingness on the part of the 
Soviet Union to co-operate in mitigating the effects of the Gulf War and it consequently 
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played an important role in bringing the conflict to an end.42 Following the failure of its 
offensives (between 1980 and 1982) Iraq began calling for a return to peace, and this 
desire for a return to the pre-conflict situation became greater between 1982 and 1987 in 
light of Iranian counter offensives which resulted in Iran occupying Iraqi territory. 
However, despite Iran’s successes, Iraqi air and missile superiority became increasingly 
obvious, since financial assistance from various GCC States had allowed it to renew and 
update its equipment at the start of 1988, which in turn meant that Iraq was able to 
resume massive air and missile raids on Iranian towns. Economic problems, a lack of 
foreign credit facilities, decreasing oil prices and the Western naval presence in the Gulf 
all combined to persuade Iranian leaders that they had no hope of winning the war. In 
addition, the fact that Soviet co-operation was all important in securing the ceasefire 
must be stressed since by withdrawing from Afghanistan it ceased to be a threat to the 
Gulf region, and by siding with the US and Britain in the Security Council, it gave SCR 
598, when adopted, the necessary authority to encourage Iran to accept its terms.43
As a direct result of the ceasefire, the absence of any recent mining, and in light 
of the successful completion of the 300-mile route check by WEU navies (known as 
Operation Cleansweep), the British Government was able to decide that there was no 
longer any suitable task to justify replacing the three RN MCMVs currently on duty in 
the Gulf. The vessels, therefore, returned to other priority tasks in home waters and were 
not replaced. However, the Government did decide to keep three MCMVs earmarked for 
‘rapid return to the Gulf should circumstances warrant it’.44
Chapter 2 identified the anti-Western bias of the Iranian Revolution as a potential 
threat to British interests in the Gulf States. The virulently anti-Western nature of the 
new Iranian regime, its territorial claims on Gulf States such as Bahrain, and its calls 
on other Shi’ites in the Arab world to revolt against their own governments increased 
the British sense of uncertainty. Under threat were the important Gulf markets and the 
oil and trade routes through the Straits of Hormuz. In 1990 a Foreign Office 
background paper concluded that throughout the 1980s Iran had exemplified a violent 
form of Shia militancy and that this had ‘led the country to act outside accepted 
international norms’ by encouraging ‘the spread of fundamentalist militancy [notably 
by promoting the export of the revolution]’. The paper went on to state, however, that 
Iran had failed in its attempts to repeat the revolution in the Gulf States, thus 
providing evidence for the contention that the British Government had reassessed the 
threat following the end of the Iran-Iraq war.45
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The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the subsequent end of the Cold War, 
the failure of Iran to export its revolution to the GCC States, and the Iran-Iraq ceasefire 
have been identified as events which feature prominently in the discourse of the period 
and therefore cannot be discounted in any assessment of British policy. The end of the 
Cold War led to a wider defence priority restructuring known as Options for Change 
whereby very substantial falls in defence expenditure were conceivable. However, 
numerous Government statements pointed to the fact that Britain’s wider interests had to 
be considered in any assessment of defence restructuring. As Archie Hamilton stated 
during a defence debate:
... Let there be no doubt that NATO remains firmly committed to the 
central concepts underlying flexible response as the best means of 
maintaining effective prevention of war, which will be essential so long 
as the Soviet Union retains its awesome military potential. At the same 
time, post-war history shows that while we retain effective alliance 
deterrence, conflict is more likely to erupt in other parts of the world, 
rather than in Europe, and the possibility remains of the United 
Kingdom’s interests out-of-area being threatened. Therefore, it is 
important that forces be retained which can contribute to security in other 
parts of the world ... As we reshape our contribution to NATO we need 
to provide forces with sufficient flexibility to contribute to out-of-area 
operations should they prove necessary.46
During the same debate the Secretary of State for Defence, Tom King, emphasised the 
need for adequate out-of-area forces, regardless of whether relations with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe improved. He referred to the need to be able to respond as 
necessary in a variety of countries, whether in conjunction with Britain’s allies or alone, 
in the defence of British interests, and precedents for British military action outside 
Europe in the defence of its interests had already been established. Despite the potential 
for a reduction in regional conflicts as a result of the reduced global tensions, uncertainty 
remained, and the fact that the Warsaw Pact was now effectively defunct provided 
defence planners with an opportunity to appraise the probability and character of future 
challenges to British interests. The events of 1989 opened up the possibility of 
transferring resources previously used for continental defence to a wider role, and this 
was confirmed by Tom King when he stated:
We shall need adequate forces to meet our commitments in the wider 
world outside Europe.. .That may be with some or all of our NATO allies 
and alone if necessary in defence of direct British interests. In some 
places that requires a specific garrison, and in others it can be met by a
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strategic reserve capable of rapid deployment, whether inside or outside 
NATO. We do not necessarily need separate forces under those separate 
headings. For example, some of the sea and air mobile elements of the 
forces in the United Kingdom designated for the reinforcement of British 
forces in Germany can have roles outside Europe as well. That is 
obviously true of other capabilities, such as frigates and aircraft.. .47
However, the Defence Select Committee was to recommend that the Government should 
remain strong on the issue of defence in light of emerging uncertainties. Although the 
Cold War officially ended in 1989 the Soviet Union was to remain Europe’s strongest 
single military power for the foreseeable future.48 Furthermore, in the context of the 
Persian Gulf there was still no signed peace treaty between Iran and Iraq even though a 
ceasefire had been declared, and Iran still sought to export its revolution to other States 
in the region.
Section 3 - British threat perceptions: 1989-August 1990
Changing circumstances in the international system led to changes in government 
discourse as it applied to the Soviet Union. Progress in arms control, and the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan gave rise to the possibility that the Cold War was over. In 
addition there was the possibility that the Iran-Iraq war would come to an end once Iran 
accepted the ceasefire resolution (SCR 598). These events contributed to changes in 
Britain's threat perceptions, and as has been shown above this was reflected in 
government discourse. One topic which began receiving increasing attention in the 
Options for Change debate was the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery systems - most 
specifically ballistic missiles. The Defence Committee concluded that the ‘Process of 
arms control in Europe [might] have the effect of increasing armaments levels 
elsewhere, as manufacturers [sought] to offset the effects of a declining European 
market...’49 This would in turn increase the risks of transferring technologies relevant 
for the so-called weapons of mass destruction to Third World countries. As Tom King 
stated in evidence to the Defence Committee
...one of the issues we have to consider in studying the Options for 
Change are what threats we may face and what may be the consequences 
in the future ... for instance, the growth of missile capability in a number 
of countries with which we do not normally associate them ... [also] the 
capability of nuclear, of chemical and of conventional warheads that 
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might be attached to such missiles. We can access that intelligence and 
access those developments and the threat. Then we have to analyse what 
does that actually mean for us and what it might mean.50
A further statement by Tom King in the House confirmed that this issue was being 
considered by the Government: ‘When one looks at the wider world, one sees that the 
biggest problem at present... is the degree of proliferation and the variety of missile and 
warhead capabilities. There is no doubt we need to consider those aspects when looking 
at our defence plans’ .51
The proliferation of nuclear weapons had long been an issue with the 
Government and British policy was based primarily on the premise noted by Archie 
Hamilton: ‘On the non-proliferation treaty it is desirable that other countries should not 
have nuclear weapons. However, despite the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such 
countries are developing a nuclear capability. That is a reality with which we have to 
deal’. In talking about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in general he 
later stated: ‘We ... aim to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons by 
providing strong support for arms control agreements and associated regimes... ’
Ballistic missile proliferation, on the other hand, had recently gained prominence 
when Gorbachev and Reagan, at their summit meeting in Moscow in 1988, referred to an 
increase in international concern over the moves made by various developing countries 
towards acquiring ballistic missile capability53. Iraq and Iran’s use of ballistic missiles 
against each other’s population centres in 1988 (the ‘War of the Cities’) had focused 
international attention on the problem54. Consequently, The Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) was established by a number of States (including Britain, the US, 
Canada, Japan, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany) with the purpose of 
setting controls on the export of relevant technology.55
Tom King’s predecessor, George Younger, had been equally concerned about 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As early as June 1989 he stated:
The existence of any of those types of weapons in the hands of anyone 
has to be a potential threat to the security of us and anyone else who is 
within the range of that. For this reason, I think [it] is of enormous 
importance that we should all attempt to discourage proliferation of 
these weapons in every way possible, and where they do not exist, we 
should do all we can to keep them out of a particular area ... The 
proliferation of these appalling weapons has to be discouraged.56
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During this time, therefore, warnings of proliferation came from politicians and 
academics alike. Navias referred to the emergence of Third World States which were 
increasingly willing to challenge regional status quos and called the ballistic missile 
threat a ‘truly global phenomena’, with the most intense build up occurring in the 
Middle East.57 Similarly in 1990, Karp regarded concern over the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles as having reached an unprecedented level of intensity in 1989, due 
largely to the reduction in tension between the superpowers: ‘...as traditional security 
fears ease, more attention is devoted to regional conflicts posing a more immediate 
danger to international peace and stability. The close relationship between the most 
serious proliferation threats, ballistic missiles, and the nuclear, chemical or biological 
warheads they can carry has created a new fear of arms races among emerging 
regional powers’.58
In the context of such States in the Persian Gulf region, Iraq was given the 
greatest level of publicity, and the “War of the Cities” demonstrated that it had 
ballistic missiles capable of reaching other States in the region. In addition to this, 
reports suggested that it was further developing its own capabilities, and evidence 
pointed to the Al Hussein, the Al Abbas and the Al Aabed surface-to-surface missiles 
(SSMs). The Al Hussein was first reported in mid-1987 to have a range of 650 km and 
was believed to be a modified Scud-B missile (originally developed by the Soviet 
Union) with a smaller payload to give it increased range. The Al Abbas was also 
claimed be a modified Scud-B missile, was first flight-tested in 1988, and reached a 
range of 900km. In addition, on 5 December 1989 Iraq announced that it had 
successfully launched the Tamouz 1 slv (satellite launch vehicle), also stating that 
there had been 2 tests earlier of a new IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) 
called Al-Aabed. This missile was reported to have a range of 2000km and a payload 
capacity of 750kg and the various tests indicated that the two programmes were 
linked.59
Other evidence of Iraq’s proliferation of WMD was provided by the fact that it 
was largely responsible for funding the Condor II project. This involved the 
development of a 2-stage, solid fuel missile with a range of 1,000km, and was initially 
a joint Egyptian-Argentinean venture, but Egypt and Argentina reportedly withdrew 
under intense pressure from the US and other members of the MTCR.60 Closely linked 
to Iraq’s ballistic missile projects were its nuclear weapon ambitions, and although the 
United Nations confirmed in 1991 that Iraq had been concealing a nuclear-weapons
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programme (see chapter 4), there was evidence that Iraq had been suspected of a nuclear 
weapons programme prior to the invasion of Kuwait despite being a signatory of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Bazoft, Supergun and Nuclear Triggers incidents, as well as the Israeli 
bombing of Iraq's Osiris research reactor in 1981, all suggested that Iraq was attempting 
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, with the triggers’ incident in particular pointing 
to the possibility that Iraq was only a few years away from acquiring a nuclear bomb.61 
Hurd subsequently provided confirmation that the UK Government regarded this 
incident as serious when he stated, ‘Iraq is not the only power in the Middle East with 
nuclear ambitions. This episode underlines starkly the dangers for the whole world from 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons ... It also points to the vital need to solve by 
negotiation the wider conflicts in the Middle East that undoubtedly act as a spur to the 
proliferation of weapons in that region’.62 In talking about the “wider conflicts” in the 
region the Arab-Israeli conflict was undoubtedly foremost in his mind. However, also of 
great importance was the fact that Iraq had just ended a brutal eight-year war with Iran 
during which time ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction (specifically 
chemical weapons) had been used. This had shown that conflicts in the Middle East 
were not entirely Arab-Israeli orientated but also involved other powers and issues 
completely divorced from the traditional conflict between Israel and the Arab world. 
This suggested that there would be future conflicts far removed from this issue and 
therefore, that Iraq’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (amongst others) had 
to be viewed in the wider context. They were not only a threat to Israel but were seen to 
contribute to the instability already prevalent in the region and therefore could be 
perceived as a threat to British interests in the GCC States.
The general problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was 
therefore viewed with increasing concern amongst British politicians. In the case of Iraq, 
this was a threat to the Gulf States since it created uncertainty in what was already a 
volatile region. Iraq’s attempts to build up its military strength also had to be viewed in 
the context of Saddam Hussein’s own ambitions. A decade earlier Iraq had invaded Iran 
on the basis that Ayatollah Khomeini’s new regime was delicate and that Iraq would 
defeat Iran quickly. Three issues are central here: first, McKnight stated that ‘Saddam 
was laying claim to the status which President Nasser of Egypt once enjoyed in Arab 
politics’.64 A rapid victory over Iran would, undoubtedly, have provided Saddam 
Hussein with the status and prestige he sought from the Arab world, and, as chapter 2 
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showed, the Gulf States had a good deal to fear from a fundamentalist Iran intent on 
exporting its revolution, and so supported Iraq.
Second, although issues such as sovereignty over the Shaft al-Arab (the Arab 
River) had been resolved in the Algiers agreement of 1975, the Iraqis actually felt that 
the agreement had been imposed on them by a more powerful Iranian regime under the 
late Shah.65 Furthermore, as Iraq lacked suitable access to the Gulf, a rapid blitzkreig 
into south western Iran would have secured this access once the eastern shores of the 
Shaft al-Arab had been captured. Prior to 1969 Iraq had controlled the entire river, but in 
the 1970s the Shah of Iran had renewed Iran’s claims to a line drawn down the channel 
in the centre of the river. Although this may seem rational, since the river formed the 
boundary between the two countries, control over the river - which was Iraq’s only real 
access to the Gulf - dominated Iraqi concerns.
Third, Bulloch and Morris suggest that Saddam Hussein desired to occupy and 
incorporate into a Greater Iraq the south-western region of Iran known as Khuzestan 
(referred to as Arabistan by Arabs). Saddam Hussein was attracted to this area because 
the region had an Arab population of over 3 million and contained most of Iran’s oil 
wealth. This annexation would also have resulted in the creation of a buffer zone 
between Iran and Iraq.66
These territorial aims must be seen in the context of regional ambitions, and not 
merely in the Iranian context. Similarly, Saddam Hussein’s distinctive attitude towards 
the Gulf States emerged quite early on in the Iran-Iraq war, as events did not proceed as 
he would have liked. Not only did the war drag on, he was also soon faced with 
overwhelming economic problems, and money borrowed from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and other Gulf States had to be used to finance the Iraqi economy. The important point 
is, however, that the Arab states were determined in their resolve to let Iraq fight the war 
alone, despite the fact that they had much to fear from a fundamentalist Iran intent on 
exporting its brand of Islamic militancy. Realising this, Saddam Hussein claimed that 
Iraq’s war against Iran was about ‘defending the Arab heartland from the threat of the 
Persian hordes’.67
One factor in Saddam Hussein’s attitude after the Iran-Iraq war is of great 
relevance to the events prior to the invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi regime used the fact 
that the country had survived the war to great effect, and claimed that Iraq had 
actually won the war. By asserting that his victory had been on behalf of the other 
Arab Gulf States, Saddam Hussein therefore found a premise upon which to base his 
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aim of extracting compensation from them for his now financially crippled economy. 
This claim was made in the early years of the war and indicated that not only did 
Saddam Hussein want territory from Iran, but also that he sought to dominate the 
GCC States.
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the British intelligence community 
took the Iraqi threat seriously during this period. As Sir Derek Boorman (Chief of 
Defence Intelligence and Deputy Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 
between 1985 - 88) stated during a personal interview:
That was a very interesting episode because at that time, irrespective of 
the success of the Iraqi side or the Iranian side ... we consistently felt 
that in terms of overall threat, the threat came from Iraq at that stage ... 
there was a long term threat from Iran if you looked into the medium 
term, but the actual threat to stability at that time was Iraq. I am not 
saying that to you because subsequently we have been proved right, but 
I can tell you that I sat for many hours in Riyadh with very good 
intelligence arguing with the Saudis that Iraq was the problem. Yes 
look at Iran very carefully, but if you don’t crack the problem with Iraq 
now, there is going to be instability.68
Furthermore, on the question of whether or not the British Government was receptive
to the advice given, Sir Derek Boorman stated:
I don’t think there would be a distinction because we played absolutely 
straight, and the advice we would give as a team to the Saudis would 
be precisely the same as the advice we would be giving our own 
ministers. There might be exemptions because of reasons obviously 
obscure ... but the thread of our argument was a consistent one both 
within HMG and external.
My observation that when Mrs. Thatcher was PM, putting politics to 
one side, was the most receptive PM almost probably of any time in the 
sense that she understood the value of intelligence, she understood the 
resources that were required, she understood the questions that had to 
be asked of the organisation, and she understood the importance of the 
product in the formulation of policy. So in short ... it was of prime 
importance to formulation, and I can think of many examples where I 
got personally involved, though there were overtures ... from 
intelligence assessments, which went right to the heart of the Cabinet 
and were taken most seriously.69
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the subsequent improvement in relations 
between East and West, the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and Iran’s failure to export its 
revolution to the Gulf States, meant therefore that the British Government felt a need to 
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reassess the range of threats confronting its strategic and economic interests in the Gulf 
region. Whereas the Armilia Patrol had remained on duty in the Gulf throughout the 
previous eight years, in 1989 decisions were taken that would affect the level of British 
military commitment to the region between 1989 and August 1990.
As stated above, the Government felt that it was no longer necessary to maintain 
the MCMVs in the Gulf in light of the ceasefire, and those vessels returned to home 
waters. However, since the situation in the Gulf region remained volatile, as identified 
by its ongoing threat assessment process, the Government believed it necessary to retain 
the Armilia Patrol in the Gulf region throughout the period leading up to Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait. As Waldegrave stated in December 1988, ‘As ... the Prime Minister has 
made clear since the ceasefire came into effect, Royal Navy ships will remain in 
international waters in the Gulf so long as we judge that there is a job to be done in 
upholding freedom of navigation there’, and just before the invasion in July 1990, 
Archie Hamilton confirmed that ‘The Armilia Patrol will remain in the Gulf so long as 
there is a task to perform’.70 As the above section has shown, the emergence of new 
threats and continuing vigilance over the threats which had destabilised the region 
between 1979-1988 meant that the Government continued to regard it as necessary to 
maintain the Patrol.
Conclusion
Chapter 2 suggested that the Conservatives, under Mr. Thatcher, considered defence 
sales during the period 1979-1988 to be of some importance. This emphasis was 
reflected in the discourse of that period, which was based on the perception that Britain's 
economy was in decline and that defence exports could provide one means of alleviating 
problems such as unemployment in specific industries. It was also suggested that the 
government constructed the identities of the GCC States as natural markets for British 
exports thereby providing a rationale for Britain's military presence in the region, and 
highlighting the mutual constitutions between the threats constructed by the government 
as its perceived interests in the region. The purpose of this chapter has been to continue 
discursive analysis based upon such constructivist principles and to consider the relevant 
factors within Thatcherite discourse during the period 1989-JuIy 1990.
This chapter has shown that economic factors continued to feature prominently 
in the discourse during this period and it appears, therefore, that the government 
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continued in its active support for the export of British defence and other products to the 
GCC States whose identity as markets continued into this period. Discursive analysis has 
shown, for instance, the importance attached to contracts such as Al Yaamamah and the 
British government's desire to build upon them. In this light successes such as Al 
Yamamah 2 would seem to suggest that the Saudi market contributed significantly to the 
success of Britain's defence industry during this period.
The chapter has also briefly considered other issues which have demonstrated the 
continuing economic and strategic importance of the other GCC States. Brief examples 
of contracts and defence links with Qatar, the UAE and Oman have been provided. It has 
also been shown that apart from Saudi Arabia, Oman in particular featured prominently 
in Britain’s security policy for the region. Secondments, close links with Sultan Qaboos, 
and naval exercises such as Saif Sareea not only demonstrated the strategic importance 
of the Sultanate for Britain, but ensured that through defence links Britain was able to 
make a substantial contribution to the stability of the Straits of Hormuz.
Attention in the chapter then shifted to an analysis of the changes that occurred in 
British threat perceptions during this period and it was shown that although the impact of 
the end of the Cold War may have been greatest in the intra-European context, the 
process of change in the Soviet Union had global implications and the Gulf region was 
certainly affected. President Gorbachev’s decision to unilaterally reduce Soviet troops 
and armaments and the so-called “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy led the Foreign 
Affairs Committee to conclude that there was a new mood of optimism in the Commons. 
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in particular, contributed to the changing 
perceptions held by the British government. Whereas in 1979, in light of Mrs. Thatcher’s 
staunchly anti-Communist stance, it had regarded the Soviet invasion as a threat to the 
surrounding region, this period saw a steady improvement in relations between Britain 
and the Soviet Union and between the West and the Soviet Union more generally.
The second factor which led to the altering of British threat perceptions was, as 
the chapter has shown, the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Here the Soviet Union’s willingness 
to co-operate in easing the effect of the Gulf war and its subsequent role in bringing the 
conflict to an end confirmed for the Government the view that the Soviet threat to the 
region had reduced significantly. The War’s end itself meant that the Government could 
now reduce its commitment in the Persian Gulf region. As chapter 2 showed, Iran in 
particular came to be regarded as more of a threat to the stability of the GCC States 
because of its reluctance to accept a ceasefire, but the stalemate which had ensued in
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1988 had persuaded Iran to accept Iraq’s offer of a cessation of hostilities and this in turn 
meant that the British Government withdrew certain elements of the Armilla Patrol.
Chapter 2 also highlighted the extent to which the fundamentalist threat from the 
revolutionary regime in Iran featured in the British Government’s perceptions. The 
conclusions drawn in this chapter, however, are based upon the Government’s 
reassessment that Iran had actually failed in its attempts to export the revolution to the 
GCC States, which meant that their pro-Westem stance and regimes remained intact.
The British reappraisal in light of the improvement in the security environment 
of the Persian Gulf formed part of the wider defence priority restructuring which the end 
of the Cold War had brought about. Despite the reduction in global tensions, however, 
there is some evidence to suggest that, although there was potential for a very substantial 
reduction in defence expenditure as highlighted by the Options for Change debate, the 
Government concluded that Britain had wider defence interests and that these had to be 
considered in any restructuring of defence priorities.71 The government’s commitment to 
ensuring continued stability for British shipping and general security in the Gulf region 
was therefore confirmed by the continuing role that the Armilla Patrol played during this 
period. The Government had taken the decision to remain strong on the issue of defence 
in the region, particularly since there was no formal peace treaty between Iraq and Iran 
and there was evidence to suggest that Iran still sought to export its revolution to other 
states in the region.
In addition to the uncertainties which remained, the chapter has shown that the 
altered state of British threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf region came to 
include a range of other threats which developed significantly during this period. The 
debate over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction intensified in the House of 
Commons in light of overwhelming evidence that Iraq, in particular, had used chemical 
weapons against both its own population and Iran during the War. Furthermore, the 
“War of the Cities” had raised the question of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
such concerns led to Britain participating actively in the establishment of the MTCR. 
The Government’s declared policy was one of opposition to such proliferation and the 
chapter has presented evidence to suggest that British politicians were indeed concerned 
and that Iraq and Iran's demonstration of their ability to use such weapons had not 
escaped the Government’s attention.
This chapter established the basis for the analysis which is conducted in chapter 
4 by introducing some factors which seek to examine to what extent Iraq was perceived 
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as a threat. This included Saddam Hussein’s attempts to lay claim to the status once 
enjoyed by Nasser, Iraq’s attempts to secure access to the Persian Gulf, and Saddam 
Hussein’s territorial ambitions, which are based on academic analysis, itself part of the 
relevant discourse and, therefore, not lightly dismissed. In addition to this Sir Boorman’s 
revelations that the British intelligence community regarded the Iraqi threat as serious 
enough to necessitate briefing Mrs. Thatcher as well as Saudi officials should not be 
discounted. It is in this context, therefore, that Iraq’s proliferation of WMD needs to be 
viewed, and the fact that it created uncertainty in a region that was already volatile may 
be regarded as a precursor to the forceful and unambiguous stance adopted by the British 
Government when Iraq finally invaded Kuwait in August 1990.
Finally, there are specific questions relating to the hypothesis itself which need to 
be discussed briefly here. The central goal of the thesis is to determine the extent to 
which economic factors shaped or influenced British foreign policy towards the GCC 
States during the Thatcher era. In order to address this issue the central claim has been 
that since Thatcherism represented a belief system based upon economics and material 
interests, it provided the British government with a framework upon which it could base 
its foreign policy towards the GCC States. The previous two chapters have drawn upon 
constructivist methodology to analyse the discourse of the Thatcher era and in light of 
this there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn here. Constructivist emphasis 
on the ability of ideas to play a structural role has important implications for this thesis 
whereby Thatcherism has been shown to structure a foreign policy based upon economic 
interests towards the GCC States. Detailed examination of government discourse, 
namely, statements by key politicians in the Official Record and the media, Select 
Committee Reports, Command Papers and so on have shown that economic factors did 
indeed feature prominently in the periods covered by both chapters. In this context, 
therefore, it is possible to assert that the statement of hypothesis is valid given this 
emphasis on economic interests in government discourse.
However, having claimed this, it remains important not to dismiss 
constructivism's post-positivist emphasis whereby constitutive arguments, reflection ad 
the opinions of the observer take on added significance. In addition to this, alongside the 
prominence of economic interests the discourse has revealed possible alternative 
explanations of British policy which do not have their basis in economic factors. Sir 
Frank Cooper's comments in chapter 2 and the long established defence links with Oman 
dealt with in both chapters 2 and 3, for instance, have pointed towards the importance of 
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historical links with the GCC States which could explain British policy in part. 
Similarly, the discussion in chapter 2 of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
in Iraq also highlights issues relating to the general stability of the region as opposed to 
economic interests.
The existence of such elements within the general discourse highlights the 
possibility that despite the prominence of economic factors and perceptions that 
Thatcherism played an ideational role whereby this belief system influenced foreign 
policy there remains some question over whether Britain's perceived economic interests 
in the GCC States could have shaped British foreign policy exclusively. The central 
purpose of chapter 4 will be to analyse Britain’s role in the Gulf crisis following Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, and it will demonstrate that there were numerous factors, other than 
economic interests, which may have had a role to play in influencing British policy. In 
light of this another important question that needs to be addressed in the final conclusion 
is whether the identification of alternative explanations diminishes to any extent the 
importance of economic interests as a factor.
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Chapter 4: British Involvement in the 1990/91 Gulf War
Introduction
The purpose of the previous two chapters has been to identify key factors relevant for 
the testing of the hypothesis established in chapter 1. Hie analysis of Thatcherite 
discourse in both periods has revealed that key elements within British industry and 
government regarded the Persian Gulf region as important for the purpose of 
exporting defence and civilian products. Chapter 1 established that Thatcherism could 
be seen as a belief system based upon economics and interests and that this provided a 
framework for foreign policy towards the region. In accordance with constructivist 
principles that identities and interests are socially created and consequently 
endogenous to the foreign policy process, it is possible to assert that economics did 
indeed influenced British foreign policy towards the GCC States. However, 
constructivist analysis of Thatcherite discourse has also revealed the existence of 
alternative explanations.
In an attempt to identify issues relating to the hypothesis, discursive analysis 
in Chapter 2 showed Persian Gulf oil and markets to be of interest to the British 
government and key industry. This analysis not only showed that the British 
government considered the region to be of some importance but also indicated that it 
was concerned with specific factors which were destabilising the region, namely, 
political changes, conflict and Soviet encirclement of the region, all of which were 
seen as potential threats. Chapter 3 continued to analyse Thatcherite discourse in an 
attempt to consider the extent to which economic interests played a role in influencing 
British policy, and further demonstrated that, between 1988 and the start of the Gulf 
War, British decision-makers were faced with the rapid passing away of an old order 
and the emergence of a number of other concerns. The conflict between Iran and Iraq, 
concern over the export of Islamic ideology to the politically fragile Gulf States, and 
the possibility of Soviet encirclement of the region began to give way to concerns 
such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although this was perceived 
as a general problem amongst Third World countries, it was seen to have important 
implications for the Gulf region.
The main question being addressed in this thesis is whether Thatcherite 
discourse has revealed sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis. Although this 
issue will be dealt with in greater detail in the conclusion, it is possible to claim here 
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that analysis of the discourse has suggested, despite an emphasis on economic factors, 
that alternative explanations can be identified. This claim is particularly relevant to 
this chapter, as an analysis of Britain's role in the second Gulf War (GW2) highlights 
the possibility of multiple sources for policy. Working within established parameters, 
this chapter centres on six main points. Following a brief historical account of pre-war 
issues, the chapter will give an account of Britain’s role in crisis diplomacy, where it 
will be shown that Britain’s clear understanding of the problems created by the Iraqi 
invasion meant that it was able to offer an unambiguous view of how the crisis should 
be handled. Britain’s unswerving commitment to achieving Iraq’s total and 
unconditional withdrawal from an important GCC State also meant that it was able to 
offer the United States diplomatic support through the United Nations in the midst of 
a disparate international coalition which, though adamant over an Iraqi withdrawal, 
began to waver in its perceptions on how this should be achieved.
Britain’s resolute diplomatic role was matched by its military support for the 
international coalition. In line with its diplomatic stance, the build-up of British forces 
in the Gulf States and a further enhancement of the long-established Armilia Patrol (in 
the Persian Gulf since 1980: see chapters 2 and 3) was almost immediate. Within a 
week of the invasion, the deployment of Tri-Service personnel and equipment had 
begun, and by January 1991, the British military presence in the GCC States 
(particularly in Saudi Arabia) was significant by any standards, amounting to over 
45,000 personnel. Indeed, Operation Granby was the ‘most comprehensive 
deployment of UK forces outside NATO since the end of the Second World War’.1
In addition to this, in the face of overwhelming evidence that Iraq was 
attempting to obtain and develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the British 
Government (even before the start of hostilities) recognised that, even after an Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait, further steps would need to be taken to ensure that a re­
militarised Iraq would not pose a threat to the GCC States in future.2 Such sentiments 
amongst highly placed British politicians contributed to Britain's leading role in the 
adoption of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687, which demanded (amongst other 
things) that Iraq accept the elimination of all its weapons of mass destruction. The 
subsequent establishment of the United Nations Special Commission and an ongoing 
monitoring and verification process of Iraq’s industrial and military capacity ensured 
a continuing British role in the region long after the cessation of hostilities.
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Further justification for Britain’s role during GW2 is provided by an analysis 
of the residual effects of the conflict. Not only did the war give the British defence 
industry an opportunity to demonstrate its hardware to an already important defence 
market, but the industry also undoubtedly benefited in terms of increasing its exports 
to the GCC States. Following the signing of the cease-fire, these States rapidly turned 
their attention to reconstruction (in the case of Kuwait) and the building up of their 
defence systems with the help of Western arms suppliers. This ensured that the 
reputation of the GCC States as lucrative defence markets (as established in chapter 2) 
continued into this period of analysis. This chapter will show, therefore, that though it 
is possible to assert that British policy towards the GCC States was shaped by 
multiple factors, economic interests continued to feature within the relevant discourse.
Section 1: Historical Account
The intention here is to concentrate on the role of British diplomatic moves in 
condemning and isolating Iraq in the international arena. This will establish the basis 
upon which a discussion of Britain’s military presence in the Gulf region and its role 
during the war can be further developed. An important question that must be 
addressed before proceeding with further analysis is why Britain failed to see the 
signs of Iraq’s invasion despite its long imperial history and subsequent association 
with the region. Britain had, after all, protected Kuwait once before in 1961 from an 
imminent Iraqi invasion.3 The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 took Britain by surprise, 
however. Prime Minister Thatcher was in the US, the British Ambassador to Iraq was 
not in Baghdad at the time, and as a result, signs of Iraq’s increasingly belligerent 
stance were not heralded as anything out of the ordinary. Even the movement of Iraqi 
troops towards Kuwait in July 1990 was a repetition of past actions when Iraq had felt 
that it needed to apply pressure on its neighbours. In August 1990 the military build­
up was described as ‘muscle-flexing and scare-mongering’ in the press, and although 
the possibility of invasion had not been ruled out, there seemed to be a general view 
that this would be merely a limited incursion across the border and not a full-scale 
invasion.4
By the Foreign Office’s own admission, Iraq’s anger was directed primarily at 
Kuwait’s (and the UAE’s) breaking of OPEC oil quotas, which had forced the price of 
oil down. Iraq’s initial demand therefore was that those two Gulf States should cut oil 
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production in order to raise the price. During the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, 
Kuwait had supported Iraq financially. At the end of the war it saw an opportunity for 
economic expansion, and therefore, at the OPEC summit of 1989, negotiated an 
increase in its quota of oil production.5 Many OPEC leaders disapproved of this 
action, but the least happy was Saddam Hussein. Since the cease-fire in 1988, 
Baghdad’s top priority had appeared to be a revival of Iraq’s economy, which was 
crucial to the survival of Saddam Hussein and his regime. As an oil producer, Iraq’s 
hopes lay with the possible increase in the price of oil but with Kuwait (and the UAE) 
exceeding the quota this was impossible. Therefore, most of Iraq’s diplomatic efforts 
until 1990 revolved around attempts to increase the price of oil, and pre-invasion 
negotiations between Iraq and other Arab States did finally lead to a Kuwaiti 
agreement to cut production to the OPEC quota of 1.5 million BPD.6 As detailed in 
chapter 3, debt problems and Iraqi access to the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and 
Warbah appeared to be the former’s other grievances, but these complaints failed to 
hint at Iraq’s claims to Kuwait’s very existence.7
Similar views were expressed by Group Captain A.P.N. Lambert during a 
personal interview when he stated that, although there was increasing concern during 
July 1990 it was
... tempered I think by a belief that he was unlikely to do anything - 
and this was maybe because of the Mubarak shuttle diplomacy that 
took place - and so there was a belief that this was all sabre rattling 
— and so therefore it was not an area we were likely to become 
involved. Actually throughout June we were far more interested in 
the events of 1989 - with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the way in 
which NATO itself would develop .. .8
Section 2: Britain’s Diplomatic Role in the Gulf Crisis 1990/91
As the discourse demonstrates Britain’s diplomatic (and ultimately military) 
contribution was significant. Official statements in Parliament, answers to the Select 
Committees, and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) documents not only reveal 
an unambiguous British stand over the Iraqi invasion, but appear to provide an 
indication that the British government was concerned that the region should remain 
stable.9 In order to gain a clear understanding of Britain’s diplomatic stance, a number 
of inter-related factors have to be considered. Firstly, the reasons behind Britain’s 
attempts to resolve the crisis must be analysed, as they provide clues to Britain’s high
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profile diplomatic involvement. Secondly, given the contention that Britain’s 
diplomatic stance was unswerving, what evidence is available to support this 
argument? Factors to be considered will include the role played by cross-party support 
in Britain’s involvement and the importance of supporting the American position, as 
this was also an opportunity to emphasise the special relationship that existed between 
London and Washington. A further consideration will be to what extent the British 
stance was a means of acknowledging the importance of the Gulf and other key Arab 
States in maintaining the international coalition against Iraq. Finally, in light of 
certain international and national attitudes towards the maintenance of sanctions as 
opposed to the early use of military force, how did Britain overcome opposition to its 
contentious actions?
Section 2.1 - Reasons for British involvement
Keohane provides a useful list of reasons behind Britain’s involvement in the Gulf 
crisis. Thatcher’s bleak image of international politics, to which Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait conformed, enabled her to play her ‘warrior leader’ role and demonstrate that 
Britain, despite being relegated to a power of the second rank, was still able to play an 
important international role.10 This thesis has also stressed the point that since the 
advent of the Thatcher Administration British foreign policy towards the GCC States 
had been accorded greater importance as confirmed by both Lord Douglas Hurd and 
Sir Alan Munro. It was reasonable to expect, therefore, since Britain had played an 
increasingly important role in the Gulf during the 1980s, that it would seek to play a 
central role in the latest crisis, and Mrs. Thatcher’s influence in this should not be 
underestimated. As Group Captain Lambert stated, ‘I think also you will find at the 
time that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did see things more in terms of black and 
white - I suspect that other Prime Ministers would not have been so adamant - they 
may have gone more for the flag waving ... I think her personality was very 
important’.11
Keohane also refers to Britain’s concern that, if allowed to retain control of 
Kuwait, Iraq would be able not only to control decisions on oil pricing and production 
but also to create uncertainty in what were important British markets. Chapter 2 of 
this thesis analysed Britain’s continuing reliance on Middle Eastern crude during the 
1980s, and the region’s importance to Britain in terms of oil continued into this
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period, as is confirmed by a Foreign Office memorandum.12 In addition, Britain’s 
concerns over allowing Iraq to retain control of Kuwait were aptly summarised by Sir 
Anthony Parsons in an article in The Times, in which he stated:
If he does get away with it he will have achieved many things ... he 
will have control of Kuwait’s rich oil resources and enormous financial 
investments. He will be able to open up an alternate route to the Gulf, 
by-passing the Shatt-al Arab waterway and rendering irrelevant the 
vexed question of whether it should be controlled by Iran or Iraq. The 
remaining States of the peninsula will increasingly fall under Saddam 
Hussein’s control ... it would be a great mistake to underestimate his 
ambition to lead the Arab world.13
Similarly Group Captain Lambert highlighted Britain’s concerns as follows:
...there was certainly a popular perception that Saddam Hussein was 
becoming a bit of an adventurist -1 mean the need to build up things 
like the super-gun, the need to have built up his forces to the level he 
had, some of his air bases were three times the size of Heathrow, he 
was building up a big military capability and it started to look, with the 
ending of the Iran-Iraq war, that he didn’t actually need to have these 
things. The picture then starts to become clearer when you start 
thinking that he does see Iraq as a regional power and himself as a man 
with aspirations and ambitions.14
Furthermore, although Britain’s military role in the crisis will be analysed later, it is 
relevant to state here that the region’s strategic importance also stemmed from the fact 
that it was located on the southern flank of NATO. This highlights the possibility that 
a crisis in the Gulf region could have had destabilising effects on southern NATO 
States. Chapters 2 and 3 have already dealt with the importance that Britain placed on 
its out-of-area role during the 1980s, and this is confirmed by the government’s 
expenditure plans (1991/92 to 1993/94), which stressed that ‘... defence plaiming 
must take account of continuing uncertainties, such as the potential danger arising 
from instability in the Soviet Union and the need to respond, perhaps at short notice, 
to threats to UK interests outside the NATO area’.15 In light of this the government’s 
response to the Iraqi invasion seems to suggest that it believed British interests in the 
region were at stake.
In addition to this, Britain felt it had a commitment towards the Gulf States, as 
it maintained Treaties of Friendship with some of them, and had close defence 
arrangements with others (see Appendix 1). As Group Captain Lambert stated:
There was no chance that Britain was going to overlook the invasion of 
Kuwait because of our long-term ties with them — the treaties and so
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forth. We had a treaty with them which had lapsed so we had no 
guaranteed requirement to reinforce them but we felt that there was 
something we owed to the Kuwaitis in the sense that it was unthinkable 
to desert them.16
The importance of the Gulf States extended further than merely to Britain however. 
Britain’s partners in the European Community (EC), for example, also viewed them 
as increasingly important, as was indicated by the ongoing negotiations between the 
EC and the GCC over the establishment of a free-trade agreement.17 A meeting 
between the GCC and the EC held in March 1990 had discussed the implementation 
of the EC/GCC first-stage agreement and had subsequently encouraged further 
negotiations for the second-stage. The importance to British industry of these 
negotiations was indicated by Waldegrave who stated at the time, ‘... We have 
consulted widely with United Kingdom industries interested in these negotiations and 
believe that the Commission’s negotiating mandate takes into account essential 
United Kingdom interests’.18
Section 2.2 - Britain’s unambiguous diplomacy
Freedman and Karsh are of the opinion that Saddam Hussein did not intend to annex 
Kuwait, but wished rather to establish hegemony over the Emirate in order to ensure 
its complete financial, political and strategic subservience to his wishes. Such a 
situation, they argue, would have provided him with Kuwait’s financial and other 
resources ‘without incurring the attendant risks of outright annexation’.19 Whatever 
Saddam Hussein’s motives, he remained in Kuwait, though he failed, in the face of a 
resilient Kuwaiti population, to persuade the international community that the Iraqi 
invasion had been in response to an indigenous uprising against the ruling Al-Sabah 
dynasty. With few exceptions the international community’s reaction was one of 
outright condemnation.
Undoubtedly, the level of the American reaction and the favourable 
environment vis-à-vis relations between East and West contributed much to the 
international response. However, not only is there an important gap in the literature 
with regard to Britain’s contribution to post-invasion diplomacy, but also an analysis 
of Britain’s diplomatic role is a necessary pre-requisite for assessing the degree of
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Britain’s military contribution, and ultimately its presence in the region during this 
period.
The international response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is well documented 
and so the intention here is not to repeat past, established analysis, but rather to 
concentrate specifically on Britain’s role.20 In order to do this, a number of issues 
have to be considered: first, Britain decided that Iraq had to be told it had no option 
but to withdraw; second, with the end of the Cold War, it appeared that the United 
Nations had finally succeeded in presenting a unified front to the international 
community. Therefore, if the UN was to retain its new-found credibility under the 
new set of international rules, it had to be seen to succeed in its first test in the post­
Cold War period, and as a permanent member of the Security Council Britain had a 
particular responsibility towards ensuring that success. Third, Britain was aware that 
the coalition, made up of European, Arab and other States, was constantly under 
pressure from a variety of ideas and opinions on how to persuade Saddam Hussein to 
leave Kuwait, and on numerous occasions it felt a need to contribute to the rejection 
of ideas which appeared to go against the objectives laid out in the UN resolutions. 
The fourth issue was the important question of sanctions versus the early use of 
military force and, finally, Britain played a significant role in the adoption of various 
important resolutions, including SCR 687. Section C of this particular resolution 
imposed on Iraq the obligation of destroying and allowing international agencies to 
destroy its weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles, nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons.
No option but to withdraw
The Prime Minister’s opening statement during the 6 September debate on the 
invasion is typical of her response to the crisis. Here she set the tone for the 
unambiguous approach of subsequent months, which may have supported the 
coalition at times when it might have succumbed to weakness and indecision. She 
referred to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, ‘...a peaceful, independent country and a 
member of the United Nations since 1963 [as] a flagrant and blatant case of 
aggression’.21 This statement highlighted the fact that the British Government’s 
attitude towards the invasion was that Iraq had to withdraw unconditionally, and as 
the crisis progressed, it became clear that there would be no compromise on this 
principle.
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However, there remained some question over whether the remainder of the 
international community would be as forceful. In this sense the British viewed 
themselves as occupying what Keohane refers to as the ‘key point of contact between 
many of the principle actors in the crisis’.22 In an attempt to ensure that the 
international community followed the principles laid out in the various resolutions, 
Britain first decided to work closely with its ally, the United States, since isolating 
Iraq would not be possible without full US co-operation. Secondly, since the 
opposition to Saddam Hussein was made up of so many disparate nations, the chances 
of one or more States offering Saddam a face-saving option increased. It was crucial, 
therefore, that the isolation and condemnation of Iraq should appear to be the result of 
a collective will rather than of one or two powerful States steam-rollering the rest 
along.
On the first point, Mrs Thatcher had no cause for concern, since it soon 
became clear that Britain and the United States had adopted identical views over the 
invasion. During the Security Council’s first debate on the crisis the US 
Representative (Thomas Pickering) strongly condemned the invasion and called for 
Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Sir Crispin Ticket! (the then British 
Representative to the Security Council) similarly condemned the invasion calling it an 
‘ugly moment in world affairs’ and ‘a clear breach of the Charter of the United 
Nations’.23 The fact that the meeting resulted in the adoption of SCR 660, with 14 out 
of the 15 Members voting in favour, showed that the process of collectively isolating 
Iraq had begun.
The second aspect to Britain’s policy, that of presenting a collective will 
behind international pronouncements of condemnation, was also forcefully put 
forward by Sir Crispin Tickell: ‘The Security Council represents a focus of world 
opinion. It is the way in which the international community can mobilise itself to 
maintain the purposes and ideals of the Charter ,..’24 Following Iraq’s failure to abide 
by the demands of SCR 660, a further Security Council meeting, held on 6 August 
1990, adopted SCR 661, which imposed mandatory sanctions against the aggressor. 
At this meeting Sir Crispin Tickell once again took the opportunity to stress the 
importance of collective action: ‘Today the Security Council faces its responsibilities. 
It must succeed this time where the League of Nations failed and where itself has 
faltered in the past...,25
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Mrs. Thatcher, at the time on a visit to the US, also condemned the invasion 
calling the ‘Iraqi violation of the territory of a full UN member [as] totally 
unacceptable’, but highlighted the need for increased international co-operation in a 
world of declining superpower influence. During this trip she emphasised that the 
international community could do nothing individually. There had to be the 
‘collective will to see that this Security Council resolution [660] against Iraq is upheld 
... We are prepared to support those measures which collectively we can agree to, and 
collectively we can make effective’.26 Furthermore, in the House of Commons Mrs. 
Thatcher stated that ‘Iraq’s actions raise very important issues of principle as well as 
of law. There can be no conceivable justification for one country to march in and 
seize another ... If Iraq’s aggression were allowed to succeed, no small state could 
ever feel safe again ... The issue is one of importance to the whole world. It affects 
world security, world oil supplies and world economic stability’, thereby stressing the 
multilateral nature of the crisis.27
In light of the perception, apparent in the discourse, that the Thatcher 
Administration viewed economic interests in the GCC States as important, the 
desirable outcome from a British perspective was that Iraq should withdraw from 
Kuwait. However, there is doubt, in the face of dwindling resources and Arab and 
domestic opposition, whether Britain would have had the will or the capacity to take 
action (specifically military action) alone. Furthermore, in light of its defence treaties 
with four other Gulf Emirates and a co-operation agreement with Jordan, Britain 
clearly had ‘an interest in putting guarantees of territorial integrity against Iraq on a 
multilateral basis’.28
Even though the coalition arranged against Iraq was made up of many States, 
it must be remembered that only a handful actually conducted military operations. 
Many important States such as Germany and Japan did not contribute military forces, 
whereas other Muslim nations such as Pakistan and Bangladesh were on orders not to 
attack Iraq but merely to defend the Islamic Holy sites in Saudi Arabia. This caused a 
degree of concern over the coalition’s durability. In its role as ‘point of contact’ 
Britain saw itself as not only co-operating with the members of the coalition, and the 
US in particular, but also as ensuring that other important States, particularly Arab 
States of the coalition and the Gulf States themselves, continued to support the 
coalition. This was of particular concern when Saddam Hussein, by firing Scud 
missiles on Israel, tried to put pressure on the Arab members of the coalition by 
192
claiming that he was upholding the rights of the Palestinians. The integrity of the 
coalition, therefore, remained one of Britain’s main concerns throughout the pre-war 
months. For this reason various Government officials, including the Foreign Secretary 
Douglas Hurd, Defence Minister Alan Clark and Defence Secretary Tom King visited 
the region at different times during August and September 1990.
The weak link in the coalition appeared to be the Arab members. Saudi Arabia 
was nervous that Iraqi troops had massed on its borders, Bahrain was well aware that 
it had been on Saddam Hussein’s list of States breaking oil quotas, and the other Gulf 
States knew of Iraq’s military exploits. Incurring Saddam’s wrath could have 
subjected them to the same fate as that of Kuwait. There was particular concern 
therefore that the Arab States would split into two camps over the issue of whether or 
not to allow foreign intervention in Arab affairs. The Gulf States, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, especially, were aware that they would need Western protection and therefore 
asked for help. Other members of the Arab League, however, remained cautious. For 
instance, although members of the Arab League condemned the invasion and called 
for an Iraqi withdrawal during the first subsequent meeting, the resolution adopted 
rejected] strenuously any foreign intervention or attempt at intervention in Arab 
affairs’.29 A subsequent GCC Ministerial meeting, however, while also condemning 
Iraq for its violation of international law, made no mention of opposing foreign 
intervention in the region. This was undoubtedly due to the GCC’s recognition that 
some form of international, specifically Western, intervention would be necessary.30
Two Arab States, Syria and Egypt, who were not members of the GCC were 
crucial in the success of the coalition. They issued statements on 11 January 1991 
indicating their support both for the coalition and for international resolutions 
condemning Iraq and calling for its withdrawal from Kuwaiti territory. Their support, 
Syria as Iraq’s neighbour and rival for Ba’athist leadership, and Egypt as a voice of 
moderation in an otherwise volatile region, was necessary if the coalition was to retain 
a degree of legitimacy amongst other Arab States.31
Further evidence that the Gulf States themselves were looking to the West for 
protection against the possibility of further Iraqi incursions is provided in statements 
by British politicians. For example, on 6 September 1990 the Prime Minister stated, 
‘... in response to requests from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf rulers, the 
United States, closely followed by Britain, immediately deployed ground, air, and 
naval forces to deter further aggression by Saddam Hussein’.32 Saddam Hussein’s 
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attempts to deflect Arab opinion by linking his invasion of Kuwait to the Palestinian 
issue was also of concern to Britain and other Western members of the coalition. 
Douglas Hurd confirmed that British diplomacy was concerned with attempting to 
ensure that the main Arab States remained supportive of the UN resolutions and did 
not split the coalition when he stated, ‘..it is clear from all the information which we 
have from the Arab Leaders, the main Arab States of the coalition against Saddam 
Hussein, that they do not intend to be deflected by the Palestinian issue from their 
stance and I believe that will continue’.
The other important factor with regard to the collective will and international 
unanimity was the position of the Soviet Union. One of the factors which meant that 
this crisis could be treated differently from other crises during the Cold War era was a 
significant degree of co-operation between the superpowers, and this was reflected in 
the unprecedented speed with which the Security Council was able to adopt 
resolutions.
The discourse at this point highlights how British threat perceptions were 
changing. In 1979, as shown in Chapter 2, it had appeared, for a time, that with the 
Soviet Union now within striking distance of the British (and Western) oil and trade 
routes, Iran purporting to spread its Revolution throughout the Gulf region, and 
conflict in danger of spilling over into the fragile GCC States, British policy-makers 
felt they had to continue to demonstrate British interests in preserving stability. The 
chapter ended, however, with an identification of factors which would have led to 
British policy-makers reassessing their perceived notions of threats to the region, and 
Chapter 3 developed those changing perceptions and identified the emergence of 
possible new threats. The end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and an emerging belief that Iran was not able to export its revolution 
gave credence to the argument that the threat environment had altered.
The international response to Iraq’s invasion seemed to reflect this change, as 
the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s increased willingness to co-operate 
with the West had provided a basis upon which the Security Council could now 
operate. This was also to contribute to Britain’s perceptions of the changing structure 
of the threats facing its interests in the Persian Gulf. Chapter 3 dealt with the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
implications for British policy in the Gulf. Analysing the general causes and effects of 
the events in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, however, is beyond the 
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remit of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is useful to briefly consider some aspects in that 
they further clarify how far Britain perceived the change in threats.
A Defence Committee Report, published in July 1990, referred to the events in 
Eastern Europe as having ‘profound and far-reaching implications for British defence 
policy’. The unification of Germany, the withdrawal of the German Democratic 
Republic from the Warsaw Pact, the emergence of democratically elected 
Governments in Eastern Europe, and the progress of the conventional arms control 
talks in Vienna contributed to the belief in Britain that ‘as a military alliance, the 
Warsaw Pact [was] effectively defunct’.34 The report went on to state that ‘The 
collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as a military alliance [meant] that even 
the technical possibility of the Soviet Union mounting a surprise attack, rapidly 
reinforced, on the Central Front [had] virtually disappeared’.35 Furthermore 
Waldegrave, in a statement to the House on 11 July 1990, commented on the new 
state of relations between Britain and the Soviet Union: ‘Anglo-Soviet relations are 
better than ever. We are moving steadily from an era of confrontation to one of co­
operation in an increasingly broad range of areas’.36
The CSCE Summit held in Paris from 19-21 November also resulted in a 
considerable improvement in relations between East and West. As Mrs. Thatcher 
stated, ‘The word historic tends to be used extravagantly these days, but I believe that 
this Summit was an historic gathering. It marked the end of the Cold War in Europe 
and the triumph of democracy, freedom and the rule of law’. The CFE Treaty was 
also signed at this time, and was heralded as a major achievement in that it 
‘...require[d] the countries of the Warsaw Pact, and in particular the Soviet Union, to 
make massive reductions in the numbers of their tanks, artillery, armoured vehicles, 
helicopters and aircraft. The overhang of vastly superior numbers of Warsaw Pact 
forces, which ha[d] for so long been a threat to Western Europe, [were to] be 
^7 eliminated’.
It would be a mistake to regard such events as being important purely from a 
European perspective. Not only did the improvement of relations between East and 
West lower tensions in Europe, it also had a significant effect worldwide. One such 
consequence was that Britain was now able to shift even more of its attention to the 
Gulf region, where it ultimately contributed over 45,000 personnel in support of 
coalition efforts (see Section 4.2). Furthermore, another effect of improved East-West
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relations was that they led to the United Nations’ decision-making structures being 
significantly strengthened, and attention now turns to this aspect.
A strengthened UN
The wider implications of the end of the Cold War must not be ignored. As 
Waldegrave clarified, relations between East and West were moving towards an era of 
‘...co-operation in an increasingly broad range of areas’.38 One such area which had 
specific implications for British policy in the Persian Gulf was the increase in levels 
of co-operation within the Security Council. The following statement by Mrs. 
Thatcher shows how important British politicians considered the Security Council’s 
effective handling of the crisis to be.
At last we are seeing the United Nations act with the determination and 
purpose that its founders envisaged ... I would make particular 
mention of the part played by the five permanent members ... They 
have worked together to an unprecedented degree to ensure that United 
Nations action is effective. I believe that in this we are seeing the first 
results of post-Cold War diplomacy: confrontation has been replaced 
by a new atmosphere of co-operation. We would never have succeeded 
in getting this response three or four years ago ...39
Soviet co-operation within the Security Council certainly appeared to be forthcoming, 
as the following quote by the Soviet Representative to the Security Council shows: 
‘The Soviet delegation believes that the Security Council must act immediately to 
eliminate this violation of international peace and security in a region where so many 
urgent conflicts still await solution. We support the draft resolution [and] expect 
immediate cessation of the armed invasion, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and a 
renewal of negotiations between the countries ...,4° Such Soviet statements regarding 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were particularly welcome in Western capitals since Iraq 
had long been supported, in terms of defence equipment, by the Soviet Union, and 
there had been concern as to whether the Soviet Union would once again exercise its 
veto power in the Security Council. With the Soviet Union supporting the various 
draft resolutions it appeared, therefore, that the UN was finally fulfilling the role 
envisaged for it. As David Nicholls stated during a personal interview:
[With] the end of the Cold War ... the West was more comfortable 
both with the idea of being able to use the United Nations, and the fact 
that the Cold War was not being pursued by all means, so that, in the 
case of the Middle East, you could argue that these events were natural 
precursors to a readiness to be involved in a just cause in which the
196
United Nations now appeared to have a distinct role ... You could 
argue that ... the trigger for British support of a UN force in the Gulf 
... was that it did find itself very much in tune with the harmony of the 
way the UN was developing.41
And,...
It has to be said that the military was also looking for a role - having 
lost some roles - NATO and all that - the British military, I think were 
really quite despondent during the period of Options for Change - and 
so this war came rather conveniently. That certainly, at the level of 
MOD activity, was very relevant. At the level of the Foreign Office I 
expect that you do need to look at the United Nations ... but it certainly 
does not undermine all the other things but it is another angle.42
In his conclusion Keohane stated ‘... the crisis provided Britain with the opportunity 
to play a central role in the revived United Nations, thereby strengthening her own 
position as a permanent member of the Security Council’.43 This reference to the 
United Nations echoes the sentiments in David Nicholls’ statement quoted above, 
where he refers to the importance of the UN at Foreign Office level.
Keohane’s conclusions and David Nicholls’ comments above go to the core of 
the thesis and demonstrate the importance of constructivism’s discursive method. 
Though much of the discourse of the era has been concerned with economic interests 
in light of Thatcherite beliefs significant evidence is emerging which suggests that 
material interests were not the sole guide in the formation of British policy. It is more 
likely that the discourse of the era contained within it a multiple range of factors 
which taken together provide a more accurate picture of the process of policy-making. 
That is not to say, however, that the economic explanation can be dismissed or indeed 
its importance reduced.
Pre-withdrawal compromises?
Britain's insistence on a no-compromise stand over the issue of Iraq’s withdrawal from 
Kuwait features prominently in the discourse, and it may be supposed to have 
contributed to several significant developments, namely a strengthening of the so- 
called special relationship with the US. This was shown in the way that the US 
military structure succeeded in integrating elements of the British Armed Forces, and 
as will be shown in Section 4.3, only British commanders were allowed to sit in on 
the US military’s decision-making meetings. Second, Britain’s belief that Iraq had to 
be persuaded, and if need be, forced, to leave Kuwait, provided a high degree of 
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support to the US in that it kept other disparate members of the coalition from 
succeeding in their attempts to reach pre-withdrawal compromises with the Iraqi 
regime.
This element in British diplomacy contrasted strongly with certain other 
coalition members’ perspectives. On numerous occasions throughout the crisis the 
British Government stated, both in the House of Commons and the Security Council, 
that the objectives of the Security Council resolutions were not negotiable. The said 
objectives were the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwaiti territory (which 
came under threat on a number of occasions throughout the initial months of 
diplomacy), the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and the 
restoration of peace and stability in the area.
Resolution 678 (adopted on 29 November 1990) specified that, in light of the 
failure of sanctions and Iraq’s own intransigence in leaving Kuwait coalition members 
could now “use all necessary means” to secure the objectives of resolution 660, in 
other words to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. However, die Resolution also 
provided for a “grace period” (until 15 January 1991), in an effort to give Iraq one 
final chance to abide by the resolutions. Just prior to the deadline a last ditch attempt 
by the French Government called for Iraq to declare its ‘intention to pull out of 
Kuwait according to a set timetable and to begin ... [immediately] with a rapid large- 
scale withdrawal’. The new British Prime Minister (John Major), however, stated that 
the British Government would not accept a watering down of the resolutions, and that 
neither could the Government be party to any extension of the deadline, as this would 
appear to reward Iraq for its aggression. He went on to state:
We fully subscribe to the idea of a last appeal to Saddam Hussein ... 
We have no difficulty with that point. But we do have considerable 
difficulty with the French text. All along we have supported the 
Security Council resolutions and we must judge the French text by 
two criteria: whether it is wholly consistent with the ... resolutions 
and whether it is likely to lead Iraq to comply with those resolutions 
or simply have the effect of taking the pressure off Iraq at this very 
late stage. In our judgement it fails those tests and it is for that reason 
that ... we cannot accept and cannot support the particular position 
put forward by the French.44
This example shows that the coalition was not unanimous in its stand over how to 
deal with the Iraqi invasion, but it also shows the firm approach adopted by the British 
Government. Several questions arise here, namely, to what extent was Britain’s 
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resolute support for the US considered invaluable? Did Britain’s stance help maintain 
the support of other members of the coalition? In what way would events have 
unfolded differently had Britain not adopted this attitude, and ultimately, would the 
US have gone to war with Iraq without Britain’s support?
The coalition may have been made up of 33 States, but Britain was one of a 
handful that provided military forces that took part in the actual war. Furthermore, 
much of Britain’s shuttle diplomacy was conducted in States with whom it had close 
economic and historical ties, namely, the Gulf States. Its support for the US within the 
UN has been well documented here. Whether or not ultimately these actions 
influenced events is a matter for supposition, however, the central issue is the British 
perception of its own role and the conclusions that the observer can draw from the 
available research material. Constructivist analysis allows for the identification of 
alternative explanations, and in light of its emphasis on ideas and discourse it places 
the observer alongside other social factors at the forefront of analysis.
The air campaign against Iraq began on the night of the 15 January 1991 and 
lasted until 25 February 1991, following which the allies began conducting the ground 
offensive. However, even after a month of intensive allied air bombardment, Iraq did 
not appear to be willing to abide by the principles (as Britain understood them) of the 
resolutions. The announcement by the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council on 15 
February 1991, for instance, indicated Iraq’s readiness to deal with SCR 660, but 
stated that the question of an Iraqi withdrawal would have to be explicitly linked to a 
number of conditions.45 The allies were to reject this immediately, and, as David 
Hannay (UK Representative to the Security Council) stated at the time,
... it is not the simple and unconditional affirmative on withdrawal that 
is needed if this conflict is to be ended. It does indeed contain one tiny 
gleam of light: the word “withdrawal” has at last re-entered the [Iraqi] 
vocabulary’. He then went on to state, ‘However [it] is promptly 
obscured behind a huge bank of conditions ... that actually contradict 
any apparent willingness to accept [SCR] 660. That resolution calls for 
unconditional withdrawal. Acceptance of it is not, therefore, consistent 
with the posing of conditions.46
This sentiment was also voiced in the House of Commons by Douglas Hurd, who 
stated: ‘It is clear that the Revolutionary Command Council’s announcement does not 
commit Iraq to unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, as required by the United 
Nations Security Council either in resolution 660 or in the later ones, nor to the 
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implementation of the other resolutions passed by the Security Council since 2 
August’.47
One item on the list was of special interest in that it caused a significant 
degree of concern to the allies from the early stages of the conflict - the question of 
linking the Iraq/Kuwait and the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli issues. Although this point 
was mentioned earlier, it is particularly relevant in this context. The Arab/Israeli 
question was one of the instruments in Saddam Hussein’s arsenal, and he made 
various attempts (such as firing Scud Missiles on Israel) to influence Arab public 
opinion. His motives became apparent on 12 August 1990 when he presented a three- 
point plan, the essence of which was to link a solution to the problem created by 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to all other outstanding Middle East problems. As a Foreign 
Office Briefing Note highlighted, this proposal referred to Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied Arab territory, Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the replacement of 
Western forces in the region by an Arab force (excluding Egyptian troops) under the 
supervision of the UN Secretary-General, and the ending of all sanctions against Iraq. 
‘By trying to make the direct linkage between Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and 
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, Saddam clearly intended his initiative 
to serve the purpose of dividing Arab opinion from the broad international 
consensus’.48 Had he succeeded in doing so, preserving the coalition with the 
important Arab members intact would have been much more difficult. Even though 
the British Government acknowledged that a conference dealing with the Palestinian 
problem was long overdue, it nevertheless categorically dismissed Iraq’s attempts at 
linking the two issues. As Douglas Hurd stated:
In Kuwait you have a very simple act of aggression ... and you have a 
simple response ... One Arab country has attacked another and must be 
forced to withdraw. The Arab-Israel problem is a much more complex 
situation with the Israelis occupying a number of lands which do not 
belong to Israel as a result of an attack not by, but on, Israel in the 1967 
War which gave rise to the occupation. We are against the occupation 
... it is in some respects unjustly conducted and ... it does not provide 
for any kind of recipe for stability ...[but] it is not the same situation 
and requires a different remedy ... It is perfectly true that ...[past] 
efforts ... have not proved successful ... the present American 
Administration is more active on this than any I can remember, and we 
will have to return to this, but it is not right to make just that very 
simple comparison between the two positions. The history ... is 
different.49
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The Government did, however, as part of its ongoing diplomatic efforts seek 
assurances from Arab members of the coalition that they would not be swayed by 
Iraq’s attempts to deflect Arab opinion. As Hurd further stated at the time:
I was discussing this with Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, 
who made the point ... that if the Arabs were to accept that kind of 
approach they would be settling for lower standards of international 
behaviour than the international community as a whole and that was 
something he did not think they should or could do. That is, I think, a 
very clear Saudi view, a very clear Gulf view, a very clear Egyptian 
view, and I have been able to confirm that from my own conversations. 
I do not think it is likely to go that way.50
Whatever the influence of British diplomacy, it did become clear that the main Arab 
members of the coalition, despite some dissension within their populations, would not 
be deflected by Saddam Hussein’s attempts to split the states opposing him. This was 
confirmed in a Security Council Document where Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria 
‘expressed their condemnation of the Iraqi regime’s attempts to take advantage of the 
question of Palestine in order to justify its subjugation of Kuwait’.51
Sanctions or military force?
Once it was deemed that Iraq would not immediately succumb to the imposition of 
comprehensive sanctions it became increasingly obvious to the British Government 
(and other coalition members) that military force would have to be an option. In order 
to assess why the British Government was so adamant in its decision not to rule out 
the use of force, a number of factors have to be considered. These include the issue of 
Iraq’s own seemingly intransigent position. Throughout the months of diplomacy (2 
August 1990 - 15 January 1991), Iraq gave no indication that it would be willing to 
withdraw from Kuwait. Also important was the question of why the British 
Government was not willing to give the sanctions longer time to work. Resolution 
661, which imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq, was adopted on 6 
August 1990. Resolution 678, on the other hand, which was adopted a mere 2-and-a- 
half months later on 29 November 1990, specified that the coalition could use “all 
necessary means” to ensure the removal of Iraq from Kuwait. This hinted at a degree 
of impatience amongst leading members of the coalition (including Britain), and, 
therefore, brought forth much criticism nationally as well as from various members of 
the international community. Although force was not used by the coalition until 15
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January 1991, this was actually a mere 5-and-a-half months after the invasion, and 
historical precedents showed that sanctions were generally applied for much longer.
The fact that Britain had to contend with a disparate national audience 
indicated that cross party support was not as unanimous as the Government may have 
claimed at the time. Opinions varied considerably between, on the one hand, the 
Thatcher (later Major) position that reflected a no compromise approach and held that 
the use of force was not to be ruled out, and a second group which sought to influence 
the Government to allow sanctions much longer to work before considering the use of 
force. A third group held the belief that force should not be used at all.
During the crisis the British Government confirmed that its own objectives 
were the same as those set out in the United Nations’ resolutions; namely, Iraq’s 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, and the restoration of the legitimate 
government of Kuwait.52 The Government’s resolve was clearly indicated by Douglas 
Hurd in the following quote: ‘. .unconditional withdrawal means what it says. It does 
not mean an announcement as to withdrawal, then we negotiate. It means Iraqi 
withdrawal from the whole of Kuwait. That... certainly is our position’.53
Initially, the hope was that sanctions would have an effect on Iraq and 
persuade Saddam Hussein to capitulate and withdraw from Kuwait. When resolution 
661 was adopted there was a belief that Iraq would be vulnerable to the effects of 
sanctions, as its economy was almost totally dependent on the export of oil through a 
limited number of outlets. This explains why Britain regarded as critical the steps 
taken by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to prevent Iraq from exporting its oil through 
pipelines in their territory. Furthermore, as SCR 661 specified, the embargo extended 
to other outlets and it was believed that since Iraq had limited currency reserves 
following the Iran-Iraq War, and was dependent on the import of food and other 
important commodities, sanctions would work. In addition to this, the effects on the 
world economy appeared to have been minimised following co-operation amongst the 
GCC States to increase their oil production to compensate for the loss of Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti oil.54
The belief that the sanctions would prove effective against Iraq was further set 
out in a Foreign Office Briefing Note which pointed out that the development of a 
huge military capacity in Iraq meant that other forms of economic development had 
suffered considerably. The result of this was that Iraq had an economy ‘... which 
[was] highly dependent on imports of foreign supplies, services and replacement
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parts. With all these supplies now unobtainable ... Iraq [was] increasingly subject to 
massive economic dislocation’.55
The sanctions regime against Iraq was further strengthened on 25 August 1990 
with the adoption of SCR 665, where Britain played a central role by being one of the 
co-sponsors. This resolution called on Member States with maritime forces in the area 
to ‘halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their 
cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related 
to such shipping laid down in resolution 661’.56 In light of its presence in the Persian 
Gulf in the form of the Armilia Patrol, Britain was also to play a central role in the 
actual implementation of the resolution (see Section 4.3). The regime was later 
extended to include measures to tighten the air embargo through the adoption of SCR 
670 on 25 September 1990.57
Resolution 665 was of particular importance in that it was adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in essence authorised Member States to use force 
if necessary to ensure that the provisions of the resolution were upheld. As Pickering 
was to state in the Security Council, ‘The authority granted in this resolution is 
sufficiently broad to use armed force ... depending upon the circumstances which 
might require it. This is a significant step. On only a few occasions in the past has this 
authority ever been exercised. This is therefore a historic and significant decision. ..’58 
At the same meeting Sir Crispin Tickell stated that the resolution had to be adopted 
because of mounting evidence of breaches of the sanctions: ‘As we know for 
ourselves, there is a string of tankers carrying Iraqi oil from Iraqi ports outwards from 
the Persian Gulf. If these open acts of defiance succeed, the authority of the United 
Nations itself, will be gravely undermined’. At the same time, the British 
Representative clarified that the international community was reserving for itself the 
right to take other measures, if necessary, to force Iraq to withdraw: ‘Let no-one, least 
of all the Government of Iraq, doubt our determination to see the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the 
legitimate authority in that country’.59
That right was later exercised on 25 September 1990 when it was deemed 
necessary to extend the sanctions regime by tightening the air embargo. Resolution 
670 was adopted following a Security Council meeting at which the Foreign Ministers 
of all five Permanent Members were present and at which Douglas Hurd once again 
stressed the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in 
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dealing with crises. ‘Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait faces this post-Cold War world with its 
first crucial test. So far the signs of the response are good ... The United States, the 
Soviet Union, China, Western and Eastern Europe, Japan, and a decisive majority of 
Arab and Muslim countries stand together in a unique collection to defeat 
aggression’.60 (Appendices 6 and 7 give an account of some of the measures taken by 
the international community and Britain to impose sanctions on Iraq).
Even though Britain supported the adoption of resolutions imposing sanctions 
on Iraq, the perception that they were merely one aspect of a strategy for putting 
pressure on Iraq is strengthened by the fact that the government was unwilling to see 
them as a long term measure. In the event, sanctions were only given 5-and-a-half 
months before military action against Iraq commenced. Further factors in support of 
Britain’s willingness to use force stemmed from the premise that Britain increasingly 
viewed Iraq’s behaviour as abhorrent, and that various steps taken by the Iraqi regime 
contributed to the British view that sanctions would not have the desired effect. The 
promise that Iraq would not use military force during the negotiations, made by 
Saddam Hussein to President Mubarak, was broken shortly after on 2 August 1990. 
As the Prime Minister was to state at the time: ‘Let us not forget that in Saddam 
Hussein we are dealing with a person who, without warning, has gone into the 
territory of another State against international law ... A person who will take such 
action against one State will take it against another, if he is not stopped and his 
invasion reversed’.61
Following the invasion the Iraqi authorities also formulated an official policy 
of destroying the very fabric of Kuwait. In a document published on 19 December 
1990, Amnesty International was to confirm emerging accounts of systematic torture, 
murder and other abuses propagated against thousands of Kuwaiti citizens. The report 
went on to state that ‘Iraq has conducted a campaign designed to end Kuwait’s 
existence as an independent State, by changing her demographic structure ... 
destroying the country’s infrastructure, industry, and public and private property...’62 
In addition, Hurd stated on 11 December 1990 that what was happening in Kuwait 
was no secret and that Saddam Hussein was out to eradicate Kuwait as an independent 
country. He went on to state that ‘... with each day that passes, the likelihood that we 
shall be able to restore Kuwait to its former position decreases’.63
The British Government not only viewed Iraq’s obliteration of Kuwait and the 
treatment of its citizens with abhorrence, but also expressed concern about third state 
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nationals (including Westerners) caught in the crisis. The use of Western hostages as 
shields to protect ‘strategic sites’ in Iraq also resulted in immense public and 
international condemnation. Even as late as December 1990 there were still over 
1,150 British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait, some of whom had been detained at various 
‘strategic sites’ by Iraqi authorities.64 By mid-December, however, it became apparent 
that Saddam Hussein had capitulated over the question of hostages and he 
subsequently allowed foreign nationals to leave Iraq and Kuwait. Although Douglas 
Hurd noted this as a welcome development, he confirmed that Iraq had not as yet 
complied with the two main requirements of the past resolutions: namely, the 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate 
Government.65
By the end of October, there were clear signs that the British Government was 
beginning to believe that Saddam Hussein would not withdraw from Kuwait, despite 
the comprehensive sanctions. As Hurd was to state in the House on 24 October 1990: 
‘I believe that President Hussein will seek to cling to the country that he has acquired 
by force, or perhaps to negotiate his way out so that he can claim some gain for his 
aggression’.66 The clearest indication that the British Government was preparing itself 
for the possibility of war came during the November (1990) ‘Debate on the Address’, 
when the Prime Minister stated:
... even though condemnation by the international community 
grows stronger, even though sanctions are steadily tightened and 
even though the people of Iraq are being subjected to unnecessary 
hardship to satisfy their dictator’s lust for power and conquest, 
there is no sign that Saddam Hussein is prepared to relinquish his 
hold on Kuwait ... Time is running out for Saddam Hussein. The 
implacable message from the House must be [that] either he gets 
out of Kuwait soon, or we and our allies will remove him by 
force...’67
A week before this particular debate Sir David Hannay had presented a similar 
argument in the Security Council. The issues he raised revolved around (amongst 
others) continuing Iraqi reluctance to abide by the principles of the resolutions, gross 
human rights violations perpetuated by Iraqi troops in Kuwait and Iraq’s continuing 
assertion that Kuwait was its nineteenth province and not a separate State. 
Subsequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 678 on 29 November 1990 
which allowed Members to use “all necessary means” to remove Iraq from Kuwait. 
Iraq’s deadline to comply with the resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait was set for
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15 January 1991, a month and a half later. This “grace period” was included in the 
resolution on Soviet insistence, with the intention of providing Saddam Hussein with 
one final chance to comply. It had been feared that the Soviet Union would veto the 
adoption of SCR 678, as Gorbachev had at the outset demanded more time for the 
sanctions to work. The Soviet Union shifted its stance, however, after a visit by Tariq 
Aziz (the Iraqi Foreign Minister) to Moscow on 26 November 1990, when he failed to 
show any sign of moderation.
Given that national opinion over the use of force varied widely, the 
Government sought to justify its own willingness to adopt this method by questioning 
whether sanctions, even if applied over a long period, would undermine Saddam 
Hussein’s resolve to keep his hold on Kuwait. The arguments used by the 
Government revolved around Saddam Hussein’s continuing belligerency and 
unwillingness to comply with SCR 660, and the threat to use force was seen as 
another means of applying pressure on Iraq. As Douglas Hurd stated in the House on 
11 December 1990: ‘We do not argue that in any blithe or careless manner. We 
prepare the military option because in sober judgement we see the experience of that 
option - the possibility of that option ... as the last and most powerful peaceful 
pressure on the aggressor ... The legal authority to use force has been there for some 
time and the political authority has now been given [SCR 678] ... That is the 
strongest possible expression of collective security’.69
The Government also claimed that, if Saddam Hussein was given longer to 
comply with the UN resolutions, it was likely that his armed forces would continue to 
take advantage of the time allowed to improve their military positions. The number of 
Iraqi troops in Kuwait now numbered nearly 300,000, and tanks had reached the 2000 
mark. The Government had to admit, however, that other sources would claim that the 
*... sanctions [were] producing decisive shortages which [would] lead to Saddam 
Hussein changing his mind ... but in our view that is not so’.70
The position now adopted by the Government, therefore, seemed to belie its 
earlier claims that Iraq was vulnerable to sanctions. In light of this it attempted to 
reconcile its seemingly contradictory position by claiming that the draft General 
Budget Law for 1991 passed on 3 January 1991 by the Iraqi National Assembly 
concentrated on strengthening the fighting capacity of the Armed Forces. As a 
Foreign Office Briefing Paper stated:
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Industry is set for a long haul: lack of spare parts will eventually have 
an adverse effect on output, but capital goods and machinery looted 
from Kuwait will help to keep essential services running; and critical 
military industries are being given priority. The Iraqi military will be 
the last to suffer from sanctions. It has a large arsenal and a domestic 
ammunition production capability. Much of its Soviet-style hardware 
is easily maintained, and it will be some time before shortages ... have 
any effect ... With these considerations in mind, after five-and-a-half 
months of sanctions being in force it is clear that it would be a long 
time before the Iraqi military machine came to a standstill.71
Douglas Hurd reinforced these points during the Gulf debate on the eve of the 
deadline. He stated that, although sanctions had not been watertight, there was 
evidence to suggest that they had reduced the flow of goods into Iraq by a substantial 
amount. However, with regard to food shortages, although rationing had been 
introduced, consumption remained fairly high since steps had been taken to force 
increases in agricultural output. Hurd went on to confirm that Iraqi industry was 
prepared for a long haul since many factories had been closed as a result of attempts 
to divert resources to the military sector. He also stated that ‘...the key sectors of 
[Iraqi] industry [were] likely on this basis to continue operations for a long time’.72
In addition to this, the Government also used the fact that the Iraqi airforce 
had not reduced the number of its sorties as evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein 
did not see a need to conserve spare parts. A similar pattern was adopted by the Iraqi 
ground forces (including tanks and artillery), which continued to be deployed in large 
numbers in Iraq and Kuwait: ‘...and we see no evidence that the imposition of 
sanctions has so far affected these elements. We believe that Saddam Hussein could 
hold out for a long time without dramatically affecting his fighting arm, and that is the 
critical point’.73
Similarly, Douglas Hogg (the then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) 
remained doubtful whether sanctions would succeed. He admitted that they had 
certainly caused hardship in Iraq, but questioned whether the hardship was at a level 
‘...to cause the destabilisation of Saddam Hussein’s regime. My own belief is that 
[they are] not... ’ He also used the argument that the Iraqi people had failed to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power despite ‘eight years of a pointless and brutal war’, again 
promoted by Saddam Hussein ... Therefore my judgement is that sanctions alone will 
not bring about a complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait’.74
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Of equal importance in providing support to the Government over the question 
of sanctions was the stand taken by the United States. As a letter from the US 
Representative to the President of the Security Council on 17 January 1991 showed, 
the American and British positions complemented each other to a great extent As 
Thomas Pickering stated in the Security Council,
‘President Saddam Hussein has rejected all ... efforts and has 
continued to defy the ... Security Council ... Economic sanctions have 
failed to force Iraq to comply with resolution 660 and the subsequent 
relevant resolutions. Iraq was continuing the destruction of Kuwait ... 
Further delay would only have prolonged the suffering of the Kuwaiti 
people and increased the risks to military forces of the United States 
and other States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait’.75
This highlights the fact that the US also was unwilling to allow sanctions more time to 
work. The similarity in British and US positions, therefore, is reinforced, as is the 
earlier point that, given the important role played by Britain in providing support for 
the US, the coalition’s position could have been weakened had it not been for the 
British resolve in continually advocating that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait. It 
could be perceived, therefore, that the British government believed that its stance had 
resulted in significant military and diplomatic support for the US led coalition.
The British government faced considerable opposition to its position 
throughout the crisis in its attempts to persuade Parliament, however, and the views 
expressed in the various debates held on the crisis can be divided into three clear-cut 
categories. The first was the position advocated by the government itself. The second 
category included those who took the view that force could never be justified and a 
third category, though not opposed to the possible use of force, nevertheless remained 
unconvinced by the Government’s arguments. The positions of these various groups is 
elaborated on below.
The Chapter has thus far considered in detail the Government’s position on 
various aspects of the crisis, and the essence of this argument has been that any pre­
withdrawal negotiations with Saddam Hussein were out of the question. As Keohane 
stated,
This approach insisted that any concessions, whether cosmetic or 
substantial, would be detrimental in that they would be seen as rewards 
for aggression. [He went on to argue that those] advocating this 
approach did not believe that war was necessarily the worst outcome 
for the region or for the international community. Instead, a worse 
situation would be one where Iraq controlled the oil reserves of
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Kuwait, dominated the oil exporters of the Gulf, and gained a capacity 
to deploy a range of weapons of mass destruction against neighbours 
and adversaries.76
Proponents of this view included leading Conservative politicians such as Mrs. 
Thatcher (later replaced by John Major, who retained the policy established by his 
predecessor), Douglas Hurd, Tom King, and Douglas Hogg. They held the view that 
Iraq had to withdraw from Kuwait and, although their declared method for forcing 
him out was sanctions, they were prepared to use force in support of UN resolutions.
Support for the Government’s policy was also to be found across the political 
divide amongst the Labour Party’s Front Benches. During the first Gulf debate, Neil 
Kinnock and other leading members of his Party provided unequivocal backing for 
the resolute stand adopted by the Government. He stated:
Our unrelenting purpose must be to ensure that Saddam Hussein gets 
out of Kuwait ... [and] ... We consider that in the circumstances 
arising from the invasion ... the action taken in the United Nations and 
in the commitment of forces was right. In the very nature of Saddam 
Hussein’s aggression, slowness or modesty in response would have 
been an invitation to him to continue over other borders and into 
77greater excesses.
And an important statement by Denis Healey shows the extent of consensus in the
House (and elsewhere) at this time:
The House will agree that Saddam Hussein will go down in history for 
at least one unique achievement: he has united all parties in the House 
of Commons, all Permanent Members of the Security Council, and the 
overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations both on 
the objective of getting him out of Kuwait and on the best method of 
doing so - a blockade supported, if necessary, by appropriate force.78
The first debate ended, therefore, with broad consensus amongst the leaderships of the 
various Parliamentary Parties, and this undoubtedly encouraged the Government, 
since it was aware that in order to demonstrate its ability to play a central role in the
Security Council it had to present a unified front nationally.
Nevertheless, the Government also recognised that there was division in the 
House. The existence of a small but vocal group, which first became apparent in the 
results of the voting following the 6-7 September 1990 Gulf debate, advocated a no- 
war approach, and although the overwhelming majority (437) voted in favour of the 
Government’s policy, 35 Members voted against it. Awareness of this division led to 
the following comments by Tom King: ‘... I recognise that it is not cowardly to be a
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pacifist and to believe that in no circumstances can force be justified. However, if that 
was the majority view of the House or the rest of the world, Saddam Hussein would 
safely continue to occupy Kuwait, and he would certainly do so...,79
Leading proponents of the no-war approach such as Tam Dalyell (Member for 
Linlithgow) advised against war on the grounds that conflict in the region would 
result in an ecological disaster if the oil wells were set alight. Others such as Dave 
Nellist (Member for Coventry, South-East) accused Britain and other Western 
members of the coalition of hypocrisy. Iraq, he insisted, had during the 1980s been 
seen as a moderating influence against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism 
following the Iranian Revolution. This view had resulted in France supplying over 
$25 billion worth of weapons, the US giving free satellite intelligence coupled with $5 
billion worth of food subsidies and $2.5 billion worth of export guarantees. In 
addition, the Soviet Union had provided huge amounts of armaments, and lately 
Britain had been developing its trade links with Iraq.80 To proponents of this approach 
it was important that ten European Union partners had not sent armed forces to the 
region, and as a consequence, they claimed that the resolution of the crisis was 
increasingly being seen as an Anglo-American effort, which could have detrimental 
results for the international coalition. As Keohane stated, ‘For many adherents of this 
approach, the American-led international pressure against Iraq was motivated above 
all else by a concern for stable and cheap oil supplies’.81
Douglas Hogg disputed this belief by stating that if the Government had been 
motivated purely by the question of oil they would have settled with Saddam Hussein 
and the oil would have continued to flow. However, he stated that:
It is manifestly undesirable for Saddam Hussein to have the oil reserves 
of Kuwait and Iraq because that will enable him in the long term to 
distort the oil markets in various ways: but we would not contemplate 
the use of force for that reason ... Notwithstanding the fact that the 
world is currently deprived of oil from both Kuwait and Iraq, oil 
supplies are adequate to meet our present requirements.82
As the voting patterns during the Gulf debate on the eve of the deadline showed, 
proponents of the no-war approach numbered only 57 against the 534 who voted in 
favour of Government policy. As Tom King was to confirm, of much greater concern 
were a larger group of Members who, although not opposed to the use of force, were 
of the opinion that sanctions should be given much longer to take effect. In attempting 
to persuade this particular group he questioned the basis of their evidence and stressed 
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that the British and other forces in the region were ‘.. .not a limitless credible military 
option. That has to be recognised by the House ... We should not expect our forces to 
wait indefinitely for sanctions to bring Saddam Hussein down. The multinational 
force and the coalition would probably not be sustained, economically or politically, 
for the length of time demanded by some of my hon. Friends’. He went on to stress 
that it was understandable that there would never be absolute consensus either in the 
House or in the international community but that ‘we must seek substantial 
agreement’.83
During the 15 January 1990 debate John Major tried once more to sway the 
opinion of this particular group. His argument was based on the fact that Saddam 
Hussein had not taken advantage of the ‘grace period’ and so was still in Kuwait with 
forces which now exceeded 600,000 men and 4,000 tanks. He highlighted Iraq’s past 
use of weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical attacks against Iranian forces 
during the Iran-Iraq war and against the Kurds at Hallabja. He referred to Iraq’s 
systematic attempts to change populations, to expunge records and to erase national 
identity: ‘The reality is clear for all to see. Iraq has used military force to wipe Kuwait 
off the face of the map and plunder its resources ... we are witnessing in Kuwait an 
attempt to eliminate an entire state ...,84 Finally, Major insisted that Britain had 
welcomed, even at this late stage, a visit by the UN Secretary-General (Perez de 
Cuellar) to Baghdad, and Major used this particular visit to further strengthen the 
Government’s argument that ‘.. .the confrontation [was] not just between the United 
States and Iraq or the West and Iraq, but between the United Nations and an aggressor
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that ha[d] overrun a neighbouring ... country’.
The Labour Party’s support for the various UN resolutions had, from the 
outset of the crisis, indicated strong support for the Government’s position. However, 
its preference to continue to rely on sanctions and only use force as a last resort 
conflicted with its support for the very resolution which established the parameters for 
the use of force to remove Iraq from Kuwait, namely resolution 678. As Neil 
Kinnock’s statements during the 15 January 1990 debate show, the Labour Party 
maintained its position over lengthening the time allowed for sanctions, but once the 
air campaign started the Party switched its attention towards supporting British forces 
going to war:
From the outset of this crisis ... it has been clear that, in the interests of 
the whole world community, the will of the United Nations must
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prevail ... It is also clear that great devastation would result from a 
war. It would therefore be best, if at all possible, for the purposes of the 
United Nations to be achieved without ... the use of force, with 
sanctions and the blockade being given the maximum time to have 
effect. It is plainly the case, too, that if it should become certain that the 
objectives of the United Nations can be achieved only by the use of 
armed force against Iraq ... such force would then have to be used.86
A further factor for consideration was the question of legality over the use of force. 
Two opposing views gradually emerged from the various discussions in the House of 
Commons as well as within the Security Council. On the one hand the US and Britain 
were reluctant to place their national forces under the command of the Security 
Council given ‘the 15 member Council’s lack of relevant experience, cohesion, 
resources and decision-making procedures ... In addition Douglas Hurd was to 
state: ‘It cannot be right to put the choice entirely and wholly within the machinery of 
the United Nations. We know that machinery ... it includes vetoes and ... We cannot 
leave open the possibility that necessary action against the aggressor would be 
blocked by such means’.88 Furthermore, from the outset Mrs. Thatcher stressed that 
the coalition was justified in using force on the grounds that Resolution 661, apart 
from calling for comprehensive economic sanctions, also affirmed the right of 
individual or collective defence in response to armed attack, in accordance with 
article 51 of the UN Charter. Therefore, as she stated at the outset:
...we are not precluded by reason of any of the Security Council 
resolutions from exercising the inherent right of collective defence in 
accordance with the rules of international law ... To undertake now to 
use no military force without the further authority of the Security 
Council would be to deprive ourselves of a right in international law 
expressly affirmed by [SCR] 661; it would do injustice to the people of 
Kuwait, who are unable to use effective force themselves; it would be 
to hand an advantage to Saddam Hussein; and it could put our own 
forces in great peril. For these reasons, I am not prepared to limit our 
legitimate freedom of action.89
On the other hand there was the possibility that, despite supporting the various 
resolutions against Iraq, the Soviet Union (and China) would veto any action that was 
not under the direct control of the United Nations Military Staff Committee in 
accordance with the UN Charter. And, as Keohane stated, there was also the danger 
that relying on Article 51 of the Charter and resolution 661 could erode domestic 
cross-party support and ultimately reduce the legitimacy of the international 
.. . on 
coalition.
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In view of such problems, therefore, Britain and the United States sought 
another resolution which could reconcile these important differences. During the 
Security Council Debate which preceded voting over SCR 678 the US Representative 
appealed to idealist sentiments of the post-Cold War period by stating, ‘We must not 
let the United Nations go the way of the League of Nations. We must fulfil our 
common vision of a peacefill and just post-Cold War world. But if we are to do so, we 
must meet the threat to international peace ... And that is why [this] debate ... will, 1 
think, rank as one of the most important in the history of the United Nations. It will 
surely do much to determine the future of this body’.
The draft resolution (submitted by Britain, the US, Canada and the USSR) 
called upon Iraq to comply with SCR 660 and the subsequent relevant resolutions. 
This provision ensured that the Chinese delegation did not cast a negative vote. They 
had after all voted in favour of SCR 660 and all other relevant resolutions. The USSR 
was more difficult to appease since, though not opposed to the use of military force, it 
insisted that any action against Iraq be conducted under the control of the Military 
Staff Committee. However, it was noted that SCR 665 of 25 August 1990 had already 
permitted the use of force to strengthen the naval embargo against Iraq.91 A precedent 
had already been set, therefore, whereby nations kept control of their own naval 
forces. Also, apart from providing Iraq with a further period of goodwill (specifically 
to appease the Soviet Union), the resolution stipulated that ‘all necessary means’ 
would be used only if Iraq had failed to comply by the deadline. Furthermore, by 
stipulating that force would be used only in order to bring about Iraq’s compliance 
with SCR 660, Britain and the US were able to ensure Soviet co-operation92 (See 
Appendix 3).
Retaining domestic cross party support for SCR 678 was just as important for 
the British Government. Shortly before the Security Council Debate Douglas Hurd 
sought to justify Government support for the forthcoming resolution in the House. He 
stressed that in order to intensify the pressures on Saddam Hussein to withdraw it was 
necessary to seek a resolution authorising ‘all necessary means’ to remove Iraq from 
Kuwait, as one of the intentions was to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that the 
political will for the use of military force existed within the Security Council.93
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Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction - changes in Britain’s objectives?
Another factor central to Britain’s diplomatic efforts was to ensure that, once ousted 
from Kuwait, Iraq was not allowed to reconstitute its various programmes designed to 
build weapons of mass destruction. For this reason Britain played a central role in the 
adoption of the cease-fire resolution (SCR 687 of 3 April 1991), Section C of which 
placed stringent controls on Iraq’s capacity to redevelop its weapons. Section 4.4 of 
this chapter considers the position over Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction once the 
war was over, and its purpose is to show that, despite having fulfilled their objectives 
in removing Iraq from Kuwait and restoring the latter’s legitimate government, the 
leaders of the coalition went further and established an ongoing weapons monitoring 
and verification regime in Iraq.
Britain’s objectives had begun to alter even before the war began on 15 
January 1991, and the intention here is to explore the evidence which demonstrates 
this fact. Britain’s declared objectives remained the same throughout the pre-war 
months of diplomacy: namely the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, forced or otherwise, 
the restoration of the Emirate’s legitimate government, and the restoration of peace 
and security in the region. It is this last objective, the ‘restoration of peace and 
security in the region’, which developed, for a time, into a source of some ambiguity. 
Since Britain played a central role in drafting Section C of SCR 687, a number of 
questions are raised. Prior to the adoption of SCR 687 on 3 April 1991, no official 
declaration of furthering the coalition’s aims beyond those established in past 
resolutions was made. Did Britain’s role in Section C of SCR 687, and subsequent 
monitoring of Iraq (as shown in Section 4.4 of the chapter) mean that the British 
Government already had an undeclared policy of applying controls to Iraq’s 
programmes? And how far did this represent a change in British war aims?
In dealing with the first question, as various statements by British politicians 
during the months of pre-war diplomacy and sanctions show, it was inevitable that 
Iraq would remain subject to control and supervision by the United Nations and 
ultimately to concerned members of the coalition. Britain’s central role in establishing 
Section C of SCR 687 (see Appendix 4) should not be surprising, since as early as 
September 1990 Mrs. Thatcher had made it clear that preventing Iraq from 
remilitarising was an important objective: ‘...no effort must be spared to prevent Iraq 
from obtaining the materials or technology to manufacture nuclear weapons’.94 In 
addition, numerous articles in the national press (amongst other more specialised
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sources) at the time sought to reveal the extent of Iraq’s armament programmes. 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, for instance, pointed to Iraq’s successes at converting Soviet 
Scuds into longer range Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas surface-to-surface missiles 
(SSMs)95 (for further details see chapter 3).
The fact that other Conservative politicians were concerned about Iraq’s 
weapons programmes became apparent in the House when Sir Peter Emery 
questioned Hurd about the status of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmes and Britain’s 
attitude towards them. On that occasion Hurd announced that ‘...even if Saddam 
Hussein were to comply fully with the Security Council resolutions, we would not 
have solved all the problems, and that when considering matters such as the retention 
of sanctions and the retention of forces we would have to take into account the 
dangers that my hon. Friend has described’.96
Another indication of Britain’s policy with regard to Iraq’s weapons 
programmes was provided by the following important statement by Mrs. Thatcher on 
7 November 1990: ‘Britain and others have argued that Iraq’s chemical, biological, 
and nuclear weapons capability must be eliminated, so that it can never again threaten 
world peace’. Furthermore, once the air campaign had started, Britain’s Defence 
Secretary (Tom King) was quoted in the Financial Times on 28 January as stating that 
disarming Iraq was an aim of the leaders of the coalition. This was the first public 
acknowledgement in the UK that the original objectives had expanded to include this 
element. In his statement Tom King revealed that the disarming of Iraq’s war machine 
had formed part of fulfilling the objectives of SCR 678: ‘.. .It has to be right, after all 
the effort and all the costs and all the pain we have been involved in. We cannot leave 
this half finished with a continuing menace, continuing to threaten other states in the 
region’.98 This represents conclusive evidence that despite Mrs. Thatcher’s 
resignation on 28 November 1990, the change in policy to include this particular 
element continued apace.
John Major’s interview with the Times on 31 January 1991 was of equal 
importance in showing that allied war aims were altering to include the possibility of 
the maintenance of some form of post-war allied presence in the region. The Times 
stated that during his interview, ‘He left open the possibility of Western forces 
continuing to attack the war machine in Iraq even after the expulsion of President 
Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait’.99 This particular interview with John Major is 
of particular importance in that it was referred to by Jim Sillars (Member for
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Glasgow, Govan) during the Gulf War debate on 21 February 1991, with the intention 
of indicating that the Government’s war aims had altered beyond what was 
established in the original UN resolutions.
Once Iraq had been forced out of Kuwait, politicians continued to stress, in the 
lead up to the adoption of SCR 687, that the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction was a major objective of the British Government and other leading 
members of the coalition. As Tom King stated on 19 March 1991, ‘... eliminating 
Saddam Hussein’s nuclear, biological and chemical capability is something to which 
we attach the greatest importance’, and as Mark Lennox-Boyd (the then Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office) confirmed, ‘We want Iraq to comply 
fully with the non-proliferation treaty and with the relevant biological and chemical 
weapons conventions...we shall be working at the United Nations for [their] 
destruction under international supervision’.100
Finally, the contention that Britain’s war aims had broadened beyond merely 
freeing Kuwait and restoring its legitimate Government is further confirmed by a 
report published by the Foreign Affairs Committee. This stated that, ‘The thickening 
out of the policy within the overall aims, became apparent after the war with the 
passing of SCR 687.. .with the comprehensive nature of its planned controls over Iraq 
... includ[ing] such...provisions on the destruction of weapons of mass 
destruction’.101
The discourse analysed here has therefore seemed to suggest that the British 
government perceived Iraq's presence in Kuwait to be a threat and this perhaps 
indicated why Britain appeared determined to play a role in condemning Iraq and 
subsequently isolating it within the international community. Having failed to detect 
the imminent invasion, the British response centred on a number of issues. Under the 
leadership of Mrs. Thatcher there was no doubt in the minds of leading politicians that 
Iraq had to withdraw from Kuwait, and this no-compromise approach was a reflection 
of the importance attached by the British government to the region. A sizeable 
expatriate population (approximately 50,000), defence agreements with various 
States, significant economic interests, Britain’s continuing reliance on Middle Eastern 
crude, and the uncertainty caused by Iraq’s invasion are all factors which, when taken 
together, seem to support the hypothesis.
The end of the Cold War raised the stakes for the United Nations. With 
increased prospects for co-operation and action, the Organisation’s future depended
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upon a successful conclusion to the crisis. The opportunity to play an important role 
in a revived United Nations in turn enabled Britain to strengthen its own position as a 
permanent member of the UN.
The crisis also enabled Britain to revive its so-called “special relationship” 
with its leading ally, the United States. It appeared that the two States had adopted a 
similar position over the invasion and if so this meant that the likelihood of their 
objectives being fulfilled had increased. Britain’s support over the question of 
refusing pre-withdrawal negotiations, the strength of the no-compromise stance 
adopted by its politicians, and its stand over the contentious issue of sanctions versus 
military force enabled the US leadership to acquire a much higher degree of 
legitimacy, despite the many disparate voices amongst the coalition. The joint 
diplomatic stance adopted by these two States ultimately paved the way for military 
action with the Security Council’s blessing.
The constructed world in which British policy makers worked privileged the 
relationship with the US and the perception that the British government was eager to 
revive its so-called “special-relationship” with the US could be construed as another 
element that may have influenced British action. It is also a further indication that 
multiple explanations for British foreign policy towards the region are present within 
the discourse, even though some, such as economic interests, are far more prominent 
than others. Although chapters 2 and 3 provided evidence of the prominence of 
economic factors within the discourse during the period 1979-July 1990 they also 
suggested the existence of other explanations. An analysis of the way in which the 
British government reacted to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait further reveals that economic 
interests were not the only influential factor. The next step is to go beyond Britain’s 
diplomatic role and analyse the extent of its military involvement in the region during 
the crisis and post-crisis periods.
Section 3: Britain’s Military Presence in the Persian Gulf, 1990/91
The British contribution to the coalition forces was on a much smaller scale than that 
of its principal ally, the United States. Nevertheless, as stated at the beginning of this 
chapter, by January 1991 the British military presence in the region was significant 
and amounted to over 45,000 personnel. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to 
demonstrate the extent of this presence during the Gulf crisis. A detailed examination 
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of the types and numbers of personnel and equipment is beyond the remit of this 
thesis and such issues have been dealt with elsewhere. However, a brief 
examination will be useful, and specific details will be included when they contribute 
to the overall picture.
Operation Granby was the ‘most comprehensive deployment of UK forces 
outside NATO since the end of the Second World War’.103 The months leading up to 
the outbreak of the conflict were characterised both by a failure to persuade Saddam 
Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, and by success in preserving the integrity of the 
Coalition and ensuring that the new-found co-operation between the principal 
international actors continued. This success was reflected in the eventual adoption of 
SCR 678, which authorised the Coalition members to use “all necessary means” to 
remove Iraq from Kuwait. In parallel with these diplomatic efforts it was deemed 
necessary to continue the build-up of military forces. In light of this the British 
deployment progressed through three specific stages which, for the sake of 
convenience, may be labelled as the initial stage, the build-up and the full 
commitment. As these various stages are analysed it will be shown that the objectives 
of Operation Granby gradually expanded. Initially the aim was to deter further 
aggression by Iraq, but this developed to include securing (with coalition allies) Iraq’s 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, restoring Kuwait’s legitimate government, 
and re-establishing peace and security in the region. Iraqi refusal to fulfil the UN’s 
objectives in the form of Security Council resolutions therefore meant that ultimately 
military force was employed.
Following the breakdown of negotiations between Iraq and the other Arab 
States, up to 100,000 Iraqi troops had massed on the border with Kuwait. On 2 August 
Iraq invaded, with the initial thrust being led by around 30,000 troops of the 
Republican Guard Force, including armoured brigades equipped with over 350 T72, 
T54 and T55 tanks. The advance towards Kuwait City was rapid and the only 
opposition by the Kuwaiti National Guard was quickly neutralised. In addition, some 
units of the Iraqi force broke off from the main advance and proceeded to occupy the 
strategically important islands of Bubiyan and Warbah at the head of the Gulf.104 
Although the invasion took Britain and other States by surprise, the diplomatic 
response was rapid and was closely followed by an increase in the US, British and 
other military forces in the Gulf region.
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Section 3.1: Britain's military role: Phase 1: 2 August —13 September 1990
Another factor indicated within the discourse was the style of Mrs. Thatcher’s 
leadership, which would seem to contribute to an explanation of the British opposition 
to Iraq’s invasion. During a personal interview, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine 
labelled this initial response as ‘... not untypical of Margaret Thatcher’s style of 
government. It was the same sort of reaction that you saw from her in 1982 when the 
Argentineans invaded the Falkland Islands. There is no doubt... she was instrumental 
in encouraging those who were advising George Bush that we had to do something 
purposeful about what had happened’.105 This opinion suggests a further variable in 
the context of factors contributing to an overall picture of British foreign policy.
Immediately following the invasion of Kuwait, the British Government was 
faced with the possibility that Saddam Hussein might go on to invade the north­
eastern territories of Saudi Arabia and seize its oilfields. There was also a general 
belief that he could then seize the smaller members of the GCC as well. After all, his 
initial threats had not been purely against Kuwait but had also included the UAE. That 
there was concern amongst the international community was again confirmed by Sir 
Patrick Hine, who stated in his despatch to the London Gazette·.i... there were strong 
indications that President Saddam Hussein had further ambitions. He massed 100,000 
troops on the border with Saudi Arabia and mobilised 140,000 volunteers in Southern 
Iraq’.106
The question emerges whether it was this factor which persuaded Mrs. 
Thatcher that some form of rapid response was necessary in order to prevent any 
further aggression. As Group Captain Lambert stated during an interview:
You cannot understate the power that the British Prime Minister has in 
ordering her Ministers and indeed Chiefs of Staff... she would be ill- 
advised to say to a Chief of Staff against their advice do this, this and 
this. But at the end of the day if she determines that’s what’s to be done 
then it will be done. Normally what happens in this process is that the 
Minister says something must be done give me options ... in terms of 
personnel, financial costs, risk, four or five options...Now I didn’t see 
any of that and I don’t think much of it was probably done at that stage 
because I think ... there was concern to get something there quickly.1 7
Initial British deployments were made in direct response to the invasion, therefore, 
and to prevent the possibility of further aggression against Saudi Arabia and other 
GCC States.108 On 8 August President Bush announced that the US was deploying 
troops to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf on the invitation of the Kingdom. This was 
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immediately followed, on 9 August, by an announcement on the part of the then 
Secretary of State for Defence, Tom King, that Britain would also be increasing its 
military presence there, thereby raising its profile in the region.
This initial increase revolved around the deployment of air defence and attack 
elements and on expanding the already established naval presence (See chapters 2 and 
3). As regards the initial naval presence, this was based on the Royal Navy’s Armilla 
Patrol group WHISKY, consisting of RN ships, HMS York, Battleaxe, Jupiter, with 
RFA Orangeleaf. Further naval deployments including HMS Diligence, Olna, and 
Fort Grange were announced on 14 August and HMS Gloucester’s deployment was 
announced on 29 August. HMS Olna, Fort Grange and Diligence had arrived in the 
Gulf by 19 September and on 20 September ministerial approval was given for the 
deployment of three Attacker Class patrol craft (Attacker, Hunter and Striker) for 
counter-terrorist duties.
The anticipation of a mine threat in the Gulf led to a further rapid expansion of 
Britain’s naval presence as three Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs), HMS 
Atherstone, Cattistock and Hurworth, were deployed, initially to the eastern 
Mediterranean and then to the Gulf by 19 September. HMS Herald, designated to be 
the command ship for this particular group, arrived on station shortly after, on 23 
September.109
As regards the RAF, Tom King announced on 7 September that the following 
deployments had been made:
• 9 August 90: Government announced the deployment of a squadron of 12 Tornado 
F3s, a squadron of 12 Jaguar, and 3 Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft to the Gulf.
• 11 August 90: Tornado F3s arrived in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) and were 
operational within 2 hours of arrival. By 7 September they had already flown over 
200 sorties in support of the air defence shield of Saudi Arabia.
♦ 13-15 August 90: Nimrods arrived in Seeb (Oman) and were operational 
immediately upon arrival. Jaguars and 2 VC10 tankers deployed to Thumrait 
(Oman).
• 23 August 90: Government announced the deployment of a squadron of 12 
Tornado GRls accompanied by 2 VC 10 Tanker aircraft to Muharraq in Bahrain. 
Arrived in Bahrain on 28 August.
• 31 August 90: Four Rapier fire units from RAF Regiment deployed to Muharraq.
• 14 September 90: Government announced the deployment of a second squadron 
of 12 Tornado GRls (including GR1 As) and half a squadron of 6 Tornado F3s 
which arrived at Dhahran on 22 September - (For a map of the region see 
Appendix 5).
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Further deployments included personnel in support of Rapier and ground defence 
tasks, medical facilities including a field hospital, logistic build-up to establish 
effective communications, and the establishment of chemical defence and 
decontamination units to support British forces and also to provide training to Saudi 
*10 units.
As regards land forces, Britain did not in this initial stage deploy large 
numbers of ground elements since they would have required extensive logistic 
support and would have been very vulnerable if present on a small scale.111 
Consequently ground deployments during the first stage were few and included the 
following:
• 10 August 90: Communications detachments from 30 Signal Regiment deployed 
to Dhahran.
• 12 August 90: R Signals detachments deployed to Oman and Bahrain.
• 20 August 90: Army medical support troops deployed to Dhahran.
• 26 August 90: RE airfield damage repair team advance party deployed to Bahrain.
• 1 September 90: Army communications detachment deployed to Seeb and 
Bahrain.
• 12 September 90: Deployment of 22 Field Hospital began.
Since the task of fulfilling Britain’s objectives during this period fell to a large extent 
on the Royal Navy, the initial duties of the naval group were defined as providing 
protection for entitled merchant shipping, being prepared to support the evacuation of 
British dependants from the Gulf States, and supporting the activities of other British 
forces in the area.112 In this endeavour past out-of-area peacetime deployments and 
exercises, such as Saif Sareea (see chapter 2) proved invaluable. Throughout the 
1980s the Royal Navy had maintained the Armilla Patrol in the Gulf region in order to 
protect entitled shipping and it therefore had the advantage of familiarity with the 
area, which proved equally important once SCR 665 was adopted on 25 August 1990. 
As the previous section highlighted, this groundbreaking resolution authorised 
measures to halt shipping in order to inspect and verify cargoes. Consequently, 
SCR 665 shifted the objectives of the Armilla Patrol from the protection of British 
merchant shipping to the enforcement of UN sanctions in co-operation with other 
naval forces,114 thereby demonstrating the extent to which the naval operation was 
conducted on a multilateral basis. Defence Ministers of the Western European Union 
(WEU) met on 21 August to establish ‘how best to co-ordinate the efforts of the 
221
maritime forces they were sending to the Gulf. Though each State retained national 
control over its own naval forces, ‘guidelines were established to ensure the closest 
possible co-ordination both within the WEU and with other allied navies in the Gulf, 
such as the US Navy and the Royal Australian Navy’.115 Britain’s deployment of 
maritime surface surveillance patrol aircraft (Nimrods) demonstrated its own 
commitment to the UN-enforced sanctions. Ultimately Britain made a significant 
contribution to the enforcement effort, ‘challenging a total of 3,171 merchant ships 
and participating in 36 boardings in the period up to the official cease-fire. In addition 
RAF Nimrod aircraft flew 295 surveillance sorties from their base at Seeb in support 
of embargo operations’.116
During the initial stage the increase in Britain’s military presence in the region 
was based primarily, therefore, upon RN and RAF deployments. Requests for 
assistance made by various GCC States was one of the factors which facilitated 
Britain’s rapid response. The Government’s objective was to provide the Gulf States 
with reassurance at a time when further aggression by Saddam Hussein could not be 
ruled out, and it was essential that the initial commitments should arrive in the area 
quickly if they were to be effective in deterring him. This was confirmed by Group 
Captain Lambert who stated, ‘... I do know ... that once die order was issued it was 
deployed very quickly — it was there in about 24 hours and operational very shortly 
after that’.117 In addition, Mrs. Thatcher stated on 6 September, ‘Saddam Hussein 
could have gone on to invade the north-eastern territories of Saudi Arabia and seize its 
oilfields. Had he succeeded, he could have taken the smaller Gulf States too. It is 
thanks to rapid action by the United States ... and prompt support by Britain, that the 
aggressor has been halted’.118
As section 4.2 showed, diplomatic pressure had also been building up on Iraq 
through the adoption of a series of UN resolutions demanding Iraq’s withdrawal and 
the restoration of Kuwait’s government. The aim of achieving this by sanctions and 
other diplomatic measures did not, however, mean that the possible use of force was 
discounted. Indeed, the British Government remained adamant throughout this period 
that the legal basis for the use of force had been established. As Tom King stated: 
‘Our immediate concern has been to join in the efforts to avoid further aggression by 
peaceful means by making the United Nations embargo work. If it does not, then of 
course we have had to make it clear that we cannot rule out anything ... it may be 
necessary to use force’.119
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Section 3.2: Phase 2: The Build-up: 14 September - 28 November 1990
This phase was characterised by two important elements. First, Iraq’s continuing 
refusal to abide by the UN resolutions led to an increase in the perception that the use 
of force might be inevitable. However, regardless of the final outcome, Iraqi 
intransigence did have the effect of persuading principal members of the coalition to 
continue to build up their forces in the Gulf. Second, the close diplomatic and political 
relationship that the United States and Britain had established over the question of the 
invasion possibly contributed to the subsequent military co-operation.
As regards the first issue, section 4.2 above showed the extent of Britain’s 
resolve over the invasion. Apart from seeing a further significant increase in the 
numbers of British personnel and equipment in the Gulf, the period from mid­
September 1990 up to the adoption of SCR 678 on 29 November 1990 witnessed a 
change in British policy with regard to ground forces. On 14 September 1990 the 
Secretary of State for Defence announced the Government’s decision to deploy the 7th 
Armoured Brigade from the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) to the Gulf:
The Brigade, including War Maintenance Reserves [comprised] 9,500 
men, 145 Challenger Tanks, 110 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles and 
28 Ml09 Guns. Its support ... include[d] the provision of 2 engineer 
regiments, 2 transport regiments, 2 ordnance battalions, 2 armoured 
workshops and a host of other specialist units including an armoured 
field ambulance.120
and the following list shows the extent of British force deployments during this 
second phase:
Royal Navy
• 10 October 90: RFA Argus deployed to Gulf to serve as Primary Casualty 
Reception Ship.
• 10 October - 15 November 90: HMS Brazen, London, Attacker, Hunter, Striker, 
Cardiff, Argus and Resource arrived at respective stations in the Gulf and Cyprus.
• 22 November 90: Government announced deployment of 2 more MCMVs, HMS 
Dulverton and Ledbury.
• 29 November 90: Ministerial approval given for the deployment of 12 RN Sea 
King MKIV helicopters to support 1 (BR) Armoured Division.
Army
• 14 September 90: Government announced deployment of 7th Armoured Brigade.
• 20 September 90: Ministerial approval given for deployment of an Engineer Field 
Troop (RE) to Bahrain: Arrived on 23 September 90.
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♦ 15 November 90: 7th Armoured Brigade declared operational.
• 22 November 90: Government announced the deployment of 4th Brigade, a 
divisional headquarters and support to join 7th Armoured Brigade and to form 1 
(BR) Armoured Division.
RAF
• 14 September 90: Government announced the deployment of a second squadron 
of 12 Tornado GR1 s and half a squadron of Tornado F3s.
• 22 September 90: 10 October 90 — arrival and redeployment of Tornados and 
Jaguars in Gulf region.
• 15 October 90: Four Rapier Fire Units deployed from Cyprus to Muharraq.
♦ 17 October 90: Additional VC 10 tanker aircraft deployed to Seeb.
• 29 October 90: Ministerial approval for the deployment of 15 RAF Puma support 
helicopters in support of 7th Armoured Brigade - in theatre by 4 November 90.
• 30 October 90: Ministerial approval for the deployment of Tornado GRls fitted 
with ALARM: began arriving in theatre (Tabuk) by 23 November 90.
• 27 November 90: 26 Squadron (Rapier) RAF Regiment deployed to Tabuk.121
As this summary demonstrates, the increase in Britain’s military presence during this 
second period was significant, and this confirmed the British resolve to contribute to 
the use of military force if sanctions failed. In giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee during the crisis, Waldegrave confirmed that Britain was prepared to 
shoulder the considerable financial burden of its contribution since the military 
activity was in Britain’s own interests. He stated, ‘Our principal contribution to this 
[effort] is in the military costs knowing that the military activity is in our own 
interests’.122 This statement is an important one and goes to core of the thesis. If it was 
in Britain’s own interests to go to war as Waldegrave states, then what were those 
interests and if we define those interests in terms of material economic interests are 
they sufficient in themselves to explain the policy? This question will be dealt with in 
detail in the main conclusion since the discourse has suggested that policy was 
influenced by multiple factors, some of which have been highlighted, and not merely 
economic interests.
Another concern for the British Government was the possibility of further 
enhancement of the so-called “special relationship” with the US. In this light the 
question of US/British military co-operation took on a particularly important 
dimension. As Sir Patrick Hine stated:
we had a very similar set of political objectives upon which, of course, 
the military aims flowed and these were fleshed out in a series of 
discussions which we had at the political / military level between
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London and Washington ... to see to what extent we could harmonise 
the political objectives and to get consensus on what die military aims 
of the operations would be if it came to it.
And as regards military co-operation:
... Very quickly after we had deployed forces there and I had been 
made the Joint Commander we established very close relationships 
with the Americans at the military level... my equivalent was General 
Schwarzkopf who set up his headquarters in-theatre - I had mine 
actually back here ... but I was out in the Gulf area every two or three 
weeks and ... so I became very close to Schwarzkopf and I therefore 
understood what his thinking was and he was able to explain to me his 
concept for re-possessing Kuwait if it came to that.123
The central most important characteristic during this second phase, therefore, was the 
degree of influence that these two allies exerted on each other. The need to retain 
British influence in the Security Council was of particular importance to the US, 
while the British felt that there was a need to retain a voice over the deployment of 
their own troops in what was rapidly becoming a US-led military operation. It is here 
that the role played by the British commanders was of particular importance.
At this stage it was the task of Lieutenant General Peter de la Billiere (British 
Forces Commander Middle East) to ensure that the increased British commitment in 
the form of the 7th Armoured Brigade be given a clear role in the region. 
Consequently, even though ultimately the Brigade remained under the control of the 
UK, ‘it was agreed that the use of British forces in combat operations would be the 
subject of joint decisions’. Hence to ensure its effectiveness as part of a multinational 
force it was placed under the tactical control of the American armed forces. In this 
sense, therefore, Billiere saw his role at this point as being more to do with co­
ordinating and supervising rather than being a direct command role.124
It was during this second phase also that the US Administration took the 
decision to significantly increase its force levels in the Gulf. This decision, taken on 8 
November, reflected the US perception that diplomacy and other peaceful measures 
such as the sanctions were not forcing Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. 
Similarly, on 22 November the British Government, in response to the American 
decision, also deemed it necessary to shift its own force levels from a defensive to an 
offensive posture. The Government’s decision to deploy 4th Brigade to join the 7,h 
Armoured Brigade in Saudi Arabia resulted in the formation of 1 (BR) Armoured 
Division (further tri-service enhancements were also announced - as listed above).125
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The manner in which the British Division was formed highlights not only the 
importance which the British Government and Commanders attached to wishing to 
retain some degree of influence on the US, but also demonstrates the value that the 
Government attached to its objective of wanting to appear independent. This objective 
had its roots not only in Britain’s desire to retain control over its armed forces in the 
Gulf but also in an attempt to appeal to the GCC’s concerns of over-reliance on the 
US.126 The decision to form the new significantly larger Division led to British 
insistence that, rather than coming under the tactical command of the US Marine 
Corps, the command structure should be switched to US Army control. As de la 
Billiere stated:
When it began to look as if we may go into an offensive mode, it was 
my opinion that [we]...had a larger force out there which could operate 
within its own boundaries and under the general direction which would 
be coming from a corps, rather than to have a brigade which would be 
under tactical control of an American Division ... [it was] desirable to 
be able to stand independent, even if you [were] under the overall 
control of another nation, so I was quite keen that we should increase 
our force levels so that we had a Division out there and thereby be able 
to negotiate to some extent where we should be able to deploy, and 
also to give the senior British military field commander the level of 
intelligence which I [wanted] to see him have.127
The decision to form the Division, therefore, reflected the British objective to play a 
more important part in the armed opposition to Iraq. Remaining under the US Marines 
would have meant that their capability would have been enhanced to ‘beyond that 
which was necessary in order to be a diversionary force’, as it was originally intended. 
As de la Billiere went on to state ‘I did not really, therefore, want us to be just a rather 
over-generous part of a diversionary force which would not have really stretched the 
1^0
British capability and commitment that we had put out there’.
As Section 4.2 showed, the decision to adopt SCR 678 and ultimately go to 
war against Iraq was based upon the premise that mandatory economic sanctions were 
not working. The Government claimed that since the middle of August 1990 Iraq had 
been ‘construct[ing] an extensive line of fortifications along the border between 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia... [which was] later extended into southern Iraq’. Consisting 
of ditches, razor-wire fences and minefields, these fortifications were intended to 
delay advancing forces. In addition to building up such defences Iraq had been 
moving troops into positions in Kuwait and southern Iraq (see map in Appendix 5), 
and the Government estimated that by mid-January 1991 Iraq had over 40 divisions, 
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with about 4,500 tanks and 3,250 artillery pieces and, in addition ‘...more than 20 
divisions with over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 artillery pieces remained in central and 
northern Iraq for internal security duties and as a potential reserve’.129 Using such 
evidence, the Government argued that even though the sanctions had been thoroughly 
applied, the test of their effectiveness was not whether shortages were increasing but 
whether they brought about a change in policy. As Douglas Hurd stated, ‘It is 
obviously true they have not so far done that... and looking ahead, our judgement is 
that there is no certainty that they will do so’.130
During a personal interview Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine stated that 
military factors were also important in the decision not to allow sanctions longer to 
work. He stated that Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons in the past had led to 
the allied assumption that they would be used again during any conflict with the 
coalition. He went on to state that
.. .we could protect our armed forces against chemical attack wearing 
normal NBC clothing - but you can imagine wearing that kind of 
clothing in very high temperatures was really something we wished to 
avoid. So in our view there was a winter window of opportunity for 
mounting an operation of that kind which began around November and 
ended around March. And by March of course you were running up 
against Ramadan - so if we were going to take this kind of military 
action the judgement both in United States amongst most military and 
certainly in the UK [was] we had to do it within that four month 
period131.
A conversation between Sir Patrick Hine and US General Colin Powell (during 
October 1990) also seemed to suggest that Britain may have sought to influence the 
Americans. At that stage Powell seemed to be against the use of force and believed 
that sanctions should be given time to work. As Sir Patrick Hine stated,
I asked him how long are [were] talking about... and he said up to two 
years, maybe more which quite surprised me. Then I said to him, ‘well 
look you’re building up to a level of around 230,000 American 
personnel alone in the Gulf area, we are building up our forces ... and 
you can’t hold them there forever and if come next March or April and 
we haven’t mounted a military operation you’ll have to start thinning 
them down and Saddam will see that you are thinning them down and 
will conclude that you haven’t got the stomach for a fight and ... hail a 
great victory’, and I said frankly the option of assembling them all 
together once again in the Autumn of 1991 I don’t think is politically 
tenable so that either sanctions and/or diplomatic pressure have worked 
to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw ... by around January or 
February at the very latest or we have to mount a military operation 
this winter.132
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He further indicated that this view was supported by the great majority of military 
people as well as by politicians: ‘I mean the politicians particularly his (Powell’s) 
boss, Dick Cheney, was not in favour of waiting a couple of years’.133 Whether or not 
the British had any degree of influence over the Americans is not an issue here, rather 
the important factor is that the discourse indicates the government’s desire to develop 
a level of influence.
The fact that the British inner War Cabinet, including amongst others Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, the Prime Minister 
(Mrs. Thatcher and from November 1990 John Major), Defence Secretary Tom King, 
and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, agreed that something had to be done that 
winter was also confirmed by Sir Patrick Hine: ‘I can’t recall any member of the War 
Cabinet who argued that we should give sanctions longer ... We were all agreed that 
something had to be done that winter’.134
Phase 2, therefore, was characterised by the perception that sanctions would 
not work and as a result it was deemed necessary to significantly increase force levels, 
thereby indicating a shift from a defensive to an offensive posture. One of the 
consequences of this was that it led to British attempts to ensure a degree of control 
over its own armed forces, despite coming under US tactical command. Although 
Britain did not match its ally in force levels the logistic exercise to shift large amounts 
of tri-service equipment, and what now amounted to over 40,000 personnel, showed 
the extent of Britain’s increasing presence in the region. The stage was now set, 
following the adoption of SCR 678, for the next phase of the crisis, the full 
commitment.
Section 3.3: Phase 3: The Full Commitment: 29 November 1990 - 3 April 1991 
The above analysis has shown in detail the extent of the British military build-up in 
the Persian Gulf region during the months leading up to the adoption of SCR 678. The 
final third phase, however, provides further insights into British policy towards the 
region. The decision to go to war against Iraq as part of a multilateral coalition should 
not be underestimated, since the fact that it was prepared to resort to military force 
provides support for the contention that Britain regarded the Gulf region as important. 
By the start of the ground campaign at the end of February 1991 Britain had more
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than 45,000 personnel in the region, along with a large quantity of equipment. The 
tables below show the build-up during the final stage.
Royal Navy
• 5 January 91: RN Sea King MKIVs in theatre and operational.
• 15 January - 19 March 91: HMS Dulverton, Ledbury, Manchester, Exeter, Brave, 
Brilliant, Hecla, Bicester, Brecon, Brocklesby and RFA Bayleaf arrived on 
station.
Army
• 5 December 90: 1(BR) Armoured Division advance party arrived in theatre.
• 19 December 90: The main air move of 4th Brigade and divisional troops began.
• 11 January 91: Air Move of 1 (BR) Armoured Division completed.
• 18 January 91: Government announced the deployment of 1 Coldstream Guards to 
form PW guard force.
• 24 January 91: Government announced the deployment of 1 King’s Own Scottish 
Borderers and 1 Royal Highland Fusiliers to increase the PW force.
• 1 February 91: 1(BR) Armoured Division was declared as being operationally 
ready.
RAF
• 1 December 90: Ministerial approval for the deployment of a further 4 Puma and 
12 Chinook helicopters.
• 14-16 December 90: Tanker aircraft redeployed to Muharraq and King Khalid 
International Airport.
• 20 December 90-3 January 91: Ministerial approval for the deployment of a 
further 12 Tornado GRls to Dhahran all of which had arrived by 3 January 91.
• 14 January 91:6 Tornado 1 As deployed to Dhahran.
• 24 January 91: The Government announced the deployment of a half squadron of 
Buccaneers, which arrived in Muharraq by 28 January.
• 5 February 91: Ministerial approval for the deployment of Tornado GRls fitted 
with TIALD to Tabuk.
• 8 February 91: The Government announced the deployment of a further 6 
Buccaneers.
• 10 February 91: Tornado GRls (with TIALD) arrived in Tabuk and the 
Buccaneers arrived in Muharraq.135
The period between 29 November and the start of the Ground war at the end of 
February 1991 was characterised, therefore, by a significant continuous build-up of 
British forces in the Gulf region. Of particular importance was the immense logistical 
exercise undertaken to enable the tri-service elements to become operational. As Sir 
Patrick Hine stated: ‘The logistic outload required the use of an extensive sea tail, 
RAF air transport assets, and chartered civilian air cargo aircraft. The first ship sailed 
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on deployment for Operation Granby on 28 September and the last ship arrived on 15 
February’.136 Furthermore, the 1991 Defence White Paper highlighted that a total of 
400,000 tonnes of freight, including 80,000 tonnes of ammunition and some 15,000 
vehicles (of which 2,600 were armoured fighting vehicles) were transported to the 
Gulf. RAF transport aircraft carried most personnel as well as over 30,000 tonnes of 
freight, and the Royal Navy was able to utilise logistics arrangements that were 
already established in support of the Armilia operation.
It was during this third phase that the 1st (BR) Armoured Division was 
deployed and this in itself was a major undertaking. The units attached to the Division 
travelled to the Gulf between October 1990 and January 1991. Having been trained to 
fight in north-west Europe, a significant amount of preparation was required to 
prepare them for the new desert conditions. The fact that over 500,000 litres of fuel, 
50 tonnes of rations and 400,000 litres of water were required each day demonstrates 
the degree of logistical problems faced by the British forces, but Ihe numbers of 
personnel and equipment deployed also indicates the extent of the Government’s 
commitment to the region.137 The fact that a significant proportion of Britain’s armed 
forces had been put on a war footing within the space of a few months showed how 
crucial the Government considered the Gulf region to be.
Despite the extent of the logistical exercise, a number of important factors not 
only simplified matters for the British but also demonstrated the multilateral nature of 
the coalition. Of greatest importance was the high degree of host nation support 
Saudi Arabia not only offered the facilities at Jubayl (see map at Appendix 5), a vast, 
modem and little used port with full infrastructure, but also allowed Britain to use 
several of its modem military airfields, some of which were already used by Royal 
Saudi Air Force (RSAF) Tornados. In addition, British forces had access to free and 
unlimited supplies of Saudi Arabian fuel, accommodation, food, water and transport. 
A post-GW2 Defence Committee report claimed that without this support Britain 
would have been stretched to provide the logistic support required.138
Another important issue was the fact that most of the forces that had been 
designated for deployment out-of-area were excluded from Britain’s contribution, 
while forces rarely contemplated in such a role were included. The deployment of 4 
landing ships logistics (LSLs) and 18 Sea King helicopters meant that a significant 
part of the UK’s amphibious capability was in the Gulf. In addition 95 percent of the 
Royal Corps of Transport were deployed on operations in the Gulf, as were all of
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RAF Germany’s support helicopters. Furthermore, since Britain had committed a 
significant proportion of its forces to the Gulf, its ability to fulfil other commitments, 
particularly with regard to British forces in Germany, was seriously depleted. This 
factor not only highlights the level of importance that the British Government 
attached to the Gulf (as shown through the significant increase in its military 
presence), but also confirms that the end of the Cold War had contributed to tile 
perception that the threat had altered.
Britain's support for President Bush's invitation to Tariq Aziz (the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister) for talks in December 1990 was based upon the British 
government's perception that it needed to appear to "go the extra mile for peace". 
However, the Government was also opposed to the view that the talks be seen as 
conciliatory towards Iraq. For this reason, Douglas Hogg (the then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs) stressed that the purpose behind the talks should not be 
misunderstood. As he stated: ‘It is very important that there should be no 
misunderstanding of the nature or purpose of the talks ... [they are] to ensure that 
Saddam Hussein understands clearly that he must comply fully and unconditionally, 
with the ... resolutions; and that, if he does not do so, he faces the risk of being driven 
out of Kuwait by force’.139
In December, however, Saddam Hussein announced that all foreign hostages 
would be released. As a consequence the Government advised all British nationals to 
leave Iraq and Kuwait, but also stressed a thinning out in the other GCC States. This 
suggests that the Government still thought that there was the possibility of further 
invasion by Iraq.140 Apart from this one concession, which was welcomed by the 
Government, Iraq’s intransigence remained absolute and hostilities seemed 
increasingly probable, and when the deadline elapsed on 15 January 1991 Iraqi forces 
still occupied Kuwait. Indeed, as the Prime Minister John Major stated during the 15 
January (’91) debate on the Gulf, Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait had now 
increased to over 600,000 men, 4,000 tanks, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces.141
There are numerous accounts on the conduct of the war to free Kuwait and it 
is not intended to add to them here.142 However, a summary of the main points is 
provided for the purpose of further strengthening the contention that the Gulf region 
was of paramount importance to Britain. The campaign to free Kuwait began on the 
night of 16 January 1991, with full British participation. The initial objective was to 
weaken Iraq’s resolve to fight by attacking its military infrastructure. For over a 
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month, therefore, aircraft from coalition forces, (primarily US, British, French, Saudi 
Arabian and Syrian) attacked Iraq’s military capability including airfields, aircraft, 
missile sites, nuclear and chemical facilities and other military targets. As Prime 
Minister John Major was to stress to the House at the start of the air campaign, the ‘... 
instructions to our pilots and those of other airforces [are to] avoid causing civilian 
casualties’.143 It remained an objective of the Government throughout the war to show 
that, despite the inevitability of civilian casualties, everything was being done to 
minimise the risks.
The priority at this stage, therefore, was to engage and destroy military targets 
in Iraq and Kuwait through a massive air campaign. The declared purpose of this 
campaign was to ‘...make it impossible for Iraq over time to sustain its forces in 
Kuwait, which will then become far more vulnerable to attack from air and from 
land’.144 Air attacks against Iraq continued for over a month and as an increasing 
number of military targets were destroyed the weight of the campaign shifted to 
attacks on Iraq’s ground forces in and around Kuwait. Concern over the possibility of 
Israeli involvement in the war in response to Scud missile attacks on Israeli cities 
meant that the attempt to destroy Iraqi missile delivery systems remained an important 
objective. As Tom King stated: ‘We know why it has been done ... He wishes to draw 
Israel into the war in the hope of inflaming Arab opinion, breaking the multinational 
coalition and inciting a holy war’ and therefore ‘... the Scud missile clearly represents 
a challenge ...[and] we are making every effort to identify and destroy [them]’.145 Sir 
Patrick Hine also confirmed Saddam Hussein’s motives behind the Scud attacks on 
Israel:
... Saddam was trying to turn it into a holy war - a Jihad between the 
infidels and the Arab nations ... so it was very important that we 
exercised all possible pressure that we could on Israel to stay out of the 
conflict. We took a number of effective measures to contain the Scud 
threat. But I have no doubt that if one of those Scuds had landed in a 
city with a chemical warhead or had gone into a block of flats and ... 
killed 2 or 3 hundred Israelis then whatever the pressure Washington, 
and our own Prime Minister brought to bear would have not borne fruit 
and the Israelis would have entered the war.
Furthermore, although Sir Patrick Hine distinguished between the various members of 
the coalition, he also confirmed that Israel entering the war would have caused 
problems: ‘I don’t think Saudi Arabia would have dropped out of the coalition [but] I 
think it would have posed problems to other members of the coalition - certainly
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Syria (and] perhaps Egypt ... it would have been undoubtedly a complicating 
factor’.146
By the beginning of February 1991 over 30,000 sorties had been flown, with 
the result that air superiority was achieved, and this supremacy was indicated by the 
sudden departure of a hundred Iraqi aircraft to Iran. There was no sign of halting the 
air campaign at this stage however, since the coalition members continued to stress 
that the Iraqi military capacity was vast and that it would be some time before it was 
sufficiently reduced to enable the coalition to conduct a ground attack. It was in this 
connection, therefore, that further evidence of co-operation between Britain and the 
US became apparent. The British Government readily agreed to a US request to 
temporarily base its B52 bombers at RAF Fairford so that missions to attack Iraqi 
targets with conventional munitions could be undertaken.147
Even though the US dwarfed the British military contribution to the coalition, 
British forces had other important attributes that were welcomed by the Americans. 
One such contribution was the airfield denial weapon better known as the JP233. 
Furthermore, as Keohane stated, the British government ‘realised that the way to 
secure maximum influence in the US controlled operation was to contribute forces 
and weapons systems which matched those of the leading ally’.148 This contributed to 
decisions to deploy weapon systems such as the JP233, MCMVs and heavy armour as 
indicated by the provision of Challenger tanks. In addition, the Royal Navy continued 
to fulfil its role by contributing to the enforcement of sanctions, keeping the shipping 
lanes free from mines and, once the war began, participating in the destruction of 
numerous Iraqi naval patrol crafts.
During the air campaign British ground forces continued to be brought up to 
their final strength of 45,000 in preparation for the invasion of Iraq and Kuwait. On 
18 February British artillery was used for the first time in a limited engagement, the 
purpose of which was to prepare for the forthcoming ground campaign.149 During the 
long air campaign the British Tornado GR1 alone flew over 1,500 offensive sorties 
against Iraqi targets, whereas the Jaguar flew more than 600. The combined coalition 
air assault on Iraqi military targets was so extensive that by the start of the land 
campaign on 24 February 1991 ‘the morale and determination of the Iraqi forces was 
either severely eroded or shattered’.150 Consequently, the land campaign was short 
and decisive with the British 1st Armoured Division playing an important role, under 
the command of the 7th (US) Corps.
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The ground attack deliberately began in the way that the Iraqis appeared to be 
expecting. As Air Chief Marshal Hine stated, ‘Naval gunfire and amphibious feints 
from the Gulf, with frontal attacks through the defensive fortifications in southern 
Kuwait, were aimed at distracting Iraqi attention from the main thrust into eastern 
Iraq’.151 The 1991 Defence White Paper and Air Chief Marshal Hine have provided 
useful descriptions of Britain’s role during the brief ground campaign and therefore 
there is no intention to duplicate that here. Appendix 6, however, provides a useful 
impression of the 1st (British) Armoured Division’s advance eastwards towards 
Kuwait City. As Appendix 6 shows, by the time President Bush announced the 
ceasefire on 28 February 1991, the Division had advanced over 300 kilometres to 
reach the Basra road in Kuwait. As Keohane states: ‘Their success was in one sense 
demonstrated by taking 7,000 Iraqi prisoners of war and by the relatively low figure 
of 24 British military personnel losing their lives during the campaign.. ,’152
During the air campaign a proposal was put forward by the Austrian 
Representative to the Security Council to hold meetings in private. The US and 
Britain readily supported this in view of the exceptional circumstances brought about 
by the war and stressed that the “closed door meetings” would encourage effective 
discussion in the Council by ensuring that no mixed signals were sent to Baghdad.153 
During these meetings the various representatives set out their objectives and war 
aims. As Pickering (the US Representative to the Security Council) stated: ‘The 
objectives of the United States ... are clear and limited and are set out in the Security 
Council resolutions. They are the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the restoration of 
Kuwait’s legitimate government and the restoration of international peace and 
security’. Furthermore Sir David Hannay (the British Representative) stated: we 
are not seeking to bring about the destruction, occupation or dismemberment of Iraq 
or to decide who governs that country. We are seeking the liberation of Kuwait, no 
more no less. The military action will end as soon as the objectives laid down by the 
Council have been achieved’.154 Despite the closed nature of these meetings, the 
representatives failed to clarify what their post-war objectives were.
It was not until Kuwait had been liberated and the Security Council met to 
discuss the immediate post-war situation that the American Representative hinted at 
the destruction of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes as a possible 
post-war objective. However, reference to this particular objective at this stage was 
brief and the meeting merely resulted in the adoption of SCR 686. This resolution
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primarily dealt with issues concerning the immediate post-war period and referred to 
matters such as prisoners of war, the location of mines in Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq’s 
implementation of past resolutions, and the release of all third-country nationals.155
However, one brief statement by Pickering seemed to reveal the US’s ultimate 
objectives, as he commented that ‘Iraq must assist tire coalition in identifying the 
location of mines, booby traps, chemical and biological weapons...’.156 As the section 
above on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (see Section 4.2.2) showed, the British 
Government had also admitted at various stages during the crisis that the elimination 
of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was a coalition objective. The latest statement 
confirming this was made by John Major after the liberation of Kuwait on 28 
February 1991. He stated ‘Through the United Nations, we shall ... seek a 
commitment from Iraq to destroy, under international supervision, all its ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and not to acquire such weapons in the 
future’.157
The effect of this broadening of coalition objectives (referred to earlier - see 
endnotes 95 - 100) had important implications for the maintenance of a presence in 
the region. Numerous statements by British politicians had confirmed that their 
objectives were merely those set out in the UN resolutions; namely the liberation of 
Kuwait, the restoration of its legitimate government and the restoration of peace and 
security in the region (see Sir David Hannay’s statement above at endnote 145). Such 
statements, combined with the fact that Iraq had suffered an overwhelming military 
defeat, suggested that the coalition members would withdraw from the region. 
However, the final objective, the restoration of peace and security in the region, 
became subject to a degree of ambiguity based upon the premise that Saddam 
Hussein’s leadership was a source of instability and, therefore, security of the region 
became linked to his removal.
Hence the question of why the coalition forces failed to proceed to Baghdad 
and remove Saddam Hussein emerges. The official Government position on this issue 
was based upon the argument that the international coalition could only remain united 
if the Security Council Resolutions (particularly SCRs 660, 661 and 678) were 
adhered to, ‘precisely because they sought to reverse Iraq’s aggression, and not go 
beyond that’. A Government statement confirmed that ‘The coalition had no mandate 
to occupy Iraq or to remove the present regime. Such action might have broken the 
international consensus and involved the coalition in administering an occupied 
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country for an indefinite period’.158 In Sir Patrick Hine’s opinion Arab sensitivities 
were the prime factor behind the coalition’s decision not to remove Saddam Hussein. 
As he stated, ‘None of the Arab nations within the coalition set one foot inside Iraq. It 
was all done by Americans, British and the French. The Saudis may have been 
involved in attacks on airfields but they were not involved in any ground attack.. .they 
did not want any part of that and all the Arab forces went into Kuwait but none went 
on to Iraq’.159
In view of this, their reluctance to go on to remove Saddam Hussein is easy to 
understand. However, the fact that Britain and the US had begun to regard Saddam 
Hussein’s regime as a destabilising factor in the region still needed to be addressed. It 
was on this basis, therefore, that the coalition, with Britain playing a leading role, 
adopted SCR 687, which established a most intrusive set of rules on Iraq, designed to 
continue as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power (see Appendix 4). The 
protection of Iraq’s Kurdish population, the payment of reparations by Iraq to Kuwait 
and other States, and importantly the elimination of all its WMD programmes, meant 
that ‘Iraq was still subject to the control and supervision of the United Nations and 
thus to the coalition’160 through till the end of 1991.
Section 4: The question of Iraq’s WMD programmes and Britain’s role
Chapter 3 analysed the changing patterns of threats as perceived by the British 
Government during the period from the beginning of 1989 until August 1990. The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, chemical, 
and ballistic missiles (as a possible delivery system), amongst Third World States, 
including those in the Middle East, was established as one area for concern. For this 
reason, although the ceasefire resolution (SCR 687) dealt with a range of issues, this 
section concentrates in particular on the provisions that dealt with the elimination of 
Iraq’s WMD programmes. The regime set up with the authority to eliminate these 
programmes was one of the most intrusive in history, and it is in this light that a 
number of implications concerning the question of a continuing British role in the 
region become apparent.
That Britain played a leading role in establishing the intrusive regime designed 
to destroy Iraq’s weapons programmes is in no doubt. A March 1991 article in The 
Times indicated that the British Government was insisting, at the United Nations, that 
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a final end to hostilities in the Gulf should be conditional upon Iraq destroying its 
weapons of mass destruction. As the article stated: ‘A provision seeking the 
elimination of Iraq’s ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons is one of 
several points Britain is trying to insert in the next Security Council resolution’.161 
Furthermore, in the Government’s own words, ‘in shaping our policy towards the 
implementation of sanctions and ensuring the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction, we must take full account of Saddam Hussein’s despicable record. 
Following the end of hostilities, further Security Council resolutions, notably SCR 
687, have set out strict terms with which Iraq must comply. We are determined to 
ensure those terms are implemented in full’.162 Indeed, shortly after the adoption of 
the resolution Douglas Hurd confirmed to the House that Britain ‘.. .took a prominent 
part in the establishment, under Security Council resolution 687, of the Special 
Commission to ensure that Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and 
ballistic missile capabilities [were] destroyed’.163
During a personal interview Colonel Terence Taylor spoke of another factor 
which contributed to the high profile adopted by Britain with regard to the resolution:
Well we played a ... prominent role in the adoption of that resolution, 
along with of course the Americans, but I do remember the UK and the 
US being prominent - but Russia was also prominent at that time — you 
must remember that was the time of euphoria at the end of the Cold 
War. When I say Russia was prominent, at that time there was no real 
policy making going on in Moscow ... so diplomats were almost free­
wheeling at that stage [and] getting an agreement was practically easier 
than would otherwise have been ... with the Cold War coming to an 
end ... all sorts of things became possible which were not possible 
before and are not possible now. So the UK did play a prominent role 
and David Hannay, our Permanent Representative, was deeply 
involved in it and was a major part in brokering the words.164
Resolution 687 was adopted by the Security Council whilst acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, thus making the provisions mandatory. This meant that the 
Council was entitled to take appropriate action in order to enforce Iraqi compliance. 
The resolution banned Iraq’s possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
and all ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometres.165 The level of Council 
intrusiveness into Iraqi affairs was further demonstrated by the fact that the resolution 
also banned ‘research and development, production, use, testing, support, repair and 
maintenance of such weapons, their delivery means, all sub-components and 
associated equipment’ (see Appendix 4).166 In order to fulfil the objectives of SCR
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687 the Council established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSC) and 
charged it with the task of dismantling Iraq’s WMD programmes. Paragraph 11 of the 
resolution referred specifically to Iraq’s nuclear programme and the task of ensuring 
its compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (of which Iraq was a 
signatory) was given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In order to facilitate these tasks, the resolution also requested that the UN 
Secretary-General should develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and 
verification of Iraq’s compliance with the provisions. This in itself demonstrates that 
Iraq was to remain subject to UN (and coalition) control even after its weapons 
programmes were dismantled. In his report of 17 May 1991, the Secretary-General 
highlighted that a three-stage implementation process would be necessary. This would 
involve the gathering and assessment of information, the disposal of weapons and 
facilities, and finally the monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance in future.167
The first stage of the implementation process, the gathering and assessment of 
information, was critical for the success of the entire operation. In order to fulfil this 
role, very close co-operation by Iraqi authorities was necessary, so one of the 
provisions of SCR 687 was that Iraq, soon after the adoption of the resolution, should 
submit to the council a detailed declaration of all the items specified in paragraphs 8- 
12 of the resolution. This factor is of particular importance, since Iraq’s subsequent 
non-compliance and attempts to block the UNSC’s and IAEA’s operations meant that 
the United Nations, and ultimately coalition members including British personnel, 
remained in the region in order to fulfil their role of dismantling Iraq’s programmes. 
As Colonel Taylor stated:
when Iraq was required under 687 to give its declarations - it said we 
have no NB programmes, we have a limited chemical programme and 
here’s a bit of it, and we have a few missiles and here’s a bit of that, 
and this was supposed to be a full and final declaration. This was 
totally inadequate. If they had made a mildly credible declaration it 
would have been over in a year or two. They thought, rather naively, 
that they could hide their nuclear programme, which was found very 
quickly.168
During a personal interview David Kay (at the time of interviewing the Secretary 
General of the Uranium Institute in London who had also been an inspector attached 
to UNSCOM), supported the view that Iraq’s initial declaration to the Special 
Commission and the IAEA had been flawed. As regards their nuclear weapons, for 
example, the Iraqis claimed that they had no prohibited items, but the Special
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Commission and the IAEA knew this to be untrue because, as Kay stated, ‘they had 
declared before the Gulf War some items which had been covered by 687 ... the same 
thing was true in chemical, missiles and biologicals.’169 It was patently clear by June 
1991 that Iraq was involved in nuclear deception and as Richardson, the UK’s 
Permanent Representative stated at the time:
‘This Council created the Special Commission and ... gave it a very 
specific mandate, which was to locate and destroy all Iraq’s nuclear 
capable material, as well as its chemical and biological weapons, and 
all its ballistic missiles over a certain range ... In my delegation’s view 
... the message from this Council must be two-fold, that Iraq must 
never again obstruct the work of the Special Commission and of the 
IAEA, and secondly, that the Iraqi authorities at the highest appropriate 
level must be called upon to reaffirm their commitment to co-operate 
fully with the Special Commission and the IAEA, not just in word but 
deed’.170
As evidence has shown, Iraq’s intransigent stance continued throughout 1991. 
Nevertheless, the IAEA and the Special Commission continued in their attempts to 
identify elements of the various programmes and during the 6th IAEA on-site 
inspection the team obtained conclusive evidence that Iraq had a programme for 
developing an implosion-type nuclear weapon.171 The Commission achieved equal 
success in discovering and dismantling Iraq’s chemical weapons. As David Kay 
stated:
... certainly the most complete destruction has been in die chemical 
side. The Iraqis had technically made some really stupid things with 
regard to chemical weapons - they had mixed cocktails of gases - 
chemicals that no-one has ever done and there is nothing in the 
literature as to show the ways that the chemistries of these gases and 
liquids behave - so by the time the inspectors got there these things 
were starting to leak — they were terribly unstable and so the Iraqis 
declared an area called Muthana - and it [had] tens of thousands of 
chemical weapons in the site ... I think what happened [was] that the 
Iraqis knew they couldn’t hide them or move them and that they were 
more of a pain to them than anything else so they were turned over to 
the UN.172
It is beyond the remit of this thesis to analyse in detail the role of the Special 
Commission and the IAEA in dismantling Iraq’s programmes of mass destruction. 
Detailed analysis has been conducted elsewhere.173 However, the above points serve 
to highlight one very important factor, namely that Iraq refused on numerous 
occasions to co-operate with die demands of the Commission and the IAE A, thus 
failing to fulfil the provisions specified under Section C of SCR 687.
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The Commission’s inability to find Iraq’s biological weapons programme 
seemed to confirm the perception that Iraq was involved in deception. Both David 
Kay and Colonel Taylor confirmed that locating this particular programme proved to 
be very difficult. As Kay stated: ‘In the biological programme it’s a big zero. We 
found nothing despite the feet of really good information that they had something. It 
is probably because the biological programme is easier to disguise [and] the 
inspections on the biological phase got started later’.174 Furthermore as Colonel 
Taylor stated:
On the biological side, although we had some information, which was 
quite hard, but no evidence and even within the Commission people 
began to doubt us - it took us nearly 4 years to find the evidence and 
we plugged away and eventually we managed to pierce the 
concealment plan but it took an enormous amount of effort ... We 
broke the case in March 1995 and our work finally bore fruit.175
From this it is possible to see that during the period in question (the end of 1991) the 
Commission remained unsuccessful, largely due to Iraqi deception, in locating the 
biological programme. This did not, however, lessen the coalition members’ 
determination to ensure Iraqi compliance. Various Security Council Documents have 
highlighted the extent of this deception. Resolution 707, adopted on 15 August 1991, 
drew attention specifically to the question of Iraq’s failure to comply with SCR 687 
and demanded that Iraq ‘provide a full, final and complete disclosure ... of all aspects 
of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with 
a range greater than 150 kilometres ... [and] allow the Special Commission, the IAEA 
... unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, 
records, and means of transportation which they wish to inspect’.176
The British Representative highlighted the importance that the British 
Government placed on the work of the Special Commission and the IAEA during a 
speech made prior to the adoption of SCR 707:
We believe it is vital that the Special Commission and the [IAEA] 
should have all the powers they need to carry out their duties under 
[SCR 687] ... Iraq [has failed] to carry out all its obligations, and this 
applies with particular force to the question of weapons of mass 
destruction ... We now have confirmation that there was indeed a 
super-gun project. We now have confirmation that Iraq did indeed have 
a biological warfare research programme with an offensive capability. 
We have confirmation that Iraq held much greater stocks of chemical 
weapons than it had previously admitted. And finally, we have 
confirmation that it had separated plutonium from enriched uranium ...
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in breach of ... the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, of which Iraq is a signatory.177
It was inevitable, therefore, that the coalition members would continue to support the 
Commission’s mandate in Iraq. Indeed, as David Kay confirmed, the Security Council 
was closely involved with the Commission and further highlighted the central role 
played, in particular, by three of the permanent members, the US, Britain and France:
... overall during this initial period, really up to the end of 1991, the 
Secretary-General’s office itself really didn’t play a major role ... now 
it was probably because 687 [was] a unique resolution in the history of 
the Security Council in that it made the Special Commission a 
subsidiary organ of the Council, not the Secretariat and so this meant 
that the reporting linkage between the Council and the Special 
Commission was very direct.
Furthermore,
The US and the British were prepared to make the Special Commission 
authoritative for all areas and at most agreed that with regard to nuclear 
weapons the IAEA could provide, on request, special assistance and 
co-operation where necessary ... [and although] there was a flow of 
information between the P5 ... you’re really talking about the P3 - the 
Chinese never shared anything ... [and] the Russians too very seldom 
came forward with any information.178
The importance that the UK attached to the Special Commission’s functions was 
further indicated by the extensive degree of assistance provided. The Ministry of 
Defence provided significant technical equipment to aid the Commission’s work and 
out of the 19 UNSCOM missions in Iraq during 1991, the British Government 
provided military and civilian experts for 16. In addition the Government made 
available over £1 million during this initial period to pay for the provision of the 
practical support.
Ultimately Iraqi intransigence and non-co-operation meant that the Special 
Commission had to continue its activities in Iraq far beyond 1991. Indeed, as Colonel 
Taylor confirmed, the first two stages, namely, gathering and assessing information 
and the disposal of weapons and facilities were still continuing in 1998.180 Work for 
the third stage, that of establishing a regime for ongoing monitoring and verification 
of Iraqi compliance began in 1991, with the Secretary-General presenting a plan for 
this stage in August 1991. This envisaged the establishment of a regime to ensure that 
Iraq complied with ‘.. .its unconditional obligation not to use, retain, possess, develop, 
construct or otherwise acquire weapons or related items prohibited ... under Section C 
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of SCR 687’. In the event of a discovery of Iraqi non-compliance the Special 
Commission would also have the ‘right to call upon Iraq to halt the activity and to 
prevent its recurrence ...[and that] findings by the Special Commission that 
indicate[d] that Iraq [was] not in compliance with its obligations ...[would] be 
brought to the attention of the Security Council’.181
The Security Council subsequently approved this plan on 11 October 1991 
with the adoption of SCR 715. This particular resolution re-confirmed Iraq’s 
obligations under Section C of SCR 687 and specified that the Special Commission 
would have specific rights to carry out its future monitoring and verification activities 
(see Appendix 7). Appendix 7 also demonstrates that the provisions set out under the 
Secretary-General’s plan for the third stage, namely the future monitoring and 
verification, were envisaged to be as intrusive as the activities during the first two 
stages. This meant that long after the Special Commission had satisfied itself that 
Iraq’s weapons programmes had been dismantled, Iraq would continue to be subject 
to control by the UN and ultimately the coalition. Indeed, up until the end of 1991, 
namely the period being analysed here, Iraq continued to be subject to one of the most 
intrusive regimes ever established in the field of arms control and, as has been shown, 
the British government had constructed a perception that Iraq's weapons could 
constitute a continuing threat and this perhaps contributed to the decision to ensure 
that British personnel continued to play a role in UNSCOM.
Section 5: Britain’s economic interests
Chapter 2 examined the extent of Britain's economic interests in the GCC States 
during the period 1980-1988 and chapter 3 extended this analysis up to the moment of 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The analysis in these two chapters showed that there was 
indeed a bias towards economic factors within the discourse of the era and that during 
the 1980s Britain did actively seek to develop markets for its exports (including 
importantly, defence markets) among the various GCC States. The chapters also 
raised the question of whether British foreign policy was largely shaped by economics 
or whether the discourse has revealed alternative or multiple explanations. Thus far 
this chapter has considered some reasons behind Britain’s involvement in the Gulf 
since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and has shown it is not possible to 
conclude that economics shaped foreign policy. Rather it appears that British foreign 
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policy towards the region can be explained in light of multiple factors, all of which 
will be brought together in the conclusion. British engagement in the region was also 
manifest in different forms, ranging from the diplomatic to the political and military. 
Section 4.4 then extended the analysis till the end of 1991 and highlighted continuing 
British interest in the work of the Special Commission in dismantling Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction. This final section will now re-examine Britain's economic 
interests in the region and demonstrate that markets and other economic factors still 
feature prominently in the discourse during this period.
The end of fixe Cold War brought with it the notion that major military markets 
would begin to erode as Britain, along with other nations, sought to cash in on the so- 
called “peace-dividend”. Concern over weakening NATO markets, however, was 
offset by the belief that there would be a growth in the Middle East (and Far East) 
where British Aerospace Defence Systems (in particular) - now comprising British 
Aerospace (military aircraft), British Aerospace (Dynamics) and Royal Ordnance - 
had a vigorous presence.182
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 reinforced this view, as it was 
believed that the crisis could improve the prospects for British defence sales to the 
GCC States, particularly in light of the crucial Al Yamamah deal with Saudi Arabia. 
Negotiated between 1985 and 1988, with Mrs. Thatcher playing a leading role, phase 
1 of the contract had not only secured thousands of jobs in British Aerospace and 
other smaller defence companies but had also proved to be very lucrative financially 
(see chapter 2).183 Phase 2 of the contract had been due to start in 1988, but had been 
postponed by Saudi Arabia because of problems in keeping up with payments. The 
crisis in August 1990, however, led to the belief that with the embargo on Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti oil and the rise in oil prices due to the crisis, more money would be available 
to Saudi Arabia for weapons procurement.184 Similarly, it was believed that the other 
Gulf States, fearful of further Iraqi aggression, would also seek to upgrade their own 
armed forces.
Issues highlighted in chapter 2 were also relevant during this period, one of 
which was the competition between Western States. The Bush Administration’s plan 
to sell up to $23 billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia had the potential, by 
threatening the successful conclusion of phase 2 of the AI Yamamah deal, to replace 
Britain as Saudi Arabia’s leading arms supplier. Indeed, in an attempt to secure the 
contract the Bush Administration went so far as to relax the limits on the number of F-
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15s that Saudi Arabia could possess at any one time. The proposed US sale was to 
include F-15s, 400 Ml Tanks, 500 Bradley APCs, Patriot air defence systems, Stinger 
anti-aircraft missiles, thousands of lorries and jeeps, tonnes of ammunition and 
various construction and maintenance projects.185 In the event the Administration was 
faced, once again, with opposition from Israel and the powerful Jewish Lobby. 
Fearful of a divisive political conflict in the middle of the Gulf crisis, the Bush 
Administration capitulated and subsequently revised its offer to just over $3 billion 
worth of equipment.186
The American commitment to Desert Shield in support of Saudi Arabia and 
the other Gulf States was a cause for concern both to the British Government and the 
defence industry. As Cook claimed, the British concern was that, despite being 
unwilling to rely solely on one nation for its defence needs, there was a possibility 
that the Saudi Government might turn to the US in light of its massive contribution to 
the defence effort. Had this been the case, lucrative Anglo-Saudi defence contracts 
such as Al Yamamah, already on hold, might have been cancelled in favour of new 
supplies from the US. Could it be argued, therefore, as Cook argues, that this concern, 
namely to protect future defence (and other) markets in Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
States, was a contributory factor influencing the subsequent British decision to 
despatch troops and equipment to the region?187
The British decision to play a major role in the coalition did ultimately bring 
rewards, as it became apparent by the end of 1991 that phase 2 of Al Yamamah was 
progressing, with negotiations over questions such as types of equipment, payment 
and delivery times. The order was expected to be placed over a five-year period and to 
amount to over £10 billion. The latest contracts were expected to include the sale of 
up to 48 Tornados, 60 Hawk jet fighters, 40 Black Hawk Westland helicopters, 6 
minesweepers, air-to-air missiles and British involvement in the construction of a new 
airbase.188
This agreement with the Saudis was secured despite attempts by the 
permanent members of the Security Council to initiate talks on limiting arms to the 
Middle East after the Gulf War. The establishment of a United Nations arms register 
appeared to indicate that more open international dialogue was being promoted and 
that limits might finally be imposed on the arms trade. However, negotiations between 
the primary arms suppliers (who also happened to be the permanent Security Council 
members) collapsed following the US sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the 
244
second phase of Al Yamamah was finalised by John Major himself during a visit to 
the Far East and Persian Gulf early in 1993. As Hartung claims, both the US and 
British sales were economically motivated; indeed, in the British case, they were ‘sold 
to the ... public as economic windfalls that would save 19,000 jobs at ... British 
Aerospace ... and an additional 1,800 jobs at the Vickers plants in Leeds and 
Newcastle’. Hartung went on to claim that the latest deal with Saudi Arabia was not 
viewed as a short-term measure but rather as part of a long-term strategy: ‘British 
officials have revealed that Major closed the deal with the Saudis in part by dangling 
a promise of access to the next generation of European combat aircraft, the 
Eurofighter 2000, when it comes into production at the end of the decade’. Gribben 
also claimed that this phase of the deal was expected to maintain BAe’s income from 
Saudi Arabia at about £2 billion a year into the next century and strengthen Britain’s 
military links with the Kingdom and the region as a whole.190
In addition to the continuing negotiations with Saudi Arabia BAe, other 
British defence companies and British politicians were closely involved in attempting 
to secure defence (and other) contracts with the other GCC States. Companies such as 
Vickers, confident of the performance of the Challenger 2 tank during the Gulf War, 
competed with the American Abrams for contracts in Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates.191 Although the Kuwaitis finally chose the American Abrams over die 
Challenger 2, this is another example of the importance which the British placed on 
defence orders from the region. Indeed, Vickers succeeded in supplying the tank to 
Oman, which placed an order for 18 with an option for 18 more. The company also 
succeeded in securing a contract to supply over 250 Challenger 2 tanks to Saudi 
Arabia as part of the Al Yamamah deal.192
Even though the British lost the Kuwaiti tank order, it was apparent that 
Kuwait, in light of its recent Iraqi experience, was proposing to spend more than $10 
billion on arms procurement over the next decade. Contracts such as the supply of 
more than 200 Warrior armoured fighting vehicles by the British engineering group 
GKN showed that the Government continued to actively encourage the sale of 
defence equipment to the region.193
Other notable contract negotiations during this period included Vosper’s coup 
in securing the largest sale of warships for more than twenty years when Oman placed 
an order for two corvettes at the end of 1991. The order was deemed to be of vital 
importance for Vosper Thomycroft since the Royal Navy had recently postponed
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orders for seven minehunters. The sale of the corvettes to Oman and the supply of 
minehunters to Saudi Arabia (part of Al Yamamah) were both required by Vosper to 
bridge the gap before further Royal Navy orders emerged. This shows how important 
the Gulf markets remained for various segments of British defence industry.194
This section has demonstrated that any concerns that the end of the Cold War 
would erode military markets were unfounded. The GCC markets, for instance, 
remained buoyant and, as the discourse analysed in this section has shown, continued 
to benefit numerous segments of the British defence industry. The information 
presented here is important in the context of the statement of hypothesis established 
in chapter 1 which stated that Thatcherism, with its emphasis on economics and 
interests, provided a framework for British foreign policy towards the GCC States. In 
light of this, therefore, it is possible to assert that British interests in the GCC States, 
as highlighted in government discourse, and the ideational basis of Thatcherism are 
mutually constitutive. Linked to this is the perception that Britain's interests in the 
region may have been presented as a rationale for Britain's decision to go to war.
Conclusion
The material presented in this chapter is of particular importance given Britain’s 
desire to play a leading role following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The 
international response to the invasion was subject to US leadership both 
diplomatically and militarily. However, this chapter has deliberately shifted the focus 
of analysis to Britain and consequently there are a number of questions which emerge 
from analysing the discourse of this particular period. What conclusions can be drawn 
about British involvement during the crisis? What light does the analysis throw on the 
factors which influenced British policy during this period? And finally can anything 
be said about the constructivist approach, given that the analytical process is 
complete?
Taking the final question first, the constructivist method adopted for this thesis 
has revealed a number of factors which feature sufficiently prominently in the 
discourse to suggest that they may have been influential in British policy-making. The 
very existence of such a variety of possible explanations would seem to throw into 
question the validity of the hypothesis.
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Analysis of all the relevant periods has shown that the British government 
regarded the Gulf region as important, as have numerous statements by politicians 
such as Sir Richard Luce and comments by Lord Hurd and Sir Alan Munro. Both 
Lord Hurd and Sir Alan Munro went so far as to say that the Conservative 
government accorded greater importance to the region than the previous Labour 
government had. The possible reasons for this importance must therefore be 
examined. If one is to conclude that the region was crucial due to Britain’s economic 
interests in the GCC States then the hypothesis remains valid. However, this position 
would ignore for instance, Mrs. Thatcher’s personal image of the international system 
to which Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait seemed to conform. This chapter has shown that 
the British government attempted to play a leading role in the diplomatic process 
aimed at forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait In light of this, therefore, could one 
argue that the crisis provided a rationale for Mrs. Thatcher to play a “warrior role”, 
and construct the perception that despite being relegated to a power of the second rank 
Britain was still able to play an international role.
The case study has shown that elements within government discourse have 
pointed to the geo-strategic importance of the region based on, for instance, Britain's 
continuing reliance on GCC crude oil. The question that needs to be asked is to what 
extent the British government considered it as a threat if Saddam Hussein had been 
allowed to remain in Kuwait, especially in light of the possibility that Iraq would then 
have had access to Kuwait's vast oil reserves and enormous overseas (including 
British) financial investments. Sir Alan Parsons, for instance, claimed that Saddam 
Hussein would have been able to open up an alternative route to the Gulf by by­
passing the Shatt-al Arab and rendering irrelevant the question of whether it should be 
controlled by Iran or Iraq. Did the British government therefore perhaps see the 
invasion of Kuwait as a first step in an attempt to control the rich Arab States? 
Furthermore, the location of the Gulf region on the southern flank of NATO led to the 
possibility that a crisis there could have had destabilising effects on southern NATO 
States. Despite falling defence budgets, as this chapter has shown, numerous 
Command Papers argued that British defence planning had to take into consideration 
continuing uncertainties, such as any danger arising from instability in the Soviet 
Union and also the need to respond to threats to British interests outside the NATO 
area.
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The chapter has also shown that it is possible that the British government felt 
it had a historical commitment to the Gulf States as demonstrated through the 
longstanding Treaties of Friendship (see Appendix 1). Related to this was the view 
that the GCC States were perhaps beginning to be viewed as important for Britain’s 
European partners as well. This was indicated by the developing negotiations between 
the EC and GCC over the establishment of a free trade agreement.
Numerous elements in the discourse have also pointed to Britain’s interest in 
the newly strengthened United Nations as another factor that may have influenced 
British policy. There was the perception that the United Nations had finally 
succeeded in presenting a unified front to the international community. Its first real 
test in the post-Cold War period was therefore crucial if it was to retain any degree of 
credibility and as a permanent member of the Security Council it may be supposed 
that contributing to this would have been in Britain’s interests. Related to this issue 
was the possibility that British threat perceptions had altered in light of the 
improvement in relations between Western States and the Soviet Union. With the 
Soviet Union increasingly willing to co-operate, Britain was able to play a more 
prominent role in international affairs, including in particular the United Nations. 
Both Nicholls and Keohane have been quoted in the chapter as supporting the view 
that the crisis provided Britain with the opportunity to play an important role in the 
revived United Nations, thereby ensuring that it was well placed to strengthen its own 
position as a permanent member of the Security Council. In his comments on the role 
of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Nicholls 
stressed some variation in possible reasons for British action, since the MOD saw the 
war as a way of alleviating the detrimental effects on the British military brought 
about by the Options for Change process whereas the FCO was particularly keen to 
play a more prominent role in the United Nations.
Although the thesis has acknowledged that the primary actor in the Persian 
Gulf during the period 1979-1991 was the US it has nevertheless provided a powerful 
argument stressing that the British also attempted to play a major role in the region. It 
is in this light, therefore, that an analysis of Britain’s military relationship with the 
United States vis-à-vis the Gulf War must be viewed. The British Government 
remained mindful of the so-called “special relationship” and sought to enhance it. 
However, could it be argued that Britain felt that there was a need to retain a voice 
over the deployment of their own troops in what had rapidly become a US-led 
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military operation? Did the way in which the 1st (BR) Armoured Division was formed 
demonstrate the importance that the British Government attached to its desire to retain 
some degree of independence within an American led operation? And if so, was this 
desire to appear independent an attempt to appeal to the GCC’s concerns of over­
reliance on the US? None of these questions can be answered definitively, however; 
they all feature in the discourse and therefore feed into a general interpretation of 
factors which may have had some influence on British foreign policy towards the 
region.
Discourse has also shown that the British government was concerned with the 
possibility that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to the general 
stability of the region. As has been demonstrated, for instance, the government was 
aware that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the past and believed that it continued 
to develop and store them. This issue was dealt with in chapter 3 but analysed here in 
the context of the role played by Britain in the adoption of Section C of Resolution 
687. In light of intelligence briefings, and the fact that Iraq had used chemical 
weapons, it appears that the British Government had already begun to regard Iraq as a 
threat to the stability of the region. One factor which has featured in statements by 
numerous politicians, including Tom King and Douglas Hurd (during his interview) 
has been Britain’s desire to ensure that once removed from Kuwait, Iraq should not be 
allowed to reconstitute its various weapons programmes. Mrs. Thatcher’s own 
statement on 7 November 1990: ‘Britain and others have argued that Iraq’s chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons capability must be eliminated’, amongst statements 
by other politicians such as Hurd, also indicate this direction in British policy.
Attention was also focused on the question of Britain’s military presence in 
the Persian Gulf during this period. Britain’s military contribution, although dwarfed 
by the US, was nevertheless significant at around 45,000 tri-service personnel and 
large quantities of equipment. This was a sizeable contribution and itself seems to 
demonstrate that the Government perceived vital interests, whether economic, 
strengthening the special relationship, or dismantling Iraq’s weapons programmes, to 
be at stake. The various factors identified in this chapter seem to therefore invalidate 
the hypothesis to some extent.
However, the chapter has also conducted an analysis of post-war defence sales 
to the GCC States and has demonstrated that the government discourse continued to 
be concerned with the search for and maintenance of markets for British defence
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products. The search for defence contracts amongst these States showed that military 
co-operation between allies on the ground had quickly transformed into intense 
economic competition as the US, Britain and France took advantage of GCC fears for 
their own security. The Anglo-Saudi Al Yamamah deal and the US F-15 sale to Saudi 
Arabia were just two examples which epitomised the view that, despite attempts to 
curb arms sales to the region, economic interests cannot be discounted in the search 
for explanations for British foreign policy. What this means for the hypothesis and the 
general question on the factors influencing British policy and the role played by 
constructivism in the analysis is now the subject of the final conclusion.
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Conclusion
Constructivists such as Albert Yee have stated that 'the inability of ... neorealism ... 
ultimately to skirt the cognitive complexity of decision making by utilising some form of 
rationality assumption has led many analysts of international relations to rediscover the 
importance of ideas and beliefs in policy making'.1 Others such as Ted Hopf have 
adopted the notion of "power" as a lens and distinguished between neorealism and 
neoliberalism which regard material power as the 'single most important source of 
influence ... in global politics' and constructivism's emphasis on discursive power which 
he defines as the 'power of knowledge, ideas, culture, and language'.2 It is in this light 
that this thesis has sought to carry out a constructivist assessment of the extent to which 
economic factors influenced British foreign policy towards the GCC States during the 
period 1979-1991, referred to in the thesis as the "Thatcher era".3
The importance that the constructivist approach places on the role of discursive 
power therefore formed a basis for the hypothesis established in chapter 1 which took as 
its starting foundation the notion that “Thatcherism” was a belief system dominated by 
ideas of economics, incentives and interests, which in turn were based on materialism. 
Consequently, this thesis has attempted to show the extent to which the discourse of the 
era was itself dominated by Thatcherite ideas and it is in this context that the statement of 
hypothesis claimed that the central elements of Thatcherism, based upon an image of 
economic interests, created a framework for approaching foreign policy, and that the 
nature of British foreign policy towards the GCC States during the Thatcher era was 
constructed by the positivist discourse of economic interests.
Chapter 1 also discussed the reasons behind the adoption of constructivism as a 
basis for the analysis by comparing its core assumptions with rationalist theories such as 
neo-realism. The de-socialised view of rationalist theories which regard interests, 
identities and material structures as exogenous and given irrespective of time and space 
was criticised on the grounds that constructivism views international relations to be 
socially constructed through the interplay of ideational as well as material structures. It 
argues that reality is socially constructed by identity, a system of meanings, the 
assumptions of the actors themselves, and indeed by the analyst’s linguistic interpretation 
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of social phenomena. Constructivism, therefore, places great importance on ideational 
structures and argues that systems of shared ideas, values and beliefs can have structural 
characteristics, which can exert a powerful influence on social and political action. 
Viewing Thatcherism as a belief system based upon economic imagery therefore relates 
closely to the ideational basis of constructivist thought
Material structures are not dismissed by constructivists, however, since they argue 
that they do play a role in shaping behaviour, alongside ideational structures, but from a 
constructivist standpoint it remains the system of meaning which defines how actors 
interpret their material environment. For constructivists, therefore, individuals are social 
beings whose interactions involve subjectivity and interpretations, where meaning is 
created through the process of human understanding of the material world. It is in this 
context, therefore, that the hypothesis refers to the connection between the structural 
characteristics of Thatcherism as a system of ideas and values based upon material 
economic interests and a foreign policy constructed by the positivist discourse of 
economic interests based upon materialism.
The questions which emerge, therefore, are how prominent economic factors were 
in the discourse of the Thatcher era and what role these perceived economic interests 
played in the context of British foreign policy towards the GCC States? Is it possible to 
argue that Britain had objective definable material interests in the GCC States or are other 
non-material factors equally or more important when attempting to explain policy? In 
order to address this issue the case study has suggested the possibility that economic 
interests did indeed dominate the discourse as it related to the GCC States.
Linked to this issue is the constitutive question of how the British government 
constructed its economic interests in the GCC States. An analysis of government 
discourse in chapter 2 highlighted that Britain's continuing reliance on GCC crude oil led 
to the construction by the Conservatives of the view that the Persian Gulf region was of 
significant geo-strategic importance which the government could ill afford to ignore. The 
chapter also highlighted that this view may have been reinforced by the government's 
perception of the GCC States as markets to which British products could be exported in 
order to provide one means of alleviating problems brought on by economic recession. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the discourse has shown that significant elements within the 
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government believed that recessionary trends were damaging Britain's manufacturing 
base, and therefore there was a perception that Britain had to export more to counteract 
some of the effects of the decline.
The discourse also showed that elements within the government believed that one 
area of manufacturing industry in particular provided an opportunity to demonstrate its 
seriousness with regard to reversing Britain's economic decline. The subsequent emphasis 
on defence exports would seem to confirm that the Government believed, although there 
had been an absolute decline in British manufacturing capabilities, that the defence 
industry had proved to be much more resilient. Increasing the sale of defence equipment 
to overseas customers did appear to pay dividends, and arguments such as supporting 
employment, significant contributions to the balance of payments and large economies of 
scale were used to justify the Government's desire to take advantage of these possibilities.
An analysis of the Government's defence procurement policies further supported 
the premise that defence exports featured increasingly in the Government's export drive. 
Since defence expenditure was accounting for an ever-increasing proportion of the 
defence budget the early 1980s saw a major attempt to secure better value for money 
when procuring defence equipment for the armed forces. The government believed 
prospective equipment needed to be made more saleable abroad, thereby assisting the 
defence industry to be less reliant on the MOD for its market and profits. Explicit 
statements by numerous key politicians such as Douglas Hurd (as Minister of State for 
the FCO) and Michael Heseltine (when he was Defence Secretary) seem to confirm the 
government’s support for the export of defence equipment. It is in this light, therefore, 
that the role played by certain factors in assisting the development of defence exports 
appears to gain importance.
Chapter 2 used the points raised above (amongst others) to demonstrate how the 
government constructed its position on both the importance of the GCC States and on the 
question of exporting in order to alleviate some of effects of the recession. Further 
analysis of the construction of British interests in the GCC was then based upon a 
consideration of these markets themselves, and British exports to Oman, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia were examined. One perception was that numerous events at the start of the 
1980s had contributed to raising levels of instability in the Persian Gulf region, and this 
263
may have contributed to the GCC States giving increasing priority to their own defence 
capabilities. In light of Government statements which supported not only the formation of 
the GCC, but also actively confirmed that stability in the region was a major British 
concern, it is understandable therefore that the British Government sought to export 
defence equipment to these states. In addition to securing numerous defence-related 
contracts in Oman and Kuwait, civilian industries such as construction, electronics and 
mining (to name but a few) were also actively involved.
Saudi Arabia, in particular, featured prominently in the discourse and could be 
seen as a crucial market since its defence purchases were based upon a multiple sources 
policy. Although the Kingdom had traditionally been heavily reliant on the US for the 
bulk of its defence needs, certain political considerations, highlighted in the chapter, may 
have contributed to its becoming increasingly disillusioned with that relationship. Since 
there was the intense competition between Western suppliers for arms sales, issues such 
as the perceived tensions in US-Saudi relations meant that other smaller suppliers such as 
Britain could capitalise and secure sizeable contracts for themselves. Indeed, contracts 
such as Al Yamamah demonstrated how high the stakes could be with early estimates of 
£5bn going up to £10bn, prompting the belief that British-Saudi defence relations would 
be sealed well into the next century.
The analysis of the relevance of economic factors within Thatcherite discourse 
continued into chapter 3, which considered the period between 1988 and July 1990. As 
the chapter highlighted, the Gulf region continued to feature in the discourse as the 
Government and various defence companies such as British Aerospace continued in their 
search for lucrative contracts. The strengthening of the close contacts between Britain 
and the GCC States reinforced the belief that these States were natural markets for British 
products and that it was therefore seen as necessary to continue to build upon the success 
achieved earlier in the 1980s. Various individuals such as Tim Sainsbury claimed that the 
Thatcher government continued to place a high degree of importance on the success of 
Britain's defence exports and that therefore the securing of important contracts such as 
phase 2 of Al Yamamah was being actively encouraged.
Indeed, even though, in light of reduced East-West tension, there was an 
opportunity to reallocate resources previously earmarked for defence to civilian purposes, 
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elements in the discourse suggested that the government was resisting this, particularly 
given its past successes in the field of defence sales. For instance, as the chapter showed, 
various politicians such as Alan Clark regarded it as absurd that the most successful parts 
of British industry should be forced to desist from what they did best. The impression 
created by the discourse was that the government continued to encourage the export of 
defence equipment with direct help continuing to be provided by DESO, alongside the 
establishment of defence fairs in potential customer areas such as the GCC States through 
the utilisation of Service Attachés and the use of companies such as IMS, the commercial 
arm of the Ministry of Defence.
Another impression created by the discourse related to the position of Saudi 
Arabia as a significant market. The Saudi decision to purchase the Black Hawk helicopter 
from Westland, for instance, although it did not alleviate Westland's long term problems, 
suggested that markets such as those of the GCC States were of some importance. In 
addition, though not on the same scale as British exports to Saudi Arabia, trade with the 
other GCC States was not insignificant. Oman in particular appeared to be a prominent 
feature in British defence plans for the region. Not only did Britain continue to provide 
the Sultanate with defence equipment, but also, since high-ranking British officers were 
prominently located in the state’s armed forces, the links between the two countries even 
became part of Oman's national defence strategy. This issue receives further attention in 
due course.
Although chapter 4 was mainly concerned with an analysis of the political, 
diplomatic and military contribution made by Britain to solving the Gulf Crisis brought 
on by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, a section of the chapter was nevertheless 
devoted to a brief summary of Britain’s economic links with the key GCC States. This 
section showed that exports continued to feature in the discourse, and that the GCC States 
were still perceived as markets. There was also a possibility that the Gulf War was seen 
as providing an opportunity to further British defence sales to the region.
This then represents a brief summary of some of the key economic issues featured 
in the discourse of the era and reported in the case study. It shows how the government 
constructed its interests in the GCC states and the portrayal of Thatcherism as a belief 
system based upon material economic interests demonstrates the emphasis placed on 
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ideational structures by constructivist thought. In addition to this, constructivism's 
acceptance of the significance of material structures as factors which, together with 
ideational structures, influence foreign policy decisions explains the relevance of 
identifying the GCC States as natural markets for British exports. Adopting the 
constructivist approach, therefore, has enabled the case study to demonstrate that foreign 
policy decisions are the product of a lengthy intersubjective process involving the 
prominence of ideas and the creation of identities. This endogenous characteristic of 
foreign policy making whereby actors enter into dynamic social relationships stands in 
clear contrast to the portrayal by mainstream theories such as neo-realism of interests and 
identities as being fixed and given irrespective of time and space, since the constructivist 
approach adopted by this thesis has shown that identities are far from fixed. Both Lord 
Douglas Hurd and Sir Alan Munro, for instance, talked of a shift in policy towards the 
Gulf region with the arrival of the Thatcher Administration in 1979 whereby the GCC 
States were accorded greater importance than previously, and the strengthening of the 
identities of these states as important markets for Britain reinforces the constructivist 
connection between identities and interests. The question now is whether, in light of the 
analysis, it is possible to endorse the view that British foreign policy towards the GCC 
States was indeed constructed, as the hypothesis states, by objective definable economic 
interests. On the surface economic emphasis and imagery appears to dominate the 
discourse and in light of this it is possible to offer validity to the statement of hypothesis 
that Thatcherism did indeed create a framework for foreign policy and that British 
foreign policy towards the GCC States was shaped by the positivist discourse of 
economic interests.
Having said this, however, two further questions emerge. Firstly, does the analyst 
have a role in the construction of conclusions and if so, what is this role? Secondly, does 
constructivism as an approach allow for the identification of alternative explanations? 
Chapter 1 highlighted the distinctions between rationalist theories such as neo-realism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism and interpretive approaches such as post-modernism and 
critical theory. The chapter also showed that the earlier debates between the rationalists 
and critical theorists revolved around an interpretive challenge of the methodological, 
epistemological and ontological foundations of rationalist theories and a rationalist 
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accusation that interpretive theories were unable to say anything about “real world” 
international relations.
Constructivism remains part of a family of theories, including post-modernism 
and critical theory, which have rejected attempts at hegemonic empirically verifiable 
truth statements. In light of this can it be argued that to say the case study has "proved" 
that objective and verifiable economic interests were responsible for the formation of 
British foreign policy towards the GCC States is just such a truth statement and therefore 
the product of an empirically based process of validation and falsification? Can it be 
argued that the case study has revealed the underlying "reality" of the nature of British 
foreign policy towards these Gulf States? What is of particular relevance here is 
constructivism’s ability to span positivist and post-positivist frameworks and thus lay 
claim to the so-called “middle ground” between rationalist and interpretive approaches 
(see chapter 1 section 1).
It is this occupation of the middle ground which has enabled constructivism to 
push purely reflective approaches such as early critical theory away from meta- 
theoretical critique to an empirical analysis of world politics while simultaneously 
challenging the rationalist and positivist view that by adopting the scientific method it is 
possible to conclude that objective and empirically verifiable truth statements do exist. It 
is in this light, therefore, that the contribution of constructivism to this thesis needs to be 
viewed. Having its roots in critical theory provide it with reflective and interpretive 
credentials, while its emphasis on analysing core issues in international relations has 
meant that constructivism has indeed “emerged as a significant force in empirical 
research”.4
Whereas positivist theories seek to explain reality by emphasising empiricist 
observation, where the analyst is able to detach him/herself from the analytical process, 
post-positivism appears more concerned with "understanding" and the analyst is assumed 
to be part of the process. Can the analyst throw any light on what Thatcherite discourse 
has revealed? The case study has been based upon an extensive range of relevant research 
material which has formed the basis of the discourse. The analysis of the complete 
Official Record (1979-1992), extensive examination of Select Committee Reports and 
United Nations documents, interviews with numerous officials, and a detailed 
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investigation of relevant press files and other secondary sources can perhaps be deemed 
to be a significant body of literature from which to draw the conclusion that economic 
interests did indeed shape British foreign policy towards the GCC States. However, 
although this discourse has been dominated by economic factors, the analyst has been 
able to identify alternative explanations which have also formed part of the language of 
the era. It therefore becomes possible to dispute elements of the statement of hypothesis, 
and also apparent that to claim that economic interests could have shaped British foreign 
policy towards the GCC States exclusively would be insufficient Indeed, though they do 
not appear to feature as prominently within the discourse, numerous factors which seek to 
provide alternative explanations for policy have been identified.
In view of the importance placed upon discourse by the constructivist approach 
any conclusions that the analyst draws must stem from the language of the era itself, and 
therefore a deconstruction of the research material would inevitably reveal the existence 
of alternative explanations, thereby demonstrating that this observation is in line with 
post-positivist emphasis on the plurality of world views. What, therefore, are the 
alternative factors this analysis has revealed? What significance is attached, for example, 
to Mrs. Thatcher's desire to play a "warrior role" and enable Britain to demonstrate it still 
had a part to play at the international level? Another factor worthy of attention, as 
highlighted by David Nicholls' comments and numerous elements within the Official 
Record and Select Committee Reports, was the possibility of a British interest in the 
revived United Nations. In light of the increasing levels of co-operation with the Soviet 
Union the British Government may well have come to the conclusion that it could play a 
more prominent role in the international system.
Furthermore, Britain's historical connection with the Gulf States through 
agreements such as the Treaties of Friendship could also have been elements influencing 
British foreign policy (see Appendix 1). For instance, Britain's connection with Oman 
was strengthened by the fact that Britain had had loan service personnel actually 
integrated into the Omani armed forces well before the arrival of the Thatcher 
Administration, as well as during the period of the case study, and this would seem 
indicate the importance of historical connections. Geo-strategic factors such as threats to 
the vast oil reserves of the region may also have featured in British foreign policy and, as 
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the case study has demonstrated, British threat perceptions during the period in question 
were seen to be based upon the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, the emergence of a 
fundamentally hostile regime in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
since they were all factors which had the potential to endanger the general stability of the 
region.
Finally, it has also been claimed that following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Britain 
remained mindful of the so-called special relationship with the US and sought to enhance 
it. Mrs. Thatcher's earlier support for the US decision to establish a rapid deployment 
force by agreeing to lease the islands of Diego Garcia to the Americans can perhaps also 
be seen in this context rather than claiming that it was because Britain wanted to 
safeguard its economic interests. Other factors such as concern over Iraq's proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, the maintenance of a military presence in the region in the 
form of the Armilia Patrol and the sizeable military contribution to the US led coalition 
forces massed against Iraq in 1991 may show that the British government was indeed 
concerned about the stability of the geo-strategically important Persian Gulf region, but 
the central question is whether these factors in themselves prove that Britain's concern 
was due to its economic interests in the GCC States.
Beyond its emphasis on discourse the constructivist approach has been invaluable 
due to factors such as its position on ideas. Constructivism is clearly ideational in the 
sense that constructivists argue that ideas can influence the behaviour of units, just as 
neo-realists argue that structural anarchy constrains the behaviour of states in the 
international system. This central proposition has, therefore, been instrumental in aiding 
both the establishment of the hypothesis and in testing it. Constructivism, however, is 
able to go beyond theories such as neo-realism in its acceptance of the premise that 
material structures also play a role. This crucial difference has allowed the analyst here to 
reflect on both the ideational influence of Thatcherism and the question of British 
material interests. Ideational power may have been distinguished from material power, 
but the hypothesis, in accordance with the central proposition of the constructivist 
approach, has not ignored material issues.
Two final questions remain, namely how useful has the constructivist approach 
been in helping to shape conclusions and what role does the analyst have in drawing 
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these conclusions. Beyond its emphasis on discourse the constructivist approach has been 
invaluable due to factors such as its position on ideas. Constructivism is clearly ideational 
in the sense that constructivists argue that ideas can influence the behaviour of units, just 
as neo-realists argue that structural anarchy constrains the behaviour of states in the 
international system. This central proposition has, therefore, been instrumental in aiding 
both the establishment of the hypothesis and in testing it. Constructivism, however, is 
able to go beyond theories such as neo-realism in its acceptance of the premise that 
material structures also play a role. This crucial difference has allowed the analyst here to 
reflect on both the ideational influence of Thatcherism and the question of British 
material interests. Ideational power may have been distinguished from material power, 
but the hypothesis, in accordance with the central proposition of the constructivist 
approach, has not ignored material issues. Constructivism's emphasis on discourse and 
ideas remains valid in that the conclusions drawn here are inherent within the language of 
the era. An analysis of that language has revealed that economic factors dominated 
Thatcherite discourse but at the same time a further deconstruction would reveal the 
existence of a plurality of explanations. Positivist theories such as neo-realism would not 
be able to yield satisfactory results given their rigid empiricist foundations based upon 
the observation, falsification and verification of the scientific method and claims that 
there is an objective truth. Constructivism's positivist and post-positivist credentials allow 
empirical analysis while at the same time enabling the analyst to reflect on the 
conclusions drawn.
Finally the analyst’s opinions cannot be ignored given post-positivist emphasis on 
reflection and the close connection between the so-called observer and the observed. In 
light of this the analyst concludes that this thesis has been as much about the impressions 
gained from the discourse as it has been about determining the extent of economic 
influence on Thatcherite policy towards the GCC States. The linguistic element of the 
discourse has not only taken on added importance but has revealed a most important 
observation, namely, the high level of economic imagery prevalent in the discourse. On 
this basis Thatcherism has to be considered in terms of the ideational construct of 
Britain's economic and global decline and with this belief system propounding a vision of 
a challenging external environment arising from the new problems of the 1980s, it is
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understandable that Britain reconsidered its foreign policy options and ultimately played 
a prominent role in the region. In view of the perceived strategic and economic 
importance of the region combined with the perceptions of threats the Government could 
not, therefore, if it was to remain consistent with the ideational construct of Thatcherism, 
have considered any options but to safeguard its interests in the GCC States. Having said 
this, however, the analyst has found it difficult to claim unqualified support for the 
hypothesis given that though the case study may have shown that material interests were 
prominent in the discourse, they were still only one element in a host of contributory 
factors which may have influenced the formation of policy. Therefore, to state that 
economics shaped British foreign policy towards the GCC States exclusively would be 
short-sighted.
Notes
1 Yee, op.cit., p.69.
2 Hopf, op.cit., p. 177.
3 The entire period of study has been referred to as the “Thatcher era” even though Mrs. Thatcher 
had been removed from office prior to the end of the analytical period.
4 See chapter 1, endnote 60.
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Appendix 1: Defence treaties and other links with the GCC States
Qatar: Treaty of Friendship, allowing for close consultation in time of 
need, signed in 1971 and renewed in 1981. No specific military 
commitments - but British officers were on loan in an advisory 
capacity
Saudi Arabia: No formal defence commitments but defence relations were
extremely close. Saudi Arabia was the UK’s largest defence 
sales market and there was a high degree of military 
assistance in the form of student training and British military 
personnel were on loan in an advisory capacity.
UAE: Limited but friendly defence relations. Treaty of Friendship 
signed in 1971, renewed in 1981. Loan Service personnel 
based in Dubai.
Bahrain: Treaty of Friendship signed in 1971, renewed in 1981. Close 
military consultation though no specific military 
commitments.
Kuwait: Friendly defence relations but no commitments to provide 
direct military support. The 1961 Military Assistance 
Agreement was abrogated in 1968. However, the Kuwait 
Liaison Team, which was set up in 1964 and manned by 
seconded British military personnel continued its role of 
training indigenous armed forces.
Oman: Long standing and close defence relations, which include 
more extensive co-operation than any other GCC State. Loan 
Service personnel filled key appointments in the Sultan’s 
Armed Forces.
[Source: ‘UK/Gulf States Defence Agreements’, Memorandum from the FCO to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 February 1988]
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Appendix 2: United Nations Security Council Resolutions: adopted in response to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait - Source: Hansard, vol. 177.
Resolution Brief Description
661-2 August 1990 Condemned the invasion and called for 
immediate and unconditional Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait
661 - 6 August 1990 Mandatory sanctions imposed on Iraq
662 - 9 August 1990 Specified that the Iraqi annexation of 
Kuwait was illegal and therefore null and 
void.
664 - 18 August 1990 Reaffirmed the rights of third state 
nationals and their rights to leave
665 — 25 August 1990 Authorised measures to halt shipping in 
order to inspect and verify cargoes
666- 13 September 1990 Established a system to permit food 
imports to Iraq and Kuwait in 
humanitarian circumstances
667 - 16 September 1990 Condemned Iraqi attacks against 
diplomatic premises
669 - 24 September 1990 Called on the Sanctions Committee to 
consider requests for economic 
assistance under article 50 of the UN 
Charter
670 - 25 September 1990 Measures to tighten air embargo and 






RESOLUTION 678 (1990) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting 
on 29 November 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling, and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August (1990), 661 (1990) 
of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 
(1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 
September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 
1990,674 (1990) of 29 October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990.
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its 
obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent 
relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council,
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for 
the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent 
relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one 
final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless 
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, 
the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement 
resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in 
pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;
4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on 
the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present 
resolution;
Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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Appendix 4: Relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 adopted 
in 3 April 1991
The Security Council....
7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligation under the Geneva 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 
and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on the Their 
Destruction, of 10 April 1972;
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or 
rendering harmless under international supervision, of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stockpiles of agents and all related 
subsystems and components and all research, development, support and 
manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major 
parts, and repair and production facilities;
7. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:
9.
(i) The forming if a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site 
inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on 
Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the 
Special Commission itself;
10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, 
construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and 
requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to 
develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s 
compliance with this paragraph ...
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear 
weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any 
research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to 
submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the [IAEA] within fifteen 
days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, 
and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable- 
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materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the [IAEA], with 
the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan 
of the Secretary-General ... to accept urgent on-site inspection and destruction, 
removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to 
accept the plan ... for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its 
compliance with these undertakings;
13. Requests the Director-General of the [IAEA], through the Secretary-General, 
with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission as provided for in the 
plan of the Secretary-General ... to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s 
nuclear capabilities based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional 
locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan ... calling for the destruction, 
removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate for all items listed in paragraph 12 
above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security 
Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the 
future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with paragraph 12 
above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency’s 
verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant 
nuclear activities in Iraq ...
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Appendix 5: Map of Persian Gulf Region
Key
1 - Jordan 2 - Israel 3 - Lebanon 4 - Kuwait 5 - Qatar
6 - Bahrain 7 - Muharraq 8 - Red Sea 9 - UAE
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Appendix 6 — Progress of 1st (British) Armoured Division towards Kuwait City
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Appendix 7
Special Commission rights under Resolution 715, adopted on 11 October 1991.
• To designated for inspection any site, facility, activity, material or other items in 
Iraq;
• To inspect, at any time ... any site or facility declared by Iraq or designated by the 
Special Commission;
• To inspect, at any time ... any activity, material, or other item at any site or 
facility, including any material or other item in movement;
• To inspect any number of declared or designated sites or facilities simultaneously 
or sequentially
• To designate for aerial overflight any area, location, site or facility in Iraq;
• To carry out, at any time ... aerial overflight ... of any area, location, site or 
facility designated by the Special Commission;
• To carry out, at any time ... all such other flights ... as it deems necessary.
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